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Summary
Vicarious pain responses represent the ability to mirror the physical pain of others on
our own bodies, a phenomenon that has been linked to individual dierences in multi-
sensory processing and empathic traits. There is considerable inter-individual variability
in the quality of the pain felt and previous research individuated two groups of people,
constituting about 30% of the population, that consciously report feeling the physical
pain of others on their own bodies. The two groups are distinguished by the quality
of the pain felt: one group reports localised and sensorial qualities (S/L group) whilst
the other one reports generalised and aective qualities (A/G group). Vicarious pain
perception is intrinsically linked to the body and evidence suggests that dierences in
bodily phenotypes shape the sensorial and/or aective perception of pain. This thesis
further investigated both exteroceptive and interoceptive bodily processes which may
be linked to the dierent qualities of vicarious pain experience.
The rst three studies of this thesis tested the prediction that vicarious pain respon-
ders may have greater bodily malleability and a general tendency to treat all other bodies
vi
as related to themselves. The central paradigm used in these studies was the rubber hand
illusion (RHI), a measure of how much participants are predisposed to feel that an ex-
traneous body part (i.e. a dummy hand) belongs to them. Article I demonstrated that
sensory-localised vicarious pain responders (S/L) perform atypically on the task and are
more susceptible to the illusion in the asynchronous and light conditions. Article II fur-
ther explored why the RHI is not disrupted by asynchrony in the S/L group by applying
models of Bayesian sensory inference which explain greater susceptibility to RHI illu-
sion through stronger precision of certain sensory modalities (e.g. vision, touch). The
Enfacement Illusion (EI) was also employed in this study as a second paradigm in order
to further clarify the role of proprioception in bodily awareness. The overall results re-
conrmed that S/L responders perceive asynchrony as synchrony, mainly because they
rely more on rhythmic expectations and are more susceptible to proprioceptive impre-
cision.
Article III further addressed the tendency of vicarious pain responders to identify
with others, but this time at a social-cognitive level. It employed a series of empathy
questionnaires and a self-other association task. The results of vicarious pain respon-
ders were comparable to controls on most measures. There were no dierences in the
social self-other association task and neither on other measures of cognitive empathy
such as perspective taking or social skills. Notably, both sensory and aective aspects
of vicarious pain were associated with higher emotional contagion and reactivity but
not with higher levels of personal distress suggesting that they may have better emo-
tional regulation. Article IV further investigated the results of Article III by recording
physiological reactivity including skin conductance, blood pressure and heart rate vari-
ability (HRV) (a measure of emotion regulation) in vicarious pain responders as well
as interoceptive processing. The ndings showed that the aective-general responders
have lower interoceptive accuracy whilst the sensory-localised responders have higher
emotion regulation. They provided evidence for dierences in interoceptive accuracy
and emotion regulation which distinguished between the sensory and aective groups.
Taken together, the ndings of this thesis further characterise bodily and self-other
processes in vicarious pain responders and provide substantial evidence for dierences
in the exteroceptive domain associated with the sensory quality of vicarious pain and
dierences in the interoceptive domain associated with the aective quality of pain.
vii
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1Introduction
1.1 Vicarious pain perception
Some people experience the physical pain of others on their own body. As neurologist
Joel Salinas confesses: ‘I distinctly recall one patient who in the setting of signicant
stress developed new self-mutilating tics. Watching him chew on the esh of the right
side of his face while grinding his teeth with all his force, I felt a painful buzzing run
through the left side of my face and mouth that was so vivid that it bordered on hallu-
cination. It was as if a stun gun was pressed against my face and triggered with each of
his tics. The more forcefully he pushed, the more vivid the pain.’ (Salinas, 2017).
Mirroring the physical pain of others on one’s own body is an exceptional and in-
triguing ability identied only in a small proportion of the general population. So, why
do these people feel the pain so intensely in their own body and how would this pain
inuence their behaviour or connection with the injured person or with other people?
Some of these questions have been partially addressed, some are still waiting for an
answer and this thesis will further investigate this phenomenon.
1.1.1 Vicarious pain perception: a general overview.
Vicarious pain perception represents the ability to experience the physical pain of others
as one’s own (Giummarra and Bradshaw, 2008; De Vignemont and Jacob, 2012; De Vignemont,
2014). This phenomenon has been referred to as mirror-pain or synaesthesia for pain
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since stimulation in the visual domain (i.e. seeing someone in physical pain) elicits a
painful, somatic sensation in the observer (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010b).
The rst anectodal evidence of vicarious pain or synaesthesia for pain was docu-
mented in a patient with allodynia, a condition in which non-painful stimuli are per-
ceived as painful, and, according to the patient’s wife reports, he would feel pain when
seeing her hurting herself but not when being told about an incident that she had suered
(Bradshaw and Mattingley, 2001). Interestingly, some of our participants classied as vi-
carious pain responders would report feeling localised pain when hearing about someone
being in pain. For instance, participant AS reported feeling pain in her tooth when she
was told the story of someone else suering from a tooth infection. In line with these ob-
servations, the denition given by Giummarra and Bradshaw (2008) to pain synaesthesia
was: ‘the sensation in one part of the body (pain) produced by stimulus (pain) observed
or imagined in another’. Synaesthesia for pain has been intensively documented in am-
putees who reported pain in their phantom limb or stump when seeing or thinking about
someone else being in pain or when observing activities associated with pain (N.B. vicari-
ous pain is dierent from phantom limb pain since it is always and exclusively triggered
by somebody else’s physical pain) (Giummarra et al., 2006), but also in women follow-
ing traumatic childbirth (Giummarra and Bradshaw, 2008). Taken together, these cases
seemed to indicate that vicarious pain was preceded by a traumatic painful experience
or a chronic painful condition leading to heightened pain sensitisation. Particularly, the
high incidence of synaesthesia for pain in amputees, present in approximately 16.2% of
the cases, seemed to indicate that this phenomenon was somehow acquired (Fitzgibbon
et al., 2010a; Goller et al., 2013). However, a study conducted by Osborn and Derbyshire
(2010) recorded somatic responses to others’ physical pain in the general population and
about one third of their sample, whom they termed responders, reported vicarious pain.
Their sample was relatively small; the authors screened 108 participants, 31 reporting a
bodily feeling of pain when watching images of injured people. Moreover, their selection
criteria were arbitrary. The authors used a mix of pictures and videos of injured people
followed by a series of questions which asked participants to describe their experience
and anyone who reported at least one pain experience was considered a pain responder.
Subsequently, they invited a very small sample of 10 responders and 10 matched con-
trols to take part in an imaging experiment where they observed signicantly greater
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activation in responders than in non-responders in both sensory and insular cortices,
two brain regions associated with both emotional and sensory pain processing.
Grice-Jackson et al. (2017a) further characterized vicarious pain responders by di-
viding them into two groups based on the qualities of the somatic pain reported when
witnessing pain. They followed a more systematic approach to identifying pain respon-
ders. Firstly, they screened a much larger sample (over 500 participants) and used a
structured questionnaire (the Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ)). The VPQ presented
videos of people suering from accidents or having injections for greater authenticity of
the experience and used a two-step cluster analysis on the questionnaire data to separ-
ate vicarious pain responders from non-responders. Importantly, they also distinguished
between the quality of the pain felt, resulting in two clusters of responders: one sensory-
localised and one aective-general one (for a more detailed explanation of the VPQ, see
sections 1.1.2 and 2.3.2). Interestingly, the two groups summed up represented about
28% of the sample, a result similar to the one previously reported by Osborn and Derby-
shire (2010). Nevertheless, the cluster analysis becomes more precise and conservative
when the database is larger (Yim and Ramdeen, 2015) and the research conducted as
part of this thesis addresses this issue by running the analysis on a much larger sample
size (1000+) and by conducting a test-retest reliability analysis of the questionnaire (see
section 2.4.1).
In the next sections, the theories and mechanisms of vicarious pain will be further
explored. This phenomenon will be referred to as vicarious pain perception and the
individuals manifesting it as vicarious pain responders. This is because the term syn-
aesthesia for pain has not been consistently used and because it is still under debate if
mirror sensations are truly synesthetic. On one hand, these phenomenon ts well the
denition of synaesthetic experiences, namely that stimulation in one sensory domain
(i.e. sensory-visual) elicits an involuntarily response in a dierent domain (i.e. sensory-
somatic) (Ward and Banissy, 2015). On the other hand, there are a series of dierences
between other synesthetic conditions (e.g. grapheme-colour synaesthesia) and mirrored
pain or touch sensations. These include the lack of idiosyncrasy in mirrored-sensory
responses (the pain felt by individuals with mirror touch or pain has similar character-
istics), the higher incidence in these populations (over 20% compared to 1-2%), and its
dependency on the social context which makes them more similar to socially contagious
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phenomena such as laughter (Provine, 1992), yawning (Provine, 1989; Platek et al., 2004),
and itching (Ward et al., 2013) (for a more detailed account see Rothen and Meier (2013)).
1.1.2 Vicarious pain questionnaire and qualities of vicarious
pain.
Dierent bodily reactions may be triggered when witnessing the physical pain of others
(Giummarra et al., 2015). As such, two main qualities of vicarious pain have been dis-
tinguished: sensorial and aective. Grice-Jackson et al. (2017a) developed the Vicarious
Pain Questionnaire (VPQ), a measure tailored to dierentiate between sensorial and af-
fective qualities of vicarious pain. This measure presents participants with 16 10s-long
videos which depict people experiencing physical pain such as accidents or injuries and
questions the observer about any bodily felt pain sensations including pain intensity,
localisation and other qualitative attributes. The bodily localisation of the pain may be
localised to a certain body part the same or a dierent one or generalised to the entire
body. The bodily pain felt may be described using sensorial adjectives such as ‘tingling’,
‘burning’, ‘stinging’ or aective adjectives such as ‘nauseating’, ‘gruelling’, ‘aversive’.
Using a two-step cluster analysis on the recorded answers, three distinct groups are iden-
tied: 1) non-responders or controls (who report no pain when watching a video with
someone else experiencing physical pain), 2) sensory-localised responders (S/L) (who
report a localised feeling of pain at the same location as the person in the video and
tend to use sensory descriptors) and 3) aective-general responders (A/G) (who report
a generalised and emotional feeling of pain).
The questionnaire has been used since its development to identify the three groups
and signicant structural and functional brain dierences prove their validity. Structural
brain analyses indicated increased grey matter density in the insular and somatosensory
cortices and decreased grey matter density in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ)
in both groups of vicarious pain responders when compared to controls (Grice-Jackson
et al., 2017a). Functional analyses indicated enhanced coupling between the rTPJ and the
bilateral insula (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017b). This study employed a restrictive sample
size, but greater than the one in Osborn and Derbyshire (2010) study (14 A/G, 18 S/L, 30
controls, compared to 10 responders and 10 non-responders), the results obtained being
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Figure 1.1: An example of an accident video presented in the VPQ and a series of questions as-
sessing various qualities of pain such as intensity and localisation.
comparable to the previous study.
This thesis will employ the VPQ and it will further address its reliability by conduct-
ing test-retest analyses and explore the dierences and characteristics of the two groups
of vicarious pain responders previously identied and characterised by Grice-Jackson
et al. (2017a). Its focus will be on bodily-self representations in these groups in relation
to others.
1.2 Theories of vicarious pain perception.
1.2.1 Core trauma and chronic pain as precursors for vicarious
pain.
Fitzgibbon et al. (2010b) propose that vicarious pain perception develops following pain-
ful events and/or medical conditions such as traumatic injuries or chronic pain. Accord-
ing to the authors, exposure to traumatic injuries or chronic pain may lead to an atypical
processing of physical pain due to: a) central sensitization of spinal cord bres resulting
in neuropathic pain; b) hypervigilance to pain cues; c) disinhibition of mirror system for
pain.
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Figure 1.2: A schematic representation of Fitzgibbon and colleagues model of vicarious pain.
Taken from Fitzgibbon et al. (2010b).
Within the model’s framework, central sensitisation occurs as an adaptive mechan-
ism following exposure to intense pain experiences, leading to lower pain thresholds and
to enhanced focus on potentially threatening stimuli (Rollman et al., 2004). Additionally,
it can be inuenced by cognitive, emotional, and attentional processes such hypervigil-
ance to pain cues (Zusman, 2002). Attention to painful cues can also modulate perceived
intensity of pain and neuronal activity in brain pain matrix regions (Mu et al., 2008; Gu
and Han, 2007). For instance, participants rated pictures depicting pain as more pain-
ful when asked to attend to the pain rather than distracting elements such as number
of hands in the pictures and higher activity in response to them was recorded in the
ACC and paracingulate cortex. Moreover, ACC response activity was also modulated
by stimuli’ veracity, being increased in response to pictures depicting real hands rather
than cartoons (Gu and Han, 2007).
All these dierent processes may interact and result in the acquired experience of
vicarious pain. The disinhibition of the mirror system would occur as a consequence of
central sensitisation to pain and to the selective attention towards pain cues and it would
primarily facilitate the vicarious pain experience by overcoming the given threshold for
pain awareness. This disinhibition would manifest in areas of the pain matrix including
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the thalamus, anterior and posterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex, premotor cortex,
supplementary motor area, and somatosensory cortices (for a meta-analysis, see Lamm
et al. (2011)). Importantly, seeing someone else in pain activates neural circuitry involved
in the physical perception of pain (Singer et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2006). Thus, vicarious
pain would correspond to a heightened sensitivity in brain’s pain matrix responding to
both self and other’s pain.
Interestingly, the specicity of the pain matrix has been recently questioned. Vari-
ous studies have indicated that non-nociceptive stimuli can elicit responses in the pain
matrix and that the correlation between pain intensity and the magnitude of the neur-
onal response can be disrupted (Mouraux and Iannetti, 2009; Iannetti et al., 2008; Treede,
2003). Mouraux et al. (2011) identied multimodal responses in the “pain matrix” to sa-
lient non-nociceptive stimuli. The magnitude of multimodal responses correlated sig-
nicantly with the perceived saliency of the stimulus and it was determined by stimu-
lus’ task relevance, indicating an interplay between bottom-up and top-down cognitive
processes. The various types of stimuli (i.e. nociceptive, somatosensory, auditory, and
visual) triggered haemodynamic responses in the insula, S2, and ACC indicating that
these regions, particularly the ACC, are involved in evaluating a stimulus and the op-
portune action in response to it, regardless of its nociceptive nature (Mouraux et al., 2011;
Iannetti and Mouraux, 2010). Other studies have shown that the magnitude of ERPs in
response to painful stimuli did not correlate with the pain intensity elicited by a second
or a third stimulus delivered at a constant inter-stimulus interval. This suggests that,
in the absence of the ‘surprise element’ of a rst stimulus, there is a reduction in the
neuronal response in the “pain matrix” most likely related to the fact that the repeated
stimulus is both less novel and less unpredictable (Iannetti et al., 2008). Therefore, the
activation of the pain matrix seems to be triggered by the saliency of a stimulus which
is dened by how much the stimulus contrasts with its surroundings rather than its
sensorial qualities (Fecteau and Munoz, 2006; Knudsen, 2007). The saliency hypothesis
provides a model which can explain various ndings in the empathy for pain research
such as the “pain” responses to watching a noxious stimulus delivered to another in-
dividual or watching a cue indicating the delivery of such a stimulus (in particular to
someone we care about (Singer et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2006), to watching a menacing
stimulus such as a needle approaching the hand (Cheng et al., 2007), or experiencing
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social rejection (Eisenberger et al., 2003). These stimuli do not activate nociceptors but
have a high saliency content. Regarding vicarious pain responses, the increased activity
in regions associated with the pain matrix (e.g. somatosensory and insular cortices) may
denote either a higher sensitivity to real or imagined pain or a higher attention to salient
cues (pain specic or not). Further research which is beyond the scope of this thesis is
needed to elucidate these claims.
In brief, this model proposes that pain experiences cause disinhibition of mirror activ-
ity encountered in the pain matrix, resulting in vicarious pain experiences. The model
emulates well on the numerous documented cases of vicarious pain responders in am-
putees (Giummarra et al., 2006), after traumatic labour (Giummarra and Bradshaw, 2008),
including on ndings showing more intensive vicarious pain activity in the pain mat-
rix in chronic backpain patients (Vachon-Presseau et al., 2013). Nevertheless, it presents
vicarious pain as an acquired disturbance. As such, it is not sucient since it cannot
account for the entire picture, namely that vicarious pain responses have been recorded
in the general population in the absence of previous pain traumatic incidents and that
not all people that experience traumatic incidents develop vicarious pain.
Notably, the core of this theory, namely the disinhibition or, in other words, over-
excitability of the mirror neuron system overlapping the pain matrix system, has been
proposed as a central mechanism by others schools of thought which extended it to more
general mirroring mechanisms related to the sensorial and phenomenological bodily self
(see De Vignemont (2013) for an overview).
1.2.2 Enhanced mirroring activity in vicarious pain perception.
Mirror neurons were rst discovered in studies performing single-cell recordings in the
F5 area of the ventral premotor cortex in macaque monkeys (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). It was
observed that these neurons red when the macaque performed a specic action but also
when it observed the action being performed by another macaque or the experimenter.
Subsequently, mirror neurons were identied in humans, fMRI studies revealing activ-
ations in brain regions such as Broca’s area and premotor cortex when actions were
performed by the participants or simply observed (Buccino et al., 2004). These ndings
evidentiated the existence of a mirror neuron system (MNS) displaying matching brain
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activity in the action execution and observation and localised to premotor and inferior
parietal cortices (Molenberghs et al., 2016). Importantly, mirror-motor activity has been
recorded at a neuronal level but also muscular level suggesting that it can inuence mo-
tor behaviour (Fadiga et al., 2005) and that it can have implications for mimicry and
action-understanding. This activity reaches only subthreshold levels, but it is sucient
to inuence behavioural responses. For example, in an imitation-inhibition task, parti-
cipant’s reaction times are signicantly inuenced by the match or mismatch between
the nger movement they are instructed to perform and nger movement that they ob-
serve on the screen. If the movement of the nger that they observe is incongruent to
the one that they are asked to perform (i.e. seeing the right index nger being lifted
and instructed to lift the right middle nger) their reactions times are larger (Brass et al.,
2001). Another example is represented by facial mimicry where capturing the other’s
emotional state is mediated by the accuracy of facial imitation (Braadbaart et al., 2014).
Thus, MNS is believed to be involved in covertly imitating other’s goal-directed actions
which would lead to their better understanding and to empathic responses in the ob-
server (Buccino et al., 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2002; Fadiga et al., 2005).
The mirror motor activity was the rst to be discovered but subsequent research
indicated that mirroring processes are not conned exclusively to actions. Mirroring
neuronal activity was recorded in response to observed touch (Keysers et al., 2004) and
pain (Jackson et al., 2006) in another individual providing supporting evidence for the
presence of shared cortical networks for vicarious sensations. For instance, the same
neuronal pain matrix including both sensory and motor regions of the cortex becomes
active when seeing that someone else is in pain or when the pain is self-inicted (Jackson
et al., 2005). The activation recorded in cortical networks in response to sensorial or mo-
tor observations would constitute the substrate for shared emotional states between self
and others rooted in bodily and neuronal responses (Gallese, 2003). As such, vicarious
pain sensations have been linked to shared self-other representations and empathetic
responses (Singer et al., 2009). Moreover, according to certain accounts, these shared
representations imply a correspondence between body parts and neuronal networks fa-
cilitating the mapping of the other’s physical states onto one’s own and leading to a
greater understanding of the other (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). This approach aligns
with theories of embodied cognition (Niedenthal et al., 2005) sustaining that cognitive
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representations are rooted in bodily states and neuronal mirroring systems.
A more detailed account of the shared self-other representations in vicarious pain
perception from both a bodily and aective perspective will be given in section 3 which
will also constitute the focus of this thesis.
1.2.3 Mirroring activity and activation of simulation
mechanisms in vicarious pain perception.
Sensory and motor neuronal activation analogous to mirror neuron activation occurs
when someone imagines the sensorial experience of another (Gallese, 2003). Decety and
Grèzes (2006) underline the importance of simulation for social functioning since the
individual does not rely purely on the environmental cues and the proximal reality but
generates internal representations of the world and others’ states. Thus, simulating the
physical pain of another person may result in a spectrum of sensations translated in the
great variability of the quality of the pain described based in interindividual dierences
and prior experiences. Interestingly, this simulation may occur at an overt level when
the individual is aware of his/her intention to simulate and has a specic aim (pragmatic
simulation) or at a covert level when it happens spontaneously, and the individual is not
aware of his/her intention to simulate (Decety and Grèzes, 2006). The spontaneity of the
experience seems to be crucial for vicarious pain perception since there is no report of
active simulation of the pain observed. For instance, when climbers are asked to imagine
a dicult climbing route, they recall the route and activate a motor, embodied simulation
of that memory more than novices (Pezzulo et al., 2010). This process occurs spontan-
eously and depends on prior experiences, its manifestation being stronger if preceded
by training or great exposure to the specic stimuli. Analogously, both imagined and
observed sensory experiences correlate with somatosensory activation (Schmidt et al.,
2014; Ebisch et al., 2008) and pain induced through suggestion presents similar patterns
of activation as physically felt pain (Derbyshire et al., 2009; Patterson and Jensen, 2003).
Extrapolating to our sub-group of the population, it has already been shown that mir-
ror pain responders display greater somatosensory activation when witnessing someone
else in pain (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a) and, possibly, they would display it when asked
to recall or imagine oneself or others being subject to painful sensory stimuli. These
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speculations are also in line with the rst theory emphasising the importance of prior ex-
posure to trauma and chronic pain in VPP and directly linked to the ‘mirroring activity’
with the mention that it emphasises the act of imagining rather than simply observing.
In conclusion, the exact mechanisms of vicarious pain perception are far from being
understood. The interpretations of this phenomenon vary covering proposals such as
sensitization to pain following an accident or chronic condition, disinhibition of mirror
neurons, and increased imaginative and simulation abilities. These various theories seem
to complement each other and are likely to be interlinked. Regardless of the exact cause,
the manifestations of vicarious pain seem to be inherently related to bodily self and
other mechanisms. This thesis will focus on understanding the link between vicarious
pain perception and self-other representations and dierentiation from both a bodily
and an aective point of view.
1.3 Shared self-other representations in vicarious
pain responders: the link with empathy.
The ability to mirror the physical pain of others has been attributed to shared self-other
representations manifested as corresponding automatic and somatic responses in the
observer (Preston and De Waal, 2002) and underpinned by co-activation in neuronal
networks underlying embodied phenomena such as the somatosensory and insular cor-
tices (Keysers et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004). This ability (to co-represent the others’
feelings) has been linked to empathy (De Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Lockwood, 2016)
which was considered to rely primarily on mirroring activity of both sensory and motor
manifestations (Rizzolatti et al., 2002; Fadiga et al., 2005). Thus, the identication with
the other’s state has been regarded as fundamental for empathetic responses dened as
the capacity to share and understand the emotional states of the others (Gallese, 2003).
However, theoreticians have drawn attention upon the fact that the transition between
feeling and understanding the other’s state is not self-explanatory and does not occur
spontaneously. Sharing the immediate feeling of the other’s state also called emotional
contagion is considered a precursor of empathy but not a sucient condition for it to
occur (Bird and Viding, 2014). Bernhardt and Singer (2012) refer to three main aspects
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of empathy: aective empathy (i.e. emotional contagion), cognitive empathy theory of
mind (ToM) or perspective taking and compassion, the action to alleviate other’s suf-
fering. As such, the aective aspect of empathy is a crucial process which allows re-
cognising and simulating others’ emotional states, but it does not necessarily require a
cognitive understanding of these states. A widely accepted model states that empathy
for pain involves coactivations in networks outside of the pain matrix and other than
aective and/or sensory including regions associated with self-other regulation. These
networks are mainly associated with perspective taking in terms of both self-other ori-
entation and bodily location and networks associated with social cognition extracting
the salient information available in the environment (Bird and Viding, 2014; Decety,
2011).
In their model of empathy, Bird and Viding (2014) address the importance of self-
other regulation and propose a more sophisticated mechanism in which the distinction
between self and other is constantly maintained. According to the authors, ‘for em-
pathy to have occurred, the requirements for emotional contagion have to be met, and
in addition the perceiver has to explicitly ‘tag’ their aective state as being experienced
by the other.’ (Bird and Viding (2014), p.521). They emphasise the crucial role of self-
other switch responsible for self-other regulation and constantly changing perspective
from self to other and vice-versa. The default state of the self-other switch is the self
so, in specic social situations, the switch engages in an active process that suppresses
self-perspective and enhances the other perspective. The self-other switch relies on the
interplay between two systems: a) the Theory of Mind system which represents the
ability to understand the mental states of others and its main neuronal substrates are
represented by the temporoparietal junction, medial prefrontal cortex and precuneus
(Frith and Frith, 2006) and b) the Aective Representation System which encodes the
current aective state of the self and its main neuronal substrates are the insular and an-
terior cingulate cortex (Craig, 2002; Critchley et al., 2004). Thus, this control mechanism
actively modulates the focus of attention towards other people whilst suppressing the
self-focus or sustains the focus of attention on the self in the detriment of others. Fur-
ther evidence has indicated that balanced self-other representations play a crucial role in
the processing of other’s emotional states and social interactions. For instance, training
the ability to regulate self-other representations in the motor domain has been linked
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to more pronounced physiological and subjective responses to observation of pain in
others (de Guzman et al., 2016).
The principal brain region acting as a switch between the self and others is con-
sidered to be the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) (Bird and Viding, 2014). There
is a fair amount of evidence supporting the involvement of this region in various psy-
chological tasks which need attention to be switched between self and other including
the egocentric bias (Silani et al., 2013), perspective taking (Mazzarella et al., 2013), motor
imitation-inhibition (Santiesteban et al., 2015), bodily ownership and location (Tsakiris
et al., 2008). In our samples of vicarious pain responders, structural and functional dier-
ences have been identied in regions other than the ones responsible for somatosensory
mirroring which included the rTPJ (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a). Considering the sensory
and neuronal particularities of vicarious pain responders as well as their ability to liter-
ally feel what the other feels within the self-other regulation model, it may be speculated
that vicarious pain responders have a tendency to actively inhibit the self and enhance
the other.
A similar speculation has been formulated in a subgroup of the population charac-
terised by vicarious tactile responses, namely Mirror Touch Synaesthetes (MTS). The
Self-Other Theory (Ward and Banissy, 2015) has been formulated based on ndings in-
dicating dierences in parietal (i.e. decreased grey matter density in rTPJ) and prefrontal
regions (i.e. reduced grey matter in mPFC) (Holle et al., 2013) which have been mainly as-
sociated with perspective taking and Theory-of-Mind (ToM) processes (Frith and Frith,
2006). The Self-Other Theory refers to impairments in the ability to distinguish and
control between self and other and evidence has shown that MTS have diculties in
inhibiting the other and enhancing the self but not vice-versa (Santiesteban et al., 2015).
These particularities may be manifested in the socio-cognitive domain, in the control
of self and other actions or experiences, and in bodily self-other representations. How-
ever, this overlap cannot be complete since this would pose serious problems to normal
functioning (Bird and Viding, 2014). Notably, MTS and sensory-localised vicarious pain
responders tend to co-occur, albeit with MTS being rarer (Ward et al., 2018), and some
people have collectively referred to them as mirror-sensory synaesthesia (Ward and Ban-
issy, 2015).
Altogether, there is a fair amount of evidence showing that particularities in shared
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self-other representations are linked to vicarious tactile perceptions and that this sys-
tem plays an important role in vicarious pain perception. Particularities in the self-other
system may tap into dierences in both bodily self-other representations as well as af-
fective and cognitive shared representations which will be separately discussed in the
next sections and constitute the focus of this thesis.
1.3.1 Shared bodily representations in vicarious pain perception.
The existence of mirroring mechanisms for both sensorial experiences and motor actions
paved the way towards dening shared bodily dimensions between self and other. Fur-
thermore, it has been suggested that knowledge about one’s own body would be used to
decode the other’s perception and actions and that correspondence between body parts
as well as cortical regions of activity would be an immutable condition for vicarious
experiences as if the observer would map the subject onto one’s self (Goldenberg and
Karnath, 2006). Findings of studies looking at vicarious responses to pain seem to sup-
port this proposal. For instance, muscle-specic inhibited motor-evoked potentials were
recorded when a participant observed someone else’s hand or foot being penetrated by a
needle. These responses occurred in the muscle that corresponded to the one being pen-
etrated and were modulated by sensory but not aective qualities of pain (Avenanti et al.,
2005). Moreover, observation of pain in others induces motor responses which are inu-
enced by congruency of body parts as well as a generalised body excitability response
(Avenanti et al., 2009). Regarding cortical mapping of pain, somatosensory-evoked po-
tentials are selectively modulated by pain intensity indicating that pain responses are
encoded onto the somatotopically organised region of the primary somatosensory cor-
tex which extracts sensorial features of pain such as localisation and intensity (Bufalari
et al., 2007). This evidence suggests that shared representations between self and other
are encoded in bodily terms and that vicarious pain is embodied. This is in agreement
with the idea that pain is inexorably linked to the spatial structure of the body and its
mapping aects body movements and posture. The brain networks where physical pain
is processed including somatosensory, insular, and parietal projections provide specially
organised tactile representations and encode bodily tactile locations providing the sub-
strate for special orientated responses to pain (Haggard et al., 2013).
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Vicarious pain is mapped on the observer’s body inuencing its representation, but,
at the same time this mirror sensory experience of another person on one’s own body
may reect an over-inclusive body ownership mechanism and a greater tendency to treat
all observed bodies as self-related or as a top-down orienting mechanism for selective
attention to the self that inhibits representations of the (non-self) other (Bird and Viding,
2014; Tsakiris et al., 2008; Northo et al., 2011). Therefore, vicarious pain responders may
incorporate others’ experiences into their own body representations modelling physical
boundaries between self and other.
Bodily ownership: the rubber hand illusion and enfacement illusion
paradigms.
The intersubjective correspondence between both physiological and neuronal responses
to pain previously described poses problems to the distinction between bodily self and
other representations. Intrinsic overlaps between bodily perceptions and actions would
impair the ability to develop a strong sense of self bodily identity and ownership. As
De Vignemont (2013) poses the question: ‘If at some level the representation of one’s
body is similar to the representation of other people’s bodies, then how could it ground
the sense of ownership?’.
One way to test this would be by measuring bodily ownership in these groups and
their propensity to incorporate or to extend ownership over other bodies. The sense
of body ownership arises from integration and correlation of intermodal sensory sig-
nals which contribute to the shape of a coherent bodily self separated from the outer
world or other similar objects (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004). Vari-
ous paradigms have been employed to manipulate bodily ownership and to underline
how correlation of incoming intermodal signals contribute to the sense of bodily self.
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is the most popular paradigm used to study body owner-
ship (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). A second paradigm which has been widely used is the
enfacement illusion (EI) (Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2010). They will both be used in art-
icles I and II of this thesis and represent the main paradigms to study bodily ownership
in vicarious pain responders.
In the RHI, participants tend to report that they feel ownership over a dummy hand
16 1.3
thus expanding their own bodily boundaries. The paradigm consists of placing a dummy
hand in front of the participants whilst their real hand is hidden from view. Subsequently,
both hands are stroked either synchronously (at the same time) or asynchronously (out
of phase) and most evidence shows that the illusion is stronger in the synchronous con-
dition (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005).
Figure 1.3: A schematic representation of the RHI paradigm indicating the incoming sensory
signals including vision, touch and proprioception.
The main theoretical accounts of this paradigm propose that the RHI arises mainly
from the integration of proprioceptive, visual and somatosensory inputs which are pro-
cessed according to the internal body representation, the illusion being stronger when
the external inputs match each other but also the internal representation of the body (e.g.
the hand has the same orientation, colour or is within the peripersonal space) (Costantini
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and Haggard, 2007). Furthermore, cognitive accounts of the RHI emphasise a central role
of top-down processes which inuence the experience since expectancies and trait dif-
ferences impact objective and subjective results obtained following induction suggesting
that performance of this task cannot be attributed to multisensory integration alone (Al-
smith, 2015; Haans et al., 2012).
A Bayesian framework has also been formulated considering multisensory integ-
ration by taking into account the weight of incoming signals (bottom-up processes)
and predictions or expectations concerning these signals (top-down processes). The
Bayesian sensory model uses causal inference to predict optimal estimates of location
and time which are subsequently matched to the actual incoming sensory signals (Sa-
mad et al., 2015). Thus, a match between expectations and input signals would result in
a greater likelihood of experiencing the illusion, as it usually happens in the synchron-
ous condition but not in the asynchronous condition when there is a temporal delay.
Moreover, within this framework, more precise signals weigh more and overwrite less
precise ones. As such, baseline confusion in the incoming sensory signals would gener-
ate an experience in accordance with and heavily inuenced by prior expectancies.
The enfacement illusion (EI) is a facial analogue of the RHI, which uses tactile fa-
cial stimulation to manipulate the perceived similarity with ‘the other’. During the EI,
touch is delivered to the participants’ face whilst they watch an induction video present-
ing mirrored touch delivered to an unfamiliar model’s face (Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al.,
2010). The touch is delivered synchronously or asynchronously and before and after each
induction video measures of perceived similarity between the participant and the model
are taken by asking participants to judge if the morphed faces that they see look more
like themselves or like the other. Synchronous touch generates an increase in perceived
similarity and feelings of ownership and agency over the model’s face (Tajadura-Jimenez
et al., 2011). Similarly, to the RHI, EI further exploits integration of multisensory signals
such as vision and touch to update the internal mental representation of self based on
prior expectations (Tsakiris, 2008).
The studies conducted in articles I and II of this thesis employed the RHI and EI
as the main paradigms in order to better understand the malleability of body owner-
ship in vicarious pain responders in light of the various existing theories explaining this
phenomenon. Our main hypothesis and expectation was that vicarious pain responders
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Figure 1.4: The set-up of the Enfacement Illusion paradigm. The image was taken from Tajadura-
Jimenez et al. (2011)
would have a greater tendency to treat other bodies as their own and thus, they would
show a greater propensity to incorporate ‘the other’ as measured by performance on
these two paradigms. Previous research indicated that there is a greater tendency in
vicarious pain responders to incorporate the rubber hand (Derbyshire et al., 2013) and
evidence from studies conducted on MTS showed that they tend to report greater owner-
ship over both a dummy hand and a model’s face (Davies and White, 2013; Maister et al.,
2013). However, this research did not distinguish between the qualities of the pain felt
and did not investigate further the signicance of the results within bodily ownership
theories. As such, articles I and II will address these gaps.
1.3.2 Shared aective representations in vicarious pain
responders.
Vicarious pain responses have a strong aective component: the immediate and intense
sharing of the painful state of the other, a contagious sensory and emotional response to
the other’s pain. As intuitive as this may seem, a few questions still arise: a) Is this ‘con-
tagious pain’ a subset of a more general form of emotional contagion?; b) Does sharing
the emotional states of the other impact the cognitive appraisal of those states? Does
it inuence others’ representations and the relations with them?; c) Can this ‘painful
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contagion’ cause personal distress?
It has already been established that vicarious pain responders activate sensory-motor
processes through mimicry mechanisms in a more pronounced way than the rest of the
population and there is a fair amount of evidence supporting this view with various
studies nding increased grey matter density and cortical activity in regions such as the
somatosensory cortex (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017b; Holle et al., 2013; Blakemore et al.,
2005). Their propensity to co-represent the others’ emotional states may be linked to
their atypical ability to distinguish between self and other which, as previously stated,
inuences both the socio-cognitive domain of perspective taking and mentalizing pro-
cesses as well as bodily self-other representations (Bird and Viding, 2014; Frith and Frith,
2006). Brief evidence coming from behavioural studies indicates that vicarious pain re-
sponders may display dierences in perspective taking and that they are more inu-
enced by the visual perspective of an avatar when judging from their own viewpoint,
being quicker in taking the other’s perspective in consistent trials (but the authors did
not dierentiate between dierent kinds of responders) (Derbyshire et al., 2013). How-
ever, there are opposing views on whether feeling the physical pain of another benets
or impairs social interactions. On one hand, emotional contagion can lead to empathic
concern and altruistic behavior (Batson et al., 1981, 1997), on the other hand, it can lead
to higher personal distress and avoidant behavior (Bloom, 2017). Some evidence indic-
ates that pain sensitivity correlates with pain anxiety and anxious traits (Palit et al., 2015)
and that anxiety is an important co-variate in regulation of emotional responses in vi-
carious pain responders (Nazarewicz et al., 2015), but there is also evidence suggesting
that heightened responses to the pain of others are associated to empathic behaviours
(Jackson et al., 2005; Hein et al., 2011). Furthermore, one more variable could mediate
these behaviours: emotion regulation which represents the ability to respond to emo-
tional stimuli in an adaptive manner (Gross, 1998). Studies have shown that emotion
regulation is linked to better cardiac autonomic regulation which can be improved in
response to pain exposure (Appelhans and Luecken, 2008; Meeus et al., 2013; Riganello
et al., 2019; Tracy et al., 2018). The extent to which vicarious pain is related to emotional
contagion and emotional self-regulatory abilities is not known and it will be addressed
by this thesis. It will also be investigated how vicarious pain processing can inuence
social closeness and self-other associations. Another important aspect of vicarious pain
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responses is that they are based in mirroring responses which can be manifested at a
somatic and physiological level (Preston and De Waal, 2002). As such, vicarious pain
responses have been linked to autonomic changes similar to the ones experienced in
one-self (Levenson and Ruef, 1992). The most prominent physiological changes are rep-
resented by arousal and an increase in measures such as heart rate, blood pressure and
skin conductance (Garnkel et al., 2015b; Fernández et al., 2012). Physiological responses
in vicarious pain responders will thus be investigated as part of this thesis together with
other social and emotional processes in articles III and IV.
1.4 Aims
Vicarious pain experiences are present in a considerable percentage of the population
and they have been of great interest in the scientic community. Various theories have
emerged in recent years and evidence has mostly linked them to mirroring and/or sim-
ulation mechanisms but, the processes underlying these manifestations and their place
within a wider phenomenological dimension are not completely understood. They have
been mainly attributed to particularities in empathic traits, self-other dierentiation and
imaginative abilities thus, this unique condition has the potential to contribute to psy-
chological and social developments. Through a combination of behavioural, physiolo-
gical and questionnaire studies, this thesis aims at developing a better scientic under-
standing of vicarious pain experiences in general and their links to more specic pro-
cesses including bodily ownership and intersubjective experiences. The main aims of
this thesis which will be addressed in the empirical chapters are:
1 To investigate bodily ownership in vicarious pain responders (Article I)
2 To explain particularities in bodily ownership of vicarious pain responders within
current theories of multisensory integration, namely the Bayesian Sensory Infer-
ence model (Article II).
3 To investigate the inuence of vicarious pain perception on empathic traits and
self-other associations (Article III)
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4 To explore physiological reactivity in these subgroups and possible coping mech-
anisms that would contribute to the normal functioning of these individuals (Art-
icle IV).
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Article I: Atypical Susceptibility to the Rubber
Hand Illusion linked to Sensory-Localised Vi-
carious Pain Perception
2.1 Abstract
The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) paradigm has been widely used to investigate the sense
of body ownership. People who report experiencing the pain of others are hypothesised to
have dierences in computing body ownership and, hence, we predicted that they would
perform atypically on the RHI. The Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ), was used to divide
participants into three groups: (1) non-responders (people who report no pain when seeing
someone else experiencing physical pain), (2) sensory-localised responders (report sensory
qualities and a localised feeling of pain) and (3) aective-general responders (report a gener-
alised and emotional feeling of pain). The sensory-localised group, showed susceptibility to
the RHI (increased proprioceptive drift) irrespective of whether stimulation was synchronous
or asynchronous, whereas the other groups only showed the RHI in the synchronous condi-
tion. This is not a general bias to always incorporate the dummy hand as we did not nd
increased susceptibility in other conditions (seeing touch without feeling touch, or feeling
touch without seeing touch), but there was a trend for this group to incorporate the dummy
hand when it was stroked with a laser light. Although individual dierences in the RHI
have been noted previously, this particular pattern is rare. It suggests a greater malleability
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(i.e. insensitivity to asynchrony) in the conditions in which other bodies inuence own-body
judgments.
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2.2 Introduction
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) is an established
means of investigating and manipulating the sense of body-ownership including body
location, image, and agency (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Longo
et al., 2008). In this paradigm, the participant’s hand is hidden from view and a dummy
hand is placed in view, alongside the real hand. The hidden and dummy hands are then
stroked either synchronously or asynchronously. The illusion is signicantly stronger
in the synchronous condition, when the participant feels the touch delivered to the vis-
ible dummy hand as if the hand belonged to him/her. Thus, when the illusion occurs,
the rubber hand becomes temporarily incorporated in the participant’s mental body rep-
resentation. This is reected in a perceived shift in the position of one’s own hand to-
wards the fake hand, a phenomenon termed proprioceptive drift. The objective measure
of proprioceptive drift complements self-reported questionnaire ratings through which
participants report their experience of ownership, self-location, and agency over the fake
hand.
The RHI arises through the integration of multisensory information with reference
to a prior mental body representation (Costantini and Haggard, 2007). According to this
model, visual, proprioceptive, and somatosensory inputs are processed within higher
order multimodal integration areas (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Limanowski and Blankenburg,
2015). As such, the illusion is the strongest when distinct external inputs match each
other (as shown by the dierence between synchronous and asynchronous stroking,
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998)) and also when external inputs match internal representa-
tions of the body (Tsakiris, 2010).
The RHI is greater when the rubber hand looks similar, has same orientation and side
as the real hand (e.g. both left or both right) and when the hand is within the peripersonal
space (PPS) of the person (Preston, 2013). Thus, the viewed object is tested against an
abstract model of one’s body for ‘t’, to determine whether or not the dummy hand is
incorporated within the body model in a process that involves both bottom-up and top-
down mechanisms (Tsakiris et al., 2008). In some circumstances, the illusion can also
occur in the absence of visuo-tactile congruency. The illusion can be induced in a ‘light
only’ condition, when the dummy hand is ‘stroked’ by a laser-pointer but no light/tactile
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stimulation is applied to the real hand (Durgin et al., 2007). Here, participants who report
tactile and thermal sensations evoked by the light-beam also report stronger feeling of
ownership of the dummy hand.
Atypical performance on the RHI has been linked to various psychiatric and devel-
opmental conditions, as well as sub-clinical individual dierences. Dierences in the
RHI are observed in patients with autism (Paton et al., 2012; Palmer et al., 2013), schizo-
phrenia (Thakkar et al., 2011), neurotypical variations linked to schizotypy (Germine
et al., 2013; Kállai et al., 2015), in eating disorders including anorexia nervosa (Eshkevari
et al., 2012; Kaplan et al., 2014), and in mirror-touch synaesthesia (Davies and White,
2013). In the latter, participants report experiencing touch when seeing others touched
and, during the RHI paradigm, report ownership of the rubber hand when it is stroked
but no physical touch is applied to the participant’s own hand. This may occur because
the observed touch triggers a synchronised feeling of touch on their own body, analog-
ous to the normal eect of synchrony in the RHI (Davies and White, 2013). However, it
may also reect more general dierences in computing body ownership in this group: in
eect, a tendency to misattribute other people’s bodies as their own (Ward and Banissy,
2015). In the present study, we extend this to a similar related phenomenon, mirror-pain
synaesthesia, namely to individuals who report feeling pain when seeing pain in others.
Various manipulations of the illusion have been previously used altering the perfect
congruency of the illusion corresponding to the synchronous condition. These have in-
cluded seeing touch without physically feeling it (Davies and White, 2013), projecting a
laser beam on the dummy hand (Durgin et al., 2007), or simply looking at the dummy
hand without any other stimulation (Rohde et al., 2011; Samad et al., 2015). Manipu-
lations of the quality of the material used to stroke the rubber hand or the anatomical
position of the real and rubber hands have also been employed. The stimulation has
been conducted using soft or rough fabric (Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2009; Filippetti et al.,
2019) thus manipulating the congruency of the quality of the sensorial feeling rather
than the temporal congruency of stimuli delivery and indicating that the experience of
the RHI is stronger in a congruent condition. The position of the rubber hand has been
used in anatomically plausible or implausible positions (Zeller et al., 2016) or at vari-
ous angles (Ide, 2013; Butz et al., 2014). These various conditions, added to the initial
synchronous and asynchronous conditions, allowed researchers in the eld to further
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explore the mechanisms of the illusion. They indicated that the illusion is the strongest
in a perfect congruency condition (e.g. synchronous, same-stroking stimulus, same-
position etc.) and very weak in conditions of total incongruency (e.g. asynchronous,
dierent stroking stimulus, dierent position) (Filippetti et al., 2019), but also that there
are intermediate levels when the illusion can occur in certain conditions and groups (e.g.
vision-only (Rohde et al., 2011), light-only (Durgin et al., 2007), see-touch (Davies and
White, 2013)). These ndings suggest that there is an interplay between top-down and
bottom-up processes which reduce conicting multisensory input and which may vary
at an individual level, this being supported by neurophysiological evidence such as the
involvement of higher-order multisensory integration areas such as the premotor cor-
tex and the superior and inferior parietal lobules in the experience of the illusion (Rohde
et al., 2011; Zeller et al., 2016). We used some of these conditions such as see-touch and
light-only to further explore this phenomenon in vicarious pain responders in relation to
the models by Rohde et al. (2011) and Zeller et al. (2016) which emphasise the importance
of the various levels of receiving conicting sensory information.
Seeing someone else in pain activates neural circuitry involved in the physical per-
ception of pain (Jackson et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2011). However, for a subset of the
general population this extends to reportable pain-like experiences evoked by observing
others in pain (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010b, 2012; Osborn and Derbyshire, 2010). These indi-
viduals have been called vicarious pain responders, or mirror-pain synaesthetes. Ward
and Banissy (2015), in their account of mirror-touch/pain synaesthesia, suggest that this
may reect an over-inclusive body ownership mechanism, in which all observed bod-
ies are matched to the person’s own internal body model, or as a failure in a top-down
orienting mechanism for selective attention to the self that inhibits representations of
the (non-self) other. Whatever the precise mechanism, the prediction is that a greater
tendency to treat all observed bodies as self-related will result in an increased tendency
to experience the RHI, as well as the tendency to report experiences on their own body
as a result of observing these on other people (the dening feature of mirror touch/pain).
One study already tested the performance of vicarious pain responders on the RHI
using only subjective reports (not proprioceptive drift). Derbyshire et al. (2013) showed a
greater tendency to incorporate the rubber hand in the pain-responder group when com-
pared to controls and this eect was unusually apparent for the asynchronous stroking
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condition (which tends not to induce the illusion in controls). We extend this to include
ve dierent manipulations of the RHI, including conditions in which the dummy hand
is observed without any physical touch, and grouping participants via a new assessment
tool for vicarious pain experience (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a).
The Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ) employs 16 movie clips depicting people
experiencing physical pain, and probes the phenomenological characteristics of any felt
pain sensations provoked in the observer (e.g. pain quality, pain intensity, pain local-
isation). Using a bottom-up approach of cluster analysis, three groups are identied: (1)
non-responders or controls (who report no pain when watching a video with someone
else experiencing physical pain), (2) sensory-localised responders (S/L) (who report a
precisely localised feeling of pain at the same location as the person in the video) and
(3) aective-general responders (A/G) (who report a generalised and emotional feeling
of pain). The validity of these groupings is endorsed by observed dierence in structural
and functional brain characteristics (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a,b) and, in the present
study, we demonstrate cognitive dierences between the groups and provide the rst
assessment of test-retest reliability of the VPQ. Thus, using the VPQ to group and re-
cruit participants, we tested both subjective and objective measures of the rubber hand
illusion, with ve dierent manipulation. Two of these manipulations were the standard
synchronous and asynchronous conditions.
Based on published ndings (Derbyshire et al., 2013), we predicted that individu-
als within the responder groups would be less sensitive to asynchrony (i.e. they will
show the illusion in both conditions). We had no predictions about whether this eect
would be found for one or both responder groups. Two further manipulations involved
the visual presentation of touch from a paintbrush or light from a laser pointer in the
absence of any physical sensation. Here, our prediction was that the sensory-localised
group (who feel sensations in the same location that they observe them on others) would
show the RHI illusion, as found for mirror-touch synaesthesia (Davies and White, 2013).
The fth condition involved the reverse scenario of feeling touch while observing an un-
touched dummy hand. We were not aware of any previous report of this manipulation
inducing the RHI, hence, this serves as an important control measure across all groups
to assess for a general bias in responding.
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2.3 Materials and methods
2.3.1 Participants
Ninety-eight volunteers from the University of Sussex took part in the experiment (70
Females; 28 Males; Aged 18-34 yrs; Mean = 21.75± 3.11 SD). Each participant completed
the Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ) and were divided into three groups based on the
2-step cluster analysis performed on the VPQ (see Section 2.3.2 for further description).
The groups were: 57 non-responders (29 F; 18 M; Aged 18-34 yrs; M = 21.88 ± 3.45 SD),
22 sensory-localised responders (S/L) (17 F; 5 M; Aged 18-25 yrs; M = 21.6 ± 2.15 SD),
and 19 aective-general responders (A/G) (14 F; 5 M; Aged 19 – 33 yrs; M = 21.53 ± 3.1
SD).
Since its development, a total sample of N=1056 individuals (Aged 18-60 yrs, M= 20.42
± 4.16 SD, 297 Males, 759 Females) have completed the VPQ including data from N=573
reported by Grice-Jackson et al. (2017a). The larger sample also included 82 participants
(Aged: 18-33 yrs, M = 20.23± 3.31 SD, 68 Females, 14 males) who had taken the measure
twice, at least one academic year apart. We used this dataset to undertake an analysis of
test-retest reliability of the VPQ and to determine how the group structure is aected by
dierent parameters entered into the clustering model. Cluster analysis is an exploratory
analysis that requires large data sets (Landwehr, 1987) and so was run on the entire
sample, and not just the experimental subsample.
2.3.2 Vicarious Pain Questionnaire
Description. The Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ; developed by Grice-Jackson et al.
(2017a) was run using Bristol Online Survey. The questionnaire comprises 16 videos
(no audio) of people experiencing physical pain (e.g. falls, sports injuries, injections),
each video lasting for approximately 10 seconds. After each video, participants were
questioned about their experience. First, participants were asked if they experienced
a bodily sensation of pain while viewing the video (yes/no). If the answer was ‘yes’,
participants were asked to describe their pain by answering three more questions about
their experience: 1) how intense their pain experience was (1-10 Likert scale, 1= very
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mild pain, 10 = highly intense pain); 2) if and where they localised the pain, answering
options were either ’localised to the same point as the observed pain in the video’, ’loc-
alised but not to the same point’, and ’a general/non-localisable experience of pain’; 3)
to select pain adjectives from a list that best described their vicarious pain experience
(10 sensory descriptors such as ’tingling’, ’burning’, ’stinging’, 10 aective descriptors
such as ’nauseating’, ’gruelling’, ’aversive’ and 3 cognitive-evaluative descriptors ’brief’,
’rhythmic’, ’constant’).
From these answers, a Localised – Generalised score was computed from the total of
’localised to the same point’ and ’localised to a dierent point’ minus the total number
of non-localisable (generalised) experiences. A Sensory – Aective score was computed
from the total number of sensory adjectives minus the total number of aective adject-
ives.
Subsequently all participants (regardless of their armative or negative answer to
the rst question) were asked to rate how unpleasant their experience was (1-10 Likert
scale, 1= not at all unpleasant, 10=highly unpleasant). The nal section of the VPQ asked
participants if they had previously experienced vicarious pain in their daily life and how
regularly that happened (10 point Likert Scale, -5 = hardly ever, 5 = very regularly).
Two-Step Cluster Analysis. The two-step cluster analysis comprised an initial hier-
archical cluster analysis using Ward’s Method (Ward Jr, 1963) and a second k-means
cluster analysis. The cluster centroids and number of clusters for the k-means analysis
were provided by the hierarchical cluster analysis. We repeated an earlier clustering
approach (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a) based on three input variables (total number of
pain responses, localised-generalised score, sensory-aective score). This analysis was
contrasted against two similar models in which total pain responses was substituted for
the conceptually related variables of mean intensity of pain responses, or the regularity
of pain responses (in daily life).
2.3.3 Rubber Hand Illusion Questionnaire
The RHI questionnaire contained 10 items divided into three subscales: ownership, loc-
ation, and agency (Longo et al., 2008), see Table 2.1 for further details. The items were
measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly, 7 = strongly agree). Four extra questions
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were added for the light condition, in order to record any tactile or thermal sensations
induced by the laser beam (see Table 2.1 for detailed description of the items). These last
four questions were added at a later stage and therefore data was gathered only from a
subset of participants (N=39).
Table 2.1: RHI questionnaire items and subscales.
Subscale Items
Ownership
It seemed like. . .
1. . . . I was looking directly at my own hand, rather than
at a rubber hand.
2. . . . the rubber hand began to resemble my real hand.
3. . . . the rubber hand belonged to me.
4. . . . the rubber hand was my hand.
5. . . . the rubber hand was part of my body.
Location
6. . . .my hand was in the location where the rubber hand was.
7. . . . the rubber hand was in the location where my hand was.
8. . . . the sensation I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching
(or laser pointer playing on) the rubber hand.
Agency 9. . . . I could have moved the rubber hand if I had wanted.
10. . . . I was in control of the rubber hand.
Light induced sensations
11. . . . I felt a tactile sensation in my hand.
12. . . . I felt a thermal sensation in my hand.
13. . . . the sensation was cold.
14. . . . the sensation was warm.
2.3.4 Experimental procedure
In the RHI task, the participant was seated at a table, opposite to the experimenter with
his/her right arm placed in a box (86cmx60cmx20cm). The participants were asked
to rest her/his hand in the most comfortable position with the palm facing down and
slightly arched. A life-size model of a right hand was placed in the box, directly in front
of participant body midline. The participant could only see the dummy hand through
a squared hole on top of the box, but could not see her/his own right hand which was
occluded by the box cover from the top and by a piece of black fabric from the right-hand
side. The distance between participant’s right index nger and the index nger of the
fake hand was 20cm.
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Five conditions were performed in a counterbalanced order across participants: Syn-
chronous (the timing of the brush strokes on the rubber hand and participant’s own hand
was synchronized); asynchronous (the timing of the brush strokes was out of phase by
approximately 625ms); light (a laser beam was playing on the index nger of the rub-
ber hand); see-touch (the brush stimulation was applied only to the rubber hand) and;
feel-touch (the brush stimulation was applied only to participant’s real hand). At the
beginning of each condition, a cover was placed on top of the box and the participant
was asked to estimate the location of her/his right index nger tip by reading the cor-
responding number along a one-meter ruler laid across the setting top, parallel to the
frontal plane. The reading was repeated three times before each trial and the place-
ment of the ruler varied each time to prevent the participant repeating responses in sub-
sequent readings. These measurements were followed by 120s stimulation ‘induction’
at approximately 1.6Hz (75 times in 120s) for all conditions. The paintbrush stimulation
was applied from the knuckle to the nger nail, while that of the laser pointer was back
and forth from the knuckle to the nger nail as it was not easy to switch o/on and main-
tain timing. Following this, post-induction nger location judgements were obtained in
the same manner as prior to the induction and the participant lled out the RHI ques-
tionnaire after each condition. The average of the three measurements taken before and
after each trial was calculated. Proprioceptive drift was calculated by subtracting the
pre-induction nger location judgement from the post-induction nger location judge-
ment.
PD = mean(post− inductionjudgements)−mean(pre− inductionjudgements)
2.3.5 Data Analysis
The statistical software used was SPSS version 23 (SPSS Inc., USA). The signicance level
for all analyses was set at p<0.05 and the results reported are two-tailed.
Analyses were performed to test the eects of two independent variables (groups and
stimulus type) on two dependent variables (proprioceptive drift and RHI questionnaire
subjective ratings). 3(group) ∗ 2(stimulationmode) mixed model ANOVAs were used
to analyse the data of proprioceptive drift and each of the RHI questionnaire subscale
for the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. For the proprioceptive drift data,
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outliers were excluded for each condition using SPSS based on the 3-interquartile range
(IQR). Thus, one outlier was excluded from the asynchronous condition, four from the
light condition and one from the see-touch condition. No outliers were found in the
questionnaire data outside the 3-IQR. Subsequent post-hoc tests adjusted for multiple
comparisons (Bonferroni corrections) assessed dierences between and within groups.
One-way ANOVAs were used for each of the other three conditions to test group eects
on proprioceptive drift. On the questionnaire data, non-parametric tests were used for
each subscale.
The sample size was based on previous publications using group comparisons in the
RHI illusion. The clinical group sizes were represented by about 20 individuals whilst
control groups sizes had the same number or larger (Eshkevari et al., 2012; Kaplan et al.,
2014; Thakkar et al., 2011; Paton et al., 2012). Power analyses were run on proprioceptive
drift data. These indicated a power higher than the conventional accepted power of 0.8
(Murphy et al., 2014) for the synchronous, asynchronous, and light conditions, but lower
in the see-touch and feel-touch conditions. Thus, the null results obtained in these last
two conditions should be cautiously interpreted.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Reliability of the VPQ
For the 82 participants who completed this measure on two occasions, the test-retest
scores were all signicantly correlated between time 1 and time 2 as shown by Spear-
man’s correlations: total pain responses (rho= 0.629, p<0.001); mean pain intensity (rho=
0.640, p<0.001); reported levels of vicarious pain outside of experiment (rho= 0.349,
p=0.001); localised-general score (rho= 0.295, p<0.001); and sensory-aective score (rho=
0.550, p=0.007). Correlation coecients are a measure of eect size and, by convention,
values >0.5 are considered large, and those >0.3 are considered medium (Cohen, 1988).
The most reliable individual dierence measures in psychology, rened over decades
of research, tend to have correlations around 0.7 or 0.8 (Vul et al., 2009). Considering
the dierent ways of clustering the data, the inclusion of mean pain intensity led to
the most consistent clustering (χ2 = 48.512, p<0.001; Cramer’s V = 0.544, p<0.001), fol-
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lowed by reported levels of real-world vicarious pain (χ2 = 47.947, p<0.001; Cramer’s V
= 0.541, p<0.001), and total number of pain responses (χ2 = 37.817, p<0.001; Cramer’s V
= 0.480, p<0.001). As such, we conclude that the VPQ measure is reliable over time and
the reliability is enhanced by adding mean intensity rather than total number of pain re-
sponses, although it is to be noted that both methods are adequate and yield only minor
dierences in the clustering across the whole data set (presented in Appendix A.1).
2.4.2 Proprioceptive drift
Means and standard deviations of proprioceptive drift for each condition and in each
group are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Mean proprioceptive drift (mm) and standard deviations for each condition in each
group.
Group Conditions
Synchronous Asynchronous Light See-touch Feel-touch
Controls 15.96 ± 23.38 3.04 ± 18.54 2.01 ± 11.50 1.07 ± 14.40 - 2.98 ± 14.40
S/L 21.36 ± 22.72 17.30 ± 18.46 17.42 ± 29.13 7.83 ± 24.35 -1.27 ± 17.33
A/G 23.51 ± 19.78 -5.88 ± 22.51 3.77 ± 19.15 10.96 ± 27.08 -1.12 ± 18.41
Considering rst the eect of synchrony/asynchrony, the 2∗3 ANOVA used for syn-
chronous and asynchronous conditions showed signicant main eects of stimulus type,
F (1,189) = 20.808, p<0.001, η2 = 0.039 and group, F (2, 189) = 3.800, p<0.05, η2 = 0.099
on proprioceptive drift. There was also a statistically signicant interaction between
the eects of group and stimulus type, F (2,189) = 3.774, p<0.05, η2 = 0.038, indicating
that synchronous and asynchronous stimulations evoked dierent group eects. Post-
hoc tests using Bonferroni corrections set at α = 0.008 (i.e. 0.05/6 (comparisons)) were
applied. Signicantly greater proprioceptive drift was found in the asynchronous con-
dition in the S/L group when compared to controls, t(76)=-3.017, p=0.003, d=0.89 and
to A/G, t(38)=3.540, p=0.001, d=0.74. No signicant dierences were found in the syn-
chronous condition. Dierences between synchronous and asynchronous conditions
were assessed within the three groups. Proprioceptive drift was signicantly greater in
the synchronous than in the asynchronous conditions in controls, t (56) = 4.520, p <0.001,
and in A/G group, t(18) = 4.723, p<0.001. However, there was no signicant dierence in
proprioceptive drift in the S/L group, t(21) = 0.848, p =0.407. Figure 2.1 shows all these
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results. In short, the S/L responder group shows a disruption of body ownership insofar
as they have a greater tendency to incorporate asynchronous touch to the dummy hand
into their body schema.
Figure 2.1: Mean PDs (mm) of the three groups for Synchronous and Asynchronous conditions.
Error bars indicate one standard error.
The other three conditions were analysed using one-way ANOVAs, as the focus was
on dierences in between groups, rather than direct comparisons of the conditions. No
signicant dierences were found for see-touch, F(2,94) = 2.153, p=0.122 and feel-touch,
F (2,95) = 1.231, p=0.297 conditions between the groups. This is important because it
suggests that there is not a general tendency to incorporate the rubber hand (or a general
response bias) but, rather, a specic tendency to do so under some conditions. There was
a signicant dierence in the light condition, F (2,92)= 5.601, p=0.005 (results are shown
in Figure 2.2). However, this data failed Levene’s test for equality of variances and the
post hoc Games-Howell test comparing S/L group with controls showed only a trend,
p=0.061, d=0.89. Further exploratory analyses for the light condition can be seen in
Appendix A.2.
The results obtained for proprioceptive drift showed higher susceptibility for the
illusion in the asynchronous condition in the S/L group which scored higher than the
controls and a similar trend was observed in the light condition.
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Figure 2.2: Mean PDs (mm) of the three groups for the Light condition. Error bars indicate one
standard error.
2.4.3 Subjective ratings
Since almost half of the conditions failed Shapiro-Wilk normality test, each of the three
subscales of the RHI questionnaire: ownership, location, and agency were analysed using
Kruskal Wallis non-parametric test followed by post-hoc Mann-Whitney test. Signic-
ant dierences were identied on the ownership subscale in the asynchronous condition
(H(2)=10.257, p=0.006; S/L > C, U=103.0, p=0.003; S/L >A/G, U=103.0, p=0.006) (see Fig-
ure 2.3) and see-only condition (H(2)=6.457, p=0.04; S/L>C, U=412.0, p=0.018) and on the
location subscale in the synchronous condition (H(2)= 6.174, p=0.046; S/L>C, U=421.5,
p=0.024) (see Figure 2.4). In summary, the questionnaire results show a similar pattern
to the proprioceptive drift scores, namely the S/L responder group shows a greater tend-
ency to incorporate the dummy hand.
A subset of participants (N=39) were asked about tactile/thermal sensations from the
laser light stimulation. Of these participants, 60% agreed to experiencing a sensation on
one or more questions, and these did not signicantly dier across groups (group per-
centages: Controls=52%; S/L= 82%, A/G=44%; χ2 = 3.521, p=0.172;). Participants who
experienced sensations from the laser light reported more subjective illusory experiences
in this condition (see Appendix A.3), thus replicating Durgin et al. (2007).
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Figure 2.3: Subjective ratings in the asynchronous condition for each sub-scale.
Figure 2.4: Subjective ratings in the synchronous condition for each sub-scale
2.5 Discussion
Previous research has suggested an atypical propensity to experience the rubber hand
illusion, a putative measure of body ownership, in people who report experiencing the
pain of others (Derbyshire et al., 2013) or who report experiencing touch when seeing
others touched (Davies and White, 2013). However, the mechanism behind this is not
clear: is it visual capture, or an exaggeration of the normal pattern, or something else?
Here, we used a novel way of identifying and grouping vicarious pain responders
(Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a), that divides them into two groups: a sensory/localised (S/L)
group who reports localised experiences with sensory qualities on their own body when
viewing pain and an aective/general (A/G) group who reports nonlocalised experiences
with aective qualities. We show that the S/L group has a distinctive pattern on the RHI,
whereas the A/G resembles controls. The S/L group show the RHI for both synchron-
ous and asynchronous stroking (in terms of higher proprioceptive drift and subjective
ratings of ownership and agency). Moreover, there was a trend towards higher proprio-
ceptive drift in the light condition, and they also reported greater subjective ratings in
the synchronous condition. None of the groups experienced the illusion when the RHI
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was broken down into its constituent parts (seeing the dummy touched, the ‘see-touch’
condition; or feeling one’s own hand touched, the ‘feel-touch’ condition). This demon-
strates that there is not a general tendency towards incorporating the rubber hand per se,
nor a general tendency for the RHI to be driven by the sight of touch (as suggested pre-
viously for mirror-touch synaesthesia). Together, these results provide evidence that the
S/L group have a heightened tendency to incorporate the rubber hand within their own
body representation under certain conditions. The question as to why it is found for the
S/L group alone remains to be determined. Of relevance here is that the S/L group, but
not the A/G group, report that their experiences are localised to the corresponding body
part at least when reporting vicarious pain (and this is supported by more somatotopic
activity in primary somatosensory cortex in the S/L group; (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a)).
Either diculties in body ownership are limited to the S/L group or, else, diculties
in body ownership are common to both but operate on dierent levels (whole bodies,
v. body parts) and generate dierent eects depending on the nature of the paradigm
(e.g. rubber hand illusion v. whole body illusion; (Lenggenhager et al., 2007)). In the
sections below we discuss the results in detail. Firstly, in relation to previously reported
individual dierences and group based dierences in the RHI. Secondly, we discuss our
ndings in relation to theoretical models of the RHI.
2.5.1 Previous atypical ndings in the RHI
Previous literature has documented atypical RHI susceptibility patterns in clinical con-
ditions including eating disorders, schizophrenia, and autism and our results will be
discussed considering similarities or dissimilarities with these conditions.
Our results resemble ndings that have been previously reported in the eating dis-
order literature. Patients with diagnosis of body dysmorphic disorder present no dif-
ferences in proprioceptive drift between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions,
scoring signicantly higher in both conditions than in the recorded baseline (Kaplan
et al., 2014). Eshkevari et al. (2012) found that patients with anorexia nervosa score
higher on both proprioceptive drift and on overall subjective ratings when compared
to controls and Zopf et al. (2016) reported higher subjective ratings in anorexia nervosa
for both synchronous and asynchronous RHI conditions when compared to controls, al-
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though they didn’t nd it in proprioceptive drift. The pattern of results in our group
is similar to these ndings which may be due to abnormalities in self representations.
Eating disorders have been associated with a more unstable bodily self-representation
and increased bodily plasticity (Eshkevari et al., 2012; Kaplan et al., 2014) as well as in-
teroceptive decits ((Preyde et al., 2016), but also see (Eshkevari et al., 2014)). Lower in-
teroceptive awareness is associated with increased susceptibility to RHI and with a less
clear perception of internal bodily processes that give rise to the bodily self (Tsakiris
et al., 2011), but also see (Crucianelli et al., 2018) and dysfunctionalities within the insu-
lar cortex have been linked to distorted body-perceptions (Heydrich and Blanke, 2013)
and to eating disorders (Strigo et al., 2013). Comparatively little is known about these
mechanisms in vicarious pain responders, although the insula is also implicated. Grice-
Jackson et al. (2017a) reported increased grey matter density in the insula in both S/L
and A/G responders and, using fMRI functional connectivity, found greater coupling of
the insula with the right tempero-parietal junction (a region implicated in selectively at-
tending to self v. other) in the S/L group when viewing the pain of others (Grice-Jackson
et al., 2017b). Insula dysfunction could therefore explain the tendency for the S/L group
to have a greater RHI (found in several conditions for subjective ratings), although it
does not make specic predictions about the asynchronous condition. It does, however,
make the testable prediction that eating disorders and these dierences in vicarious pain
perception may co-occur more than chance if they share similar neurocognitive mech-
anisms.
The heightened tendency towards experiencing the RHI has also been associated
with more pronounced psychotic traits, but, this manifests itself as an exaggeration of
the normal (synchronous) eect (Germine et al., 2013; Kállai et al., 2015). In one study,
schizophrenic patients scored higher on ownership questions of the RHI questionnaire
and presented greater proprioceptive drift after the synchronous condition (Thakkar
et al., 2011). Overall, psychotic traits seem to be associated with more pronounced sub-
jective feelings of ownership, but only after the synchronous condition of the rubber
hand illusion and these results are not convincingly replicated for proprioceptive drift.
Compared to this group, our S/L subjects present some similarities (i.e. higher subject-
ive ratings of ownership than controls in synchronous condition) but dier insofar as
this extends to the asynchronous condition. Conversely, lower susceptibility towards
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the RHI (in the standard synchronous condition) has been found in people with Aut-
ism Spectrum Conditions (ASC) or high autistic traits in non-clinical groups. This is
expressed in measures of proprioceptive drift (Palmer et al., 2013) and in reported ex-
perience of ownership, when there is no discrepancy between the felt and seen location
(Paton et al., 2012). In terms of theoretical models, it is possible that people with autism
rely more on sensory input (from their own hand) and less on a top-down internal model
of the body (Quattrocki and Friston, 2014). A reverse mechanism may be present in the
S/L group and we will discuss possible explanations for this below.
2.5.2 Theoretical models explaining the RHI
Three models explaining the occurrence of the illusion have been proposed until now so
we will further interpret our results within these theoretical models. The rst, classical
model proposes that the RHI is enhanced by synchrony or, more generally, by matching
external signals (tactile, visual, and proprioceptive). The Botvinick and Cohen (1998)
model suggests that the visuo-tactile correlation alone is responsible for updating the
spatial location of subject’s real hand and that intermodal matching is a sucient con-
dition for the rubber hand attribution. This model has been expanded arguing that the
visuo-tactile correlation is necessary but not always sucient. It has been proposed that
not only the matching of external stimuli is important but also the matching between the
external input and the pre-existing body image (e.g. body shape/size) or body-schema
(e.g. body conguration) (Makin et al., 2008; Tsakiris, 2010). Even though the visual-
tactile synchrony is the main driver of the illusion, the coherence with pre-existing visual
and proprioceptive body representations is necessary for the illusion to manifest. Thus,
there is a necessity of congruent posture and identity with respect to the participant’s
hand (Tsakiris and Haggard (2005), but also see Holle et al. (2011)) which facilitates the
integration of sensory information in favour of vision within the peripersonal space
(Makin et al., 2008). In our study, we did observe that the illusion occurred when there
was a match between visual and tactile input (synchronous condition) in all groups,
however the S/L group performed similarly in the asynchronous condition too. Within
this model, we would conclude that the S/L interprets asynchrony as a matching signal.
This could be because they do not perceive the visuo-tactile asynchrony (a very unlikely
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scenario since the temporal dierence was of approximately 625ms) or, more likely, that
the asynchrony is perceived but does not inuence the computation of body ownership
in the normal way. For instance, it is to be noted that both the visual and tactile signals
are equally correlated in both the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Whereas
they are in-phase in the synchronous condition (occur simultaneously) they are out of
phase (occur consecutively) in the asynchronous condition (i.e. correlations of +1 and -1
respectively). In our ‘see touch’ condition the dummy hand was touched and in our ‘feel
touch’ condition the real hand was touched; i.e. there was never a correlation between
them. It may be that the S/L group are sensitive to visuo-tactile correlations, whereas the
more typical pattern is to rely also on visuo-tactile simultaneity. This generates a test-
able prediction that asynchronous stroking in which the strokes occurs unpredictably
(i.e. with zero correlation) would not lead to the RHI in the S/L group.
A second model that has been proposed by Rohde et al. (2011) states that the RHI
is disrupted by asynchrony rather than enhanced by synchrony or matching signals.
Their study found that visual capture alone (i.e. looking at the dummy hand with no
touch to either hand) produced comparable proprioceptive drift to the synchronous con-
dition. The authors proposed that proprioceptive drift is typically found when looking
at an anatomically plausible dummy hand and that the asynchronous control condition
has a negative eect on the visual capture of proprioception as opposed to the syn-
chronous condition having a positive eect on visual-proprioceptive integration. Within
this model’s framework, our result shows that asynchronous stroking does not weaken
the visual-proprioceptive integration in the S/L group suggesting that this group is not
treating the visuo-tactile signals as mismatching. The main condition that adjudicates
between this model and the previous one is whether there is drift in the absence of any
touch to either hand. Our study did not include this condition and it is important for
future research to explore this with these groups and in terms of other individual dier-
ences.
A third theoretical model, the predictive coding or Bayesian framework, proposes
that the rubber hand illusion can be construed as the interpretation that dierent sens-
ory signals (tactile, visual, proprioceptive) have a common cause, i.e. that the signals
are attributed to a single hand rather than two dierent causes namely a dummy and a
real hand (see (Samad et al., 2015)). The attribution of a common cause depends on two
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things: the nature of the incoming sensory signals (e.g. how well they are matched) and
prior expectations (e.g. how long it takes for an observed touch to be felt). With regards
to the sensory signals, those that are spatially and temporally aligned are more likely
to be integrated (i.e. attributed to a common cause) – as in the original Botvinick and
Cohen (1998) explanation and other models in that tradition. However, there is an addi-
tional property of the sensory signal that is relevant namely it’s precision. More precise
sensory signals are weighted more heavily, so vision with its high spatial precision tends
to dominate over proprioception and, hence, the illusion as measured by proprioceptive
drift can occur just by looking at the rubber hand (Rohde et al., 2011; Samad et al., 2015).
This may also be a source of individual dierences: if an individual has poor proprio-
ception abilities then they should show a stronger inuence of vision and a greater RHI.
This is a testable prediction that could account for some of the reported dierences in-
cluding those we observe for the S/L group (note: previous studies on the RHI measure
proprioceptive drift rather than actual proprioceptive ability). The alternative, not yet
considered in detail by these models, is that there are individual and group dierences
in priors (i.e. willingness to attribute dierent signals to a common cause, or to update
priors on the basis of new evidence). These kinds of dierences have been postulated
in conditions such as autism (Van de Cruys et al., 2014) and schizophrenia (Fletcher and
Frith, 2009) that also show dierences in RHI susceptibility, and may also be the case in
those who report experiencing the localised pain of others.
2.6 Conclusion
We have identied a new group of individuals who are highly susceptible to the rubber
hand illusion. Our ndings indicate particularities in body representations and self-other
distinctions. The S/L group scored higher under certain conditions on both proprio-
ceptive drift, a measure attributed to body perception and localization. Moreover, the
S/L group scored higher on subjective ratings of the illusion. Even though the exact
mechanisms are still unknown, there are various possible interpretations. These are not
mutually exclusive and include: more unstable body image and body schema, predom-
inant inuence of visual input and lower tactile precision. Further research is needed to
disentangle these aspects.
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Article II: Atypical susceptibility to the Rub-
ber Hand Illusion and Enfacement Illusion in
Sensory-LocalisedVicarious PainResponders.
Evidence for greater inuence of tactile-temporal
predictions.
3.1 Abstract
Individual dierences in experiencing the pain of others is linked to dierences in the sense
of body ownership as revealed by the rubber hand illusion paradigm (RHI). Specically,
people who report localised vicarious pain experiences (sensory-localised responders) ex-
perience the RHI during asynchronous visuo-tactile stroking as well as synchronous. This
atypical pattern is examined further in this study according to the Bayesian Sensory Infer-
ence Model in which computations of body ownership depend on the degree (and precision)
of sensory evidence, rather than synchrony per se. Sensory-localised responders only ex-
hibit the RHI in asynchronous conditions when the stroking is predictable (alternating) but
not when it is unpredictable (random), suggesting individual dierences in the way that
sensory evidence is weighted. There was no evidence that their bottom-up proprioceptive
signals are less precise. Moreover, the enfacement illusion paradigm (EI) was also employed
in order to establish performance on a conceptually related bodily illusion paradigm that
involves a completely dierent response judgment (based on vision rather than propriocep-
tion). Sensory-localised responders show a comparable pattern on this task consistent with
the idea that they have top-down (prior) dierences in the way body ownership is inferred,
independently of the exact judgment being made.
43 3.2
3.2 Introduction
3.2.1 Bodily ownership. An overview of the rubber hand
illusion (RHI) and enfacement illusion (EI) paradigms
The sense of self primarily arises from the feeling of owning one’s body. Bodily owner-
ship is one fundamental dimension of the bodily self and represents the capacity to at-
tribute our physical body and the sensations associated with it to ourselves (Costantini,
2014; Tsakiris, 2017). Notably, this dimension is malleable, and the experience of our
bodily self is not always as solid and coherent; it can be restricted as it happens in cases
of somatoparaphrenia when the ownership over one’s limb or part of the body is denied
(Feinberg et al., 2010) or expanded to incorporate parts of extraneous bodies (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2008) or full bodies (Blanke
and Metzinger, 2009).
Rubber Hand Illusion
The most popular paradigm proving the malleability of bodily ownership is the rubber
hand illusion (RHI) (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). In this paradigm, participants tend to
report that they feel ownership over a dummy hand thus expanding their own bodily
boundaries. The paradigm consists of placing a dummy hand in front of the participants
whilst their real hand is hidden from view. Subsequently, both hands are stroked either
synchronously (at the same time) or asynchronously (out of phase) and most evidence
shows that the illusion is stronger in the synchronous condition (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). The illusion is reected in an objective measure of
proprioceptive drift, when participants report that the real hand is positioned closer to
the rubber hand, and a subjective measure of self-report when participants report their
perceived experience of ownership, self-location or agency over the fake hand.
The initial synchronous and asynchronous conditions have represented the main
conguration of the RHI, but it has also known many variations along the time. These
variations included the introduction of new conditions such as: vision-only when parti-
cipants have to look at the dummy hand and no stroking is involved (Rohde et al., 2011;
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Samad et al., 2015); light condition when a laser beam plays on the dummy hand (Dur-
gin et al., 2007); or conditions when only one of the hands is stroked: either the dummy
hand with no touch on the real hand (Davies and White, 2013), or the real hand with
no strokes on the dummy hand (Botan et al., 2018b). The illusion is the strongest in
the synchronous condition as indicated by proprioceptive drift and subjective ratings,
but it can also occur in other conditions such as vision-only (Rohde et al., 2011; Samad
et al., 2015) or light (Durgin et al., 2007). Other manipulations consisted in changes in
the appearance (e.g. skin colour) of the dummy hand (Farmer et al., 2012; Lira et al.,
2017) or variations of the angle of the dummy hand in respect to the real hand and of
perspective (Bertamini et al., 2011; Ide, 2013; Holle et al., 2011), of the distance between
the dummy hand and participant’s body (Preston, 2013), and of the timing of the strokes
(Shimada et al., 2009; Costantini et al., 2016). Regarding the latter one, previous studies
have indicated that the strength of the illusion in the asynchronous condition is negat-
ively correlated with the delay time between the strokes. The eect of the illusion is very
strong for delays shorter than 300ms and it is signicantly attenuated by delays larger
than 600ms (Shimada et al., 2009). These results are compatible with the view that the
brain requires temporal contiguity of 200–300 ms to integrate visual and tactile/proprio-
ceptive inputs for self-body processing (Shimada et al., 2010). Moreover, the attenuation
is seen both in proprioceptive drift and subjective ratings measures (Shimada et al., 2014)
and it depends on participants’ temporal sensitivity (i.e. their ability to consciously de-
tect temporal discrepancies) (Costantini et al., 2016). These later ndings may explain
the great variability seen in the RHI and the fact that the correlation between visual
and tactile signals within certain time limits can be integrated together and inferred to
a common cause which, in some people at least, can elicit the RHI (Fujisaki et al., 2004;
Parise et al., 2012).
There have been various interpretations of these ndings and the mechanisms that
contribute to the illusion. The main theoretical explanation states that the RHI arises
mainly from the integration of proprioceptive, visual and somatosensory inputs which
are processed according to the internal body representation, the illusion being stronger
when the external inputs match each other but also the internal representation of the
body (Costantini and Haggard, 2007). There is a large body of evidence supporting this
theory, with various studies proposing that the illusion is enhanced by synchrony, when
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there is a complete match between all sensory signals: vision, touch, and proprioception
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Further evidence also sugges-
ted that the illusion is stronger when the rubber hand looks similar, has same orientation
and side as the real hand (e.g. both left or both right) and when the hand is within the
peripersonal space (PPS) of the person (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Preston, 2013; Makin
et al., 2008). Thus, the occurrence of the RHI seems to depend on an interplay between
bottom-up (i.e. external inputs) and top-down (i.e. previous body model) inferences
integrated in higher order multimodal areas (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2008;
Ishida et al., 2015; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2015). Notably, the illusion also occurs
in the absence of any direct tactile stimulation, in the vision-only condition by simply
looking at the dummy hand (Rohde et al., 2011; Samad et al., 2015) or in the light con-
dition by projecting a laser beam on it which usually elicits a thermal sensation on the
real hand (Durgin et al., 2007), the results in proprioceptive drift being comparable to
the ones obtained in the synchronous condition. This evidence suggests that the RHI is
more likely to be disrupted by asynchrony rather than enhanced by synchrony. How-
ever, since there is no mismatch between the sensorial inputs in the above-mentioned
conditions, the claim that the illusion is stronger when there is a match between the
external and internal inputs remains legitimate.
In the attempt to further elucidate these claims, Samad et al. (2015) applied the
Bayesian causal sensory inference model to stimulus integration in the RHI. This frame-
work sustains that the RHI derives mainly from the perception of a common cause for
proprioceptive, tactile and visual sensations and applies a causal inference process to
it. Thus, the Bayesian causal inference model would make an inference of the possible
common cause of the experience based on the prior probability of the cause (e.g. the
probability that the touch that I feel on my real hand is caused by the touch that I see
on the dummy hand) in which case, the properties of the stimulus including location
and time will be approximated according to the inferred cause. In the synchronous and
asynchronous conditions of the RHI, there are three modalities (i.e. vision, touch, and
proprioception) contributing to the experience which can be integrated based on the at-
tribution of a common cause and two signals (i.e. spatial and temporal) deriving from
these three modalities. Moreover, the model would generate optimal estimates of loc-
ation and time and their match with the actual input signals would result in a greater
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likelihood of attributing a common cause, as it usually happens in the synchronous con-
dition but not in the asynchronous condition when there is a temporal delay. In the
vision-only condition, there are only two modalities (i.e. vision and proprioception) and
one signal (i.e. spatial) involved in the illusion but, within this model, more precise
sensory signals are weighted more heavily (Ernst and Banks, 2002). Thus, vision which
is a highly precise and extremely reliable sensory signal can override proprioception, a
weaker input, making possible the occurrence of the illusion in the vision-only condition
(Rohde et al., 2011; Samad et al., 2015). As such, this model claries and reconciles nd-
ings obtained when manipulating the RHI with various conditions including synchrony,
asynchrony or vision-only. In our study, we used this model to make further predictions
about possible causes of atypical susceptibility to the RHI observed in vicarious pain
responders as further explained in the Section 3.2.2.
Enfacement Illusion
A second paradigm that has been widely used to investigate the bodily self is the en-
facement illusion (EI), a facial analogue of the RHI, which uses tactile facial stimulation
to manipulate the perceived similarity with ‘the other’. EI further exploits integration
of multisensory signals such as vision and touch to update the internal mental repres-
entation of self-appearance and, besides generating a greater feeling of ownership over
an extraneous body part (i.e. the face), it also acts on mnemonic mechanisms of face-
recognition and induces a new sense of identity (Tsakiris, 2008).
During the EI, touch is delivered to the participants’ face whilst they watch an induc-
tion video presenting mirrored touch delivered to an unfamiliar model’s face (Tsakiris,
2008; Sforza et al., 2010). The touch is delivered synchronously or asynchronously and
before and after each induction video measures of perceived similarity between the par-
ticipant and the model are taken. Participants judge if the morphed faces that they see
containing dierent percentages of themselves and the model look more like themselves
or not. Synchronous touch usually generates an increase in perceived similarity when
compared to the asynchronous one with participants recognising images that contain a
higher percentage of the model as self. They also report feeling greater ownership and
agency over and higher similarity to the model’s face (Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2011).
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This pattern of results further suggests that body representations of the self, includ-
ing appearance and facial features, are malleable and constantly updated by integrated
multisensory experiences and that selfhood emerges from the match between rst-hand
experience, observed actions, and felt sensations.
There have been many alterations of the EI, some of them concerning the induction
video, some others concerning the morphing procedure. The original EI study used
touched on a morphed face for the induction video (Tsakiris, 2008) whilst a following
study did not use a video, but a confederate placed in front of the participant (Sforza
et al., 2010). More recent studies used induction videos recording the face of the model
being stroked (Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2011; Maister et al., 2013), this being the option we
opted for due to its robustness and simplicity. Regarding the morphing procedure, this
also varied from displaying morph videos that participants had to stop whenever they
believed that the face looked more like the self (Tsakiris, 2008; Tajadura-Jimenez et al.,
2011) or presentation of morphed faces in increments of 1% or 2% that participants had to
judge as looking more like the self or like the other (binary decision) (Tajadura-Jimenez
et al., 2011; Maister et al., 2013) or using a VAS scale for perceived resemblance with the
morph (continuous decision). We opted for the presentation of 2% increment morphs and
a binary decision of resembling more self versus other. Regardless of the procedure, all
studies provided evidence that synchrony had a stronger eect on perceived similarity
than asynchrony.
In this study, the EI complements the RHI and adds two important aspects to it in
relation to vicarious pain. Firstly, it explores the ability to identify with the other and
to expand ownership over a face and not only a hand by re-adjusting mnemonic facial
representations. Secondly, it serves to clarify the role of proprioception (a main com-
ponent of multisensory inputs in the RHI that lacks in the EI) in the susceptibility to
bodily-ownership paradigms in a group of vicarious pain responders as further claried
and explained in the next section.
3.2.2 Bodily ownership and vicarious pain
There are noticeable dierences in the susceptibility to bodily ownership paradigms,
with certain sub-groups of the population being susceptible to a higher or a lesser degree.
48 3.2
Notably, dierences in susceptibility to bodily ownership illusions have been registered
in vicarious sensory responders, people who report a sensorial bodily response when
seeing others enduring tactile stimulation such as touch or pain (Davies and White, 2013;
Derbyshire et al., 2013; Botan et al., 2018b). This phenomenon has been mainly attributed
to overreactive sensory mirroring mechanisms and to shared self-other representations
(Ward and Banissy, 2015) which may lead to a tendency to treat the other as the self to the
point of expanding self-bodily ownership over the other. Indeed, previous research has
shown that vicarious sensory responders have a greater susceptibility to bodily owner-
ship illusions. For instance, mirror-touch synaesthetes (MTS) report greater ownership
than controls in the RHI paradigm when touch is delivered exclusively to the dummy
hand (Davies and White, 2013). Analogously, when observing touch on somebody else’s
face in an adapted version of the EI, MTS feel touch on their own face but also blur the
boundaries between self and other and consider that the other resembles more them-
selves (Maister et al., 2013).
In this paper, we will focus on vicarious pain responses, the ability to report a con-
scious bodily feeling of pain when seeing others in pain and which characterize almost
30% of the population (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a). Based on previous research, we
used two dierent groups of vicarious pain responders which were classied accord-
ingly to the quality of pain felt. Thus, in our experiment we had: a control group or
non-responders, people who do not report any bodily sensation of pain when seeing
other in pain and represent about 70% of the population; a group of sensory-localised
pain responders (S/L) , people who report feeling a bodily sensation of pain when seeing
others in pain which is localised and has sensorial qualities and represent approxim-
ately 17% ; and a group of aective-general pain responders (A/G), people who report
feeling a bodily sensation of pain when seeing others in pain which is generalised and
has aective qualities and represent approximately 10% of the population. A vicarious
pain questionnaire was used in order to group the participants (please see Grice-Jackson
et al. (2017a); Botan et al. (2018b) for further details).
Atypical patterns of susceptibility to the RHI have already been recorded in vicarious
pain responders. Derbyshire et al. (2013) used the RHI paradigm and reported a greater
tendency to incorporate the rubber hand in the pain-responder group when compared
to controls but they only used subjective reports and did not dierentiate the vicari-
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ous pain responders in two groups based on the quality of the pain felt. In a more
recent study, Botan et al. (2018b) showed that only the sensory-localised group of vi-
carious pain responders displayed a greater tendency to incorporate the rubber hand in
both synchronous and asynchronous conditions as recorded by subjective ratings and
proprioceptive drift. Moreover, there was a greater tendency to incorporate the rubber
hand in the light condition but not in the see-only condition, when the stroking was ap-
plied only to the dummy hand, results that dier from the ones obtained by Davies and
White (2013) in MTS. Thus, there seems to be a tendency in S/L vicarious pain respon-
ders to be more susceptible to the RHI, a characteristic present in MTS too, however,
there are dierences in the performance on certain conditions. More specically, S/L
responders perceive asynchrony as synchrony in the RHI and they also have a stronger
tendency towards greater ownership when a light beam touches the dummy hand, likely
eliciting tactile and thermal sensations on the real hand (Durgin et al., 2007). However,
this is not a general tendency to incorporate the rubber hand since it does not occur in
conditions such as seeing the dummy hand being stroked or receiving touch only on the
real hand (see Botan et al. (2018b)). Moreover, it is unlikely that the S/L responders are
susceptible to the asynchronous condition because they do not perceive the time-delay.
As previously mentioned, delays of 600ms (i.e. used in the current studies) severely dis-
rupt the illusion (Shimada et al., 2009, 2014; Costantini et al., 2016). As such, it is more
likely that their susceptibility is due to temporal correlations between the timing of the
strokes (e.g. (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Samad et al., 2015). In other words, S/L responders
have a greater propensity towards recalibrating predictable lagging sensory signals in
order to be consistent with an internal model of common cause (Fujisaki et al., 2004;
Parise et al., 2012), a possibility which will be further investigated in the present study.
In the present study, we try to further elucidate this atypical pattern of performance
on the RHI within the Bayesian sensory inference model. As previously explained, this
framework proposes that the experience of the RHI derives from integrating incoming
sensory signals by attributing a common cause to them based on prior probabilities.
Thus, signals which are spatially and temporarily matched are more likely to generate
the illusion since they have a higher likelihood to be integrated and to correspond to
prior expectations (Samad et al., 2015). Concomitantly, it also emphasizes the importance
of the precision of sensory signals and, according to the Bayesian model of sensory
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inference, more precise sensory signals such as vision overweigh proprioception. As
such, the illusion would occur just by looking at the hand (in the vision-only condition)
but the synchronous condition, consisting in a perfect match between all inputs, would
provide the strongest evidence for the illusion.
By applying this model to the atypical performance of sensory-localised vicarious
pain responders on the RHI, namely greater susceptibility to the illusion in the asyn-
chronous and/or light conditions, a few explanations can be formulated. Firstly, this
group may weigh visual input more than proprioceptive input either because they rely
more on visual capture or because they have higher proprioceptive imprecision than the
other groups (a probable but unlikely scenario considering the fact that they do not re-
port higher drifts in the see-only condition). Secondly, this group may rely more on the
perfect correlation between visual and tactile signals (in the asynchronous condition, the
strokes on the real hand are always delivered at a specic time after the strokes on the
dummy hand) inducing more easily the perception of a common cause and recalibrat-
ing visual-tactile temporal synchrony (Fujisaki et al., 2004; Parise et al., 2012). Thus, an
asynchronous random condition, when the touch would be delivered at unpredictable
times would strongly disrupt the illusion in all groups.
Starting from these premises, our hypotheses regarding why the S/L group may
present the atypical pattern of performance on the illusion, perceiving asynchrony as
synchrony were: a) they rely more on visual capture, thus showing higher drift in the
vision-only condition when compared to the other two groups; b) they have higher
proprioceptive imprecision, easily overwritten by visual capture so they would show
higher proprioceptive imprecision when compared to the other two groups; or c) they
rely more on prior expectations regarding the time when the touch is delivered thus they
would not be susceptible to the illusion in an asynchronous random condition when the
touch is delivered randomly, at unpredictable times.
In order to address this, two more conditions and one extra measure were added to
the paradigm. Thus, alongside the synchronous and asynchronous conditions, a vision-
only condition, a measure of visual capture, and an asynchronous random condition
were used. In the vision-only condition, participants had to simply look at the dummy
hand for two minutes. In the asynchronous-random condition, participants received
alternating strokes on either the real or the dummy hand but at dierent time intervals
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so they could not predict when the next stroke would be delivered. The new measure
introduced consisted in taking three reported measurements of the position of the real
hand before every condition, without any other previous manipulation, generating a
total of twelve measurements. The variation in these measures was calculated providing
an indicator of the proprioceptive imprecision (the higher the variation, the higher the
imprecision) and, according to our predictions, this would be higher in the S/L group
and would positively correlate with proprioceptive drift amplitude.
Besides the RHI paradigm, the EI paradigm was used to determine if the S/L group
of vicarious pain responders tends to identify more with someone else’s visual features.
We hypothesised that, if the performance of the S/L group is not disrupted by asyn-
chrony, then they would identify more with the model in the asynchronous condition
too. Moreover, the greater susceptibility to the EI would indicate that proprioceptive im-
precision, a crucial component of integrated inputs in the RHI but not in the EI, cannot
be the only or main factor contributing to their atypical performance and that this group
would also be more prone to identify with another person and not only to incorporate an
extraneous body part. As such, this group may have diculties in accurately inferring
selfhood, irrespective of whether they are making self-related proprioceptive or visual
appearance judgments.
3.3 Materials and Methods
3.3.1 Participants
A total of 59 participants (mean age = 22.28, SD = 4.53; 49 females) completed the study.
Participants were recruited via email invitation or via SONA from Sussex University,
and all but four (two S/L and two A/G) had never taken part in our previous research
(Botan et al., 2018b). Ethical approval was obtained from the Science and Technology
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex and all participants oered their
written informed consent at the beginning of the study.
Each participant had previously completed the VPQ online via Qualtrics Online Sur-
vey and were divided into three groups following a cluster analysis conducted on a larger
dataset of participants (Aged 18–60 years, mean age = 20.11, SD= 6.94; 290 Males, 1004
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Females). There were 27 participants classed as non- responders (i.e. controls) (mean age
= 23.26, SD = 5.64, 19 females), 20 participants classed as sensory-localised (S/L) respon-
ders (mean age = 21.52, SD = 3.62, 17 females) and 12 participants classed as aective-
general (A/G) responders (mean age = 21.42, SD = 2.64, 11 females). The groups did not
dier by age (F(2,57) = 1.144, p = 0.326, η2 = 0.039) or gender (χ2 = 2.351, p = 0.309).
In the rubber hand illusion task, 8 participants (6 controls and 2 S/L) lack measure-
ments for proprioceptive variance and the asynchronous random condition which were
introduced at a later time. Due to technical and logistical issues, 7 participants (4 controls
and 3 S/L) did not complete the EI task.
3.3.2 Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ)
Before completing the tasks, all participants undertook the VPQ. They watched 16 videos
(no audio) of people experiencing physical pain (e.g. falls, sports injuries, injections)
(Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a). After each video, they had to report :1) if they experi-
enced a bodily sensation of pain;2) how intense was the pain (1-10 Likert scale); 3) if
the pain was localised to the same place, to a dierent place or generalised to the en-
tire body; 4) asked to describe the pain selecting various pain adjectives. These answers
were used to generate the three variables (i.e. pain intensity, localised-generalized re-
sponses, and sensory – aective responses) entered the two-step cluster analysis. The
three groups of vicarious pain responders were generated: controls or non-responders,
sensory-localised (S/L) and aective general (A/G) (for further details see Botan et al.
(2018b)).
3.3.3 Rubber Hand Illusion
In the RHI task, participant’s right arm was placed in a box (86cm ∗ 60cm ∗ 20cm),
hidden from view and a visible life-size model of a right hand was placed in the box,
directly in front of participant body midline. The stroking was applied to the index
nger and the distance between participant’s right index nger and the index nger of
the fake hand was 20 cm. Four conditions were performed in a counterbalanced order
across participants: synchronous (the timing of the brush strokes on the rubber hand
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and participant’s own hand was synchronized); asynchronous (the timing of the brush
strokes was out of phase by approximately 625ms); vision-only (no stroking at all, the
participants had to look at the rubber hand for 2 minutes) and asynchronous random
(the timing of the brush strokes was out of phase, but this time was completely random;
the participants could not predict when the next stroke would start). At the beginning
of each condition, the participant was asked to estimate the location of her/his right
index ngertip three times by reading the corresponding number along a one-meter ruler
laid whose position varied each time to prevent the participant repeating responses in
subsequent readings. This generated 12 baseline location measurements (three for each
of the four conditions). The standard deviation was calculated for each participant across
the 12 measurements, giving an estimation of the variation in proprioception.
Post-induction nger location judgements were obtained in the same manner as prior
to the induction. Proprioceptive drift was calculated by subtracting the average of the
pre-induction nger location judgements from the average of post-induction nger loc-
ation judgement:
PD = mean(post−inductionjudgements)−mean(pre−inductionjudgements).
After each condition, participants completed the RHI questionnaire comprising 10
items divided into three subscales: ownership, location, and agency (Longo et al., 2008),
see Appendix B.1, Table B.1 for further details. The items were measured on a 7-point
Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
3.3.4 Enfacement illusion (EI)
The EI task comprised 120s-long clips recording the face of a model being stroked on the
right cheek with a cotton bud at a frequency of approximately one stroke per second.
There were four models: two females and two males and digital photographs of their
faces were taken and subsequently edited on Photoshop CS6, having all non-facial attrib-
utes (i.e. hair, ears etc.) removed and a uniform grey background replacing the original
one. Both clips and photographs were in black and white and the models had a neutral
face-expression. The models and participants were gender-matched and all models were
Caucasian (N.B. race does not seem to inuence the illusion (Bufalari et al., 2014)).
Prior to the experiment, a photograph of the participant face was also taken and ed-
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ited following the same procedure as the models’ photographs. Subsequently, the parti-
cipant face was morphed into the model face using the Abrasoft FantaMorph5 software.
The procedure generated morphs of 2% increments in which the participant face was
merged with the model face resulting in 50 pictures per model (Sforza et al., 2010). The
morphs used in the task varied between 30% and 70% resulting in a total of 21 morphed
pictures, the rst picture representing 30% model’s face and 70% participant’s face and
the last picture the reverse.
The experiment consisted of two blocks: the synchronous block when the participant
face was stroked simultaneously with the model’s face and the asynchronous block when
the strokes on the participant face alternated with the ones on the model’s face, by a
delay of approximately 500ms.
During the experimental procedure, the participants rst performed a self-recognition
task when they saw the 30% to 70% increment morphs in a randomized order and had to
judge if the face depicted ‘looked more like their own face or like the other person’s face’.
They were instructed to make their decision using the arrows on the keyboard, with left
arrow key corresponding to ‘more like myself’ and right arrow key corresponding to
‘more like the model’s face’. Subsequently, they watched the 120s induction clip with
their face being stroked synchronously or asynchronously with the face of the model.
The clip was presented three times per block and the self-recognition task was performed
at the beginning of each block as a pre-induction (baseline) measurement and after each
trial (i.e. video presentation) as a post-induction measurement. Thus, each block con-
sisted of a baseline measurement and three trials (i.e. the participants watched the clip
three times for each condition). Only one model was used for each block and the block
and model order was counterbalanced. A detailed representation of the task can be seen
in Figure 3.1.
For each self-recognition task, the point of subjective equality (PSE), representing the
point when the participants cannot distinguish between self and other, was calculated
using a logistic function (Bacaër, 2011). The logistic function was applied to the per-
centages of the morph data (x values) generating binary probabilities of y tted values
(Cramer, 2002). The x value corresponding to the minimum value of the sum of square
dierences between the y values (actual binary responses) and y tted values (the binary
probabilities generated by the logistic function) represented the PSE, namely the steep
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transition of the sigmoid curve.
The PSEs obtained for each trial were averaged and the baseline PSE was subtrac-
ted independently for each condition according to the formula: PSEtotal = (PSE1 +
PSE2+PSE3)/3 – PSEbaseline. Thus, PSEtotal represents the value of how much more
percentages from the face of the model were present in the morph. For instance, a
PSEtotal of 2% means that 2 more percentages of the model’s face were present in the
morph after the induction and, in this situation, the participant tended to identify more
with the other. Reversely, a PSEtotal of -2% means that 2 more percentages of the parti-
cipant’s face were present in the morph and, in this situation, the participant tended to
identify less with the other.
Figure 3.1: EI task: detailed representation.
After each condition, participants completed the EI questionnaire comprising 14
items divided into four subscales: ownership, appearance, disownership, and agency
(Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2011), see Appendix B.1, Table B.2 for further details. The items
were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
3.3.5 Data analysis
All analyses were conducted in SPSS version 25 (SPSS Inc., USA). Synchronous and asyn-
chronous conditions for objective measures of proprioceptive drift in the RHI and PSE in
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the EI were analysed using 3(group) ∗ 2(condition) mixed model ANOVAs. The other
PD measures including proprioceptive imprecision, vision-only condition, and asyn-
chronous random condition were analysed using between-groups one-way ANOVAs.
Most variables passed Levene’s test for equality of variances (the only exceptions being
the vision condition in the RHI and asynchronous condition in the EI Illusion). When
this assumption was violated, post-hoc t-test results of equal variances not assumed
were reported (Field, 2013). When Shapiro-Wilk normality tests were violated (p<0.05)
(i.e. questionnaire data), non-parametric tests were run. Pearson correlations between
proprioceptive imprecision and drift magnitude in each condition were also run.
Questionnaire results for both RHI and EI were analysed using non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis H tests for ordinal data comparing all groups and subsequent post-hoc non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U tests comparing two independent groups.
Outliers were excluded for each condition using SPSS based on the 3rd interquartile
range (IQR) (Manikandan, 2011). Thus, one outlier was excluded from the asynchron-
ous condition, four from the vision-only condition, one from the asynchronous random
condition, and three from proprioceptive imprecision. No outliers were found in the
questionnaire data outside the 3-IQR. Subsequent post-hoc tests adjusted for multiple
comparisons (Bonferroni corrections) assessed dierences between and within groups.
The sample size was calculated using G-power calculator F-tests (Faul et al., 2007).
It was based on the results obtained in the previous study in the synchronous and asyn-
chronous conditions, setting alpha at 0.05, power at 0.8, and considering a large eect
size (as indicated in Article 1), the suggested sample size was 64, thus approximately 21
participants in each group. Both control and S/L group reached this number, but the
A/G group was considerably smaller (i.e. 12 participants). Previous studies using clin-
ical population (e.g. autism) have employed samples of 12 participants (Palmer et al.,
2013). Given that the S/L group was the one of interest, previously showing atypical
performance on the RHI, these numbers were considered acceptable and the results rep-
licated previous ndings. Extra attention should be paid to the visual and asynchronous
-random conditions and future studies should try to replicate these ndings too.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 RHI proprioceptive drift results
Means and standard deviations of proprioceptive drift for each condition and in each
group are shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Proprioceptive drift means± standard deviations in mm for each condition and in each
group.
Synchronous Asynchronous Visual Only Asynchronous Random
Controls 28.83 ± 33.04 -1. 42 ± 16.21 17.65 ± 27.45 2.87 ± 12.66
S/L 21.02 ± 26.99 17.63 ± 19.37 18.14 ± 34.89 -3.75 ± 13.77
A/G 10.76 ± 20.02 0.00 ± 19.27 18.94 ± 15.69 4.09 ± 18.37
A mixed model 3(group) ∗ 2(condition) ANOVA run on the synchronous and asyn-
chronous conditions showed a statistically signicant interaction, F(2,54)=3.756, p=0.030,
η2=0.122. There was a main eect of condition, F(1,54)=7.918, p = 0.007, η2=0.128 but the
main eect of group did not reach signicance F(2,54) = 2.006, p=0.144, η2=0.069. Bonfer-
roni corrections were applied setting alpha at 0.008. An alpha value of 0.05 was divided
by six comparisons (3 groups x 2 conditions) in each analysis. Post-hoc paired t-tests
revealed that proprioceptive drift was signicantly greater in the synchronous than in
the asynchronous conditions in the control group, t(26)=4.268, p < 0.001, but not in the
in the S/L group, t(18)=0.453, p=0.656 nor in the A/G group, t(10)=0.888, p = 0.395. In-
dependent t-tests revealed a signicant higher drift in the S/L group when compared
to the control group, t(44) = -3.621, p=0.001, d=0.89 and the A/G group, t(29) = 2.474,
p=0.019, d=0.84 for the asynchronous condition. However, this very last comparison did
not survive Bonferrroni corrections set as alpha =0.008 despite having a large eect size.
These results can be seen in Figure 3.2.
The other conditions were analysed using one-way ANOVAs. No signicant dif-
ferences were found in the vision condition between groups, F(2,56)=0.008, p=0.992,
η2=0.015 or in the random condition, F(2,44)=1.239, p=0.300, η2=0.003. Paired t-tests
re-conrmed that drift in the vision-only condition was comparable to drift in the syn-
chronous condition in all groups: controls, t(26)=1.772, p = 0.088; S/L, t(18)= 0.262, p =
0.796; A/G, t(9)=-0.939, p = 0.372, and higher than the asynchronous condition in the
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Figure 3.2: Proprioceptive drift in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions in each group.
Bars indicate the mean ± 1 standard error. Non-R= controls; S/L= sensory-localised;
A/G=aective-general.
control group, t(26)=-3.365, p = 0.002 but not in the S/L group, t(17)=-0.471, p =0.643 nor
in the and A/G group, t(10)=-1.964, p=0.078. Results can be seen in Figure 3.3a. Paired
t-tests showed that drift in the asynchronous random condition were lower than in the
synchronous condition in controls t(17)= 2.825, p = 0.012 and the S/L group, t(15)=3.433,
p=0.004, but not in the A/G group, t(10)=0.920, p=0.379. Notably, drift in the asynchron-
ous random condition was lower than drift in the asynchronous condition in S/L group,
t(14)=3.025, p=0.008, d=0.88 but not in controls t(17)= -0.561, p = 0.582 nor A/G group
t(10)=-0.143, p=0.889. Results can be seen in Figure 3.3b.
Results obtained on the entire sample showing dierences in proprioceptive drift
between conditions can be seen in Appendix B.2.1. Regarding proprioceptive impreci-
sion, there were no dierences between groups F(2,49)=2.705, p=0.077, η2=0.086. Im-
portantly, the order of the conditions did not aect the magnitude of proprioceptive im-
precision (the results can be seen in Appendix B.2.4). That is, there is no evidence that
the S/L group have less reliable proprioceptive signals. However, Pearson correlations
run on the entire sample showed a positive correlation between proprioceptive impre-
cision and drift in the asynchronous, r= 0.301, p=0.036 and vision-only, r=0.444, p=0.002
conditions. There were no correlations between proprioceptive drift and synchronous,
r=0.087, p=0.554 or asynchronous random, r=0.097, p=0.541 conditions. The correla-
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Figure 3.3: Proprioceptive drift in a) vision-only condition against synchronous and asynchron-
ous conditions; b) asynchronous-random condition against synchronous and asyn-
chronous conditions. Bars indicate the mean ± 1 standard error. Non-R= controls;
S/L= sensory-localised; A/G=aective-general.
tions did not reach signicance in the control group for neither asynchronous: r=0.033,
p=0.895, nor vision: r=-0.102, p=0.686 conditions, whilst in the A/G group the correlation
was negative for the asynchronous condition: r=-0.666, p=0.018, and non-signicant for
the visual condition: r=0.270, p=0.422. Thus, these correlations were driven by the S/L
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group where they were the strongest: for the asynchronous condition, r = 0.716, p=0.001,
for the vision-only condition, r=0.731, p=0.001. Correlation results can be seen in Figure
3.4.
Figure 3.4: a) Proprioceptive imprecision at baseline expressed in mm; b) correlation between
proprioceptive imprecision at baseline and drift in the asynchronous condition; c)
correlation between proprioceptive imprecision at baseline and drift in vision-only
condition.
Overall, there were no signicant dierences in proprioceptive drift between syn-
chronous and asynchronous conditions in the S/L group which also recorded higher
proprioceptive drift in the asynchronous condition when compared to the other two
groups re-conrming that this group perceives asynchrony as synchrony. There were
no signicant dierences between groups in the vision-only and asynchronous-random
conditions between groups and drift in the asynchronous-random condition was sig-
nicantly lower than drift in the asynchronous and synchronous conditions in the S/L
group indicating that this group does not rely more on visual capture and that disrupting
tactile-temporal expectations inhibits susceptibility to the illusion in this group. There
are no dierences in proprioceptive imprecision between groups but there is a correl-
ation between proprioceptive imprecision and the magnitude of proprioceptive drift in
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asynchronous and vision conditions driven by the S/L group suggesting that S/L do not
have higher proprioceptive imprecision, but they are more susceptible to it.
3.4.2 RHI Subjective ratings
The medians of RHI subjective ratings for each condition and in each group can be seen
in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Medians for each condition and each subscale of the RHI questionnaire.
Synchronous Asynchornous Visual-only Asynchronous
Random
Own Loc Age Own Loc Age Own Loc Age Own Loc Age
Non-resp 5.00 4.33 4.00 1.80 2.00 1.50 2.4 2.67 1.00 2.20 2.33 1.00
S/L 5.20 4.50 4.50 2.20 2.67 2.00 2.50 2.67 1.25 2.89 2.89 2.64
A/G 5.00 4.33 4.00 2.20 2.67 2.00 2.40 2.67 1.00 2.40 2.33 2.00
Non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis H tests for ordinal data were used to analyse dier-
ences between groups for each condition and on each of the subscales. There were no
signicant dierences between groups on any of the conditions or subscales. The results
of Kruskal-Wallis H tests can be seen in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Kruskall-Wallis H test results indicating dierences between groups for each condition
and subscale.
Ownership Location Agency
Synchronous H= 0.770
p= 0.681
H= 0.050
p= 0.975
H= 0.802
p= 0.670
Asynchronous H= 2.238
p= 0.372
H= 4.125
p= 0.127
H= 3.657
p= 0.161
Vision-only H= 0.287
p= 0.866
H= 0.752
p= 0.687
H= 0.166
p= 0.920
Asynchronous-
Random
H= 0.905
p= 0.920
H= 1.724
p= 0.422
H= 4.330
p= 0.115
Results obtained on the entire sample showing dierence in subjective ratings between
conditions can be seen in Appendix B.2.2. Overall, these results indicate that there were
no dierences between groups on any of the subjective report measures, re-conrming
the drift results obtained in the synchronous, vision-only and asynchronous-random
conditions but not in the asynchronous condition.
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3.4.3 EI: Point of Subjective Equality (PSE) results
PSE means and standard deviations expressed as percentages for each condition and in
each group are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Means± standard deviations expressed in percentages of the dierence between post-
induction PSE and baseline PSE for each condition and in each group.
Synchronous Asynchronous
Controls 5.93 ± 4.76 2.72 ± 4.92
S/L 5.07 ± 6.84 5.11 ± 3.45
A/G 4.50 ± 4.67 -0.50 ± 2.13
Figure 3.5: PSE for synchronous and asynchronous conditions in each group. Bars indicate the
mean ± 1 standard error. Non-R= controls; S/L= sensory-localised; A/G=aective-
general.
PSE for the synchronous and asynchronous blocks were analysed in a mixed model
3(group) ∗ 2(condition) ANOVA. The results showed a statistically signicant interac-
tion, F(2,50)=3.418, p=0.041, η2=0.120. There was a main eect of condition, F(1,50)=12.363,
p = 0.001, η2=0.198 but the main eect of group did not reach signicance F(2,50) = 2.271,
p=0.114, η2=0.083. Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed that the point of subjective equality
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(PSE) was signicantly greater in the synchronous than in the asynchronous conditions
in the control group, t(22)=3.850, p = 0.001, and in the A/G group, t(11)=3.561, p = 0.004,
but not in the in the S/L group, t(17)=-0.022, p=0.983. Independent t-tests revealed a sig-
nicant higher PSE in the S/L group when compared to the A/G group, t(28) = -5.024,
p=0.001, d =1.38 but not the control group t(39) = - 1.749, p= 0.088, d=0.53 for the asyn-
chronous condition. These results can be seen in Figure 3.5.
3.4.4 EI: Subjective ratings
Medians of EI subjective ratings for each condition and in each group can be seen in
Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Medians in EI subjective ratings in each group and for each condition and subscale.
Synchornous Asynchronous
Ownership Appearance Agency Disownership Ownership Appearance Agency Disownership
Non-resp 2.20 4.33 2.50 3.00 1.40 2.67 2.00 2.00
S/L 2.90 4.83 4.50 4.00 2.50 5.50 2.75 3.50
A/G 2.80 5.00 2.75 3.50 1.40 3.00 1.75 3.00
Non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis H tests for ordinal data were used to analyse dier-
ences between groups for each condition and on each of the subscales. There were no
signicant dierences between groups on most of the conditions or subscales except for
the disownership subscale in the asynchronous condition as it can be seen in Table 3.6.
Further Mann-Whitney U test revealed that the S/L group reported greater disownership
in the asynchronous condition that the control group Z= -2.634, p = 0.008, d=0.81.
Table 3.6: Kruskal-Wallis H test results indicating group dierences in EI subjective ratings for
each condition and each subscale.
Ownership Appearance Agency Disownership
Synchronous H= 1.279
p= 0.528
H= 1.953
p= 0.377
H= 5.613
p= 0.060
H= 3.956
p= 0.174
Asynchronous H= 3.495
p= 0.174
H= 3.336
p= 0.189
H= 1.974
p= 0.373
H= 7.040
p= 0.030
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3.5 Discussion
The present study further explored bodily ownership in vicarious pain responders by in-
terpreting the atypical susceptibility to the RHI observed in sensory-localised vicarious
pain responders through the Bayesian sensory inference model (Samad et al., 2015) and
by exploring their performance on a second bodily ownership paradigm, namely the EI.
Our results for both RHI and EI paradigms indicated no signicant dierence between
synchronous and asynchronous conditions in the S/L group, reconrming previous res-
ults showing that S/L responders perceive asynchrony as synchrony.
The EI and RHI present numerous similarities and, together with full body owner-
ship illusions, they exploit the same mechanisms of multisensory integration, all these
illusions being stronger when there is a perfect match between the incoming sensory
signals (Serino et al., 2013). Furthermore, both EI and RHI tap on similar mechanisms
of bodily-ownership and, during the experience of embodying a dierent body part, be
it a hand or a face, same multimodal parietal brain regions are recruited including the
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and the temporo-parietal junction, and the premotor cortex,
an area with high density of mirror-neurons (agency/correspondence of actions give the
illusion of ownership) (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Apps et al., 2013). The
dierence between the RHI and the EI consists in the fact that the latter taps into mne-
monic processes of recognition and facial identity besides the ones of bodily ownership.
This is supported by neuroanatomical evidence indicating the recruitment of areas pro-
cessing facial identity in the EI, mainly the unimodal inferior occipital gyrus, a crucial
component in the face perception network that responds to synchronicity and enhanced
feeling of ownership (Nagy et al., 2012).
Considering the above, our results suggest that bodily perception and recognition
mechanisms dier in S/L responders. These mechanisms rely on multisensory integra-
tion processes and lead to a greater tendency to alter self-other bodily representations.
Mainly, S/L responders seem to rely more on tactile and corporeal priors as further dis-
cussed.
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3.5.1 RHI results and the Bayesian Sensory Inference Model
Firstly, our results indicated no signicant dierence between proprioceptive drift in
the synchronous and asynchronous conditions in the S/L group. There were also no
signicant dierences between these two conditions in A/G responders, but the sample
was small, and these results were due to a low drift in the synchronous condition in this
group and not to a higher drift in the asynchronous one. These results may suggest that
the A/G group is less susceptible to the illusion, however, after collapsing drift results
from rst and second study and obtaining a very robust sample, there were no signicant
dierences between this group and controls as it can be seen in Appendix B.3.
We did not obtain signicant dierences in the questionnaire data, but the sample
was considerably smaller than in the previous experiment. Furthermore, it has been
previously indicated that the reported subjective experience of the illusion and the per-
ceived location of the hand as measured by drift magnitude may be correlated (Tsakiris
and Haggard, 2005) but they do not necessarily correspond to each other (Rohde et al.,
2011; Holle et al., 2011; Carruthers, 2013; Riemer et al., 2015). In our sample, the drift cor-
related with the subjective ratings only for the asynchronous and vision conditions as it
can be seen in Appendix B.2.3. Drift and subjective ratings are believed to correspond to
two dierent dimensions of bodily ownership: body-location (i.e. proprioceptive drift)
and body-ownership (i.e. subjective experience of ownership and/or agency) (for a re-
view see Serino et al. (2013)) and they also have dierent neuronal correlates: rTPJ is
involved mainly in self-location and vPMc/PPc in body ownership.
Regarding the other two conditions that were introduced in this study, there were no
signicant dierences between groups in the vision-only condition nor in the asynchronous-
random condition. According to the Bayesian sensory inference model, the illusion de-
pends on the match and strength of the incoming sensory signals and high precision
signals, such as vision, outweigh less precise signals such as proprioceptive location.
The vision-only condition was used in order to establish if the S/L group relies more on
visual input, leading to a biased estimation of hand location based on the place where the
vision signal comes from (i.e. the place of the dummy hand). The clear absence of sig-
nicant dierences between this group and the other two groups indicates that they do
not rely more on visual capture. Importantly, the overall results matched the predictions
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of the model, namely that the illusion occurs in the vision-only condition. Our results
indicated comparable drift in the vision-only condition with the one in the synchronous
condition in line with previous results obtained by Rohde et al. (2011) and Samad et al.
(2015). Also, drift in the vision only condition was higher than in the asynchronous con-
dition in the control group but not in the S/L group indicating that the S/L group has a
similar performance on all these conditions. The questionnaire results indicated that the
subjective experience of the illusion is still stronger in the synchronous condition than
in the vision-only condition suggesting that the synchronous condition indeed provides
the strongest evidence for the illusion as previously vehiculated. It also re-enforces the
fact that subjective perception and objective drift are two dierent dimensions of the
illusion.
The asynchronous-random condition was introduced in order to test the hypothesis
that S/L responders rely more on tactile-temporal predictions. The Bayesian sensory
model uses causal inference to predict optimal estimates of location and time which are
subsequently matched to the actual incoming sensory signals. Thus, a match between
expectations and input signals would result in a greater likelihood of attributing a com-
mon cause, as it usually happens in the synchronous condition but not in the asynchron-
ous condition when there is a temporal delay. Importantly, high correlation between
multi-sensory events can lead to the attribution of a common cause (Parise et al., 2012)
and this may happen in the asynchronous condition due to the perfect correlation of
visual and tactile signals. This may also explain why sometimes a small positive drift is
observed in the general population in the asynchronous condition but signicantly smal-
ler than synchronous drift (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). In
the asynchronous-random condition, the tactile-temporal rhythmicity of the asynchron-
ous condition was disrupted so participants could not predict the time of the next stroke.
Thus, we would expect asynchronous random drift to be smaller than the asynchronous
drift and the illusion completely suppressed. In the entire sample, the drift was smal-
ler in asynchronous-random compared to the asynchronous condition and very close to
0 (see Appendix B.2.1) suggesting that this condition severely disrupts the illusion. In
the S/L group, asynchronous random drift was negative and signicantly smaller than
drift in the asynchronous condition indicating that this group strongly relies on tactile-
temporal expectations and that the high correlation between tactile and temporal signals
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is critical for in this group for experiencing the illusion.
Results in proprioceptive imprecision showed no dierences between groups sug-
gesting that the S/L group does not have higher tactile imprecision which would be
easily overwritten by visual input and lead to higher drift in conditions other than the
synchronous one. However, there was a positive correlation between proprioceptive im-
precision and drift amplitude in asynchronous and visual conditions. Importantly, this
correlation was led by the S/L group indicating that, if proprioceptive imprecision is
higher in S/L responders, they are more likely to report a higher drift in synchronous
and asynchronous conditions and are more susceptible to proprioceptive imprecision
compared to the other two groups. Interestingly, the correlation was observed only for
the asynchronous and vision-only conditions which may be in line with previous predic-
tions of the Bayesian sensory inference model, namely that the synchronous condition
generates the highest drift, being the condition of maximum saturation and that the
asynchronous random condition would completely abolish drift being at the other end
of the spectrum.
Altogether, the results obtained suggest that vision is not a stronger signal and that
proprioceptive imprecision is not weaker in the S/L group. However, S/L responders
rely more on tactile-temporal correlations recalibrating visual and tactile modalities and
attributing a common cause to them and they are also more susceptible to proprioceptive
imprecision.
3.5.2 EI results
The point of subjective equality (PSE) was comparable in the synchronous and asyn-
chronous conditions in the S/L group indicating that S/L responders identify more with
the other’s face in both conditions and re-conrming that asynchrony is perceived as
synchrony in this group. Considering previous results obtained in the RHI, we can as-
sume that this is due to the perfect tactile-temporal correlation. Moreover, the EI does
not have a proprioceptive component so the results obtained can be mainly attributed to
tactile-temporal rhythmicity and meeting strong tactile expectations (i.e. receiving the
stroke when it is expected).
The subjective ratings results registered higher disownership over own’s face in the
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S/L group when compared to controls in the asynchronous condition, but no dier-
ences were recorded in the other three subscales including ownership, appearance, and
agency. This may indicate a propensity in this group towards disowning self in order
to identify or feel the other, or just a higher tendency towards depersonalisation traits
or depersonalisation-like experiences (Bowling et al., 2019). In this task, objective and
subjective measures of the illusion seem to be more in line with each other, however,
there are not in perfect agreement. PSE, analogously to proprioceptive drift, is an ob-
jective measure of self-other facial identity which is obtained after participants decide
if the morphs that they see look more like themselves or like the model. This decision
is not informed by the awareness of the direction of their choice (i.e. if they decided
that the morphs look more or less like themselves). When lling out the questionnaire,
participants have full awareness of the perceived identity with the other. Thus, these ob-
jective and subjective measures may tap on dierent mechanisms of bodily awareness
and the questionnaire measure may require a stronger experience.
Overall, both EI and RHI seems to occur in a similar fashion in S/L vicarious pain
responders as it has been previously recorded in MTS participants who experience both
illusions in a touch-only condition (Davies and White, 2013; Maister et al., 2013). We
do not know how S/L responders would perform in dierent conditions such as vision-
only or touch only conditions in the EI. However, we would expect to notice a positive
eect in PSE the vision-only condition, only by looking at a face being stroked, with
the synchronous condition still providing the strongest evidence for the illusion, as pre-
viously recorded by Maister et al. (2013) and to register a comparable PSE amongst all
three groups in these two conditions, analogously to the drift results obtained in the RHI
task. We would not expect a signicant positive change in PSE in the touch-only con-
dition since S/L responders do not necessarily feel touch when seeing someone being
touched, despite the fact that a small subgroup may display MTS like traits (Ward et al.,
2018). Thus, a touch-only condition would be the equivalent of a synchronous condition
(feeling touch when seeing touch) in MTS but not in S/L responders. Theoretically, the
occurrence of the EI can be attributed to multisensory integration in a Bayesian sens-
ory inference fashion, in which visual and tactile modalities would operate generating
temporal and spatial signals attributed to a common cause. However, more empirical
research is needed in order to test this model in EI and to record performance on various
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conditions for a better understanding of underlying mechanisms in EI.
3.5.3 General Conclusions
The present study further explored susceptibility of vicarious pain responders to bodily
ownership illusions by employing both RHI and EI paradigms.
The Bayesian sensory inference model was successfully applied to the RHI paradigm
and the model’s general predictions were all met as shown by analyses conducted on the
entire sample. The conrmed predictions included: a) the higher precision of the visual
modality; b) positive correlation between drift magnitude and the degree of propriocept-
ive imprecision; c) illusion was severely disrupted when tactile-temporal correlations
were completely violated.
Regarding vicarious pain responders, our results mainly indicated that S/L respon-
ders display atypical susceptibility to bodily ownership illusions perceiving asynchrony
as synchrony. This unusual pattern is due to dierences in prior probabilities and in the
ability to re-calibrate visual and tactile modalities and to generate the experience based
on their perfect correlation.
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Article III: Individual Dierences in Vicarious
PainPerceptionLinked toHeightened Socially
Elicited Emotional States
4.1 Abstract
For some people (vicarious pain responders), seeing others in pain is experienced as pain felt
on their own body and this has been linked to dierences in the neurocognitive mechanisms
that support empathy. Given that empathy is not a unitary construct, the aim of this study
was to establish which empathic traits are more pronounced in vicarious pain responders.
The Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ) was used to divide participants into three groups:
(1) non-responders (people who report no pain when seeing someone else experiencing phys-
ical pain), (2) sensory-localised responders (report sensory qualities and a localised feeling
of pain) and (3) aective-general responders (report a generalized and emotional feeling of
pain). Participants completed a series of questionnaires including the Interpersonal React-
ivity Index (IRI), the Empathy Quotient (EQ), the Helping Attitudes Scale (HAS), and the
Emotional Contagion Scale (ECS) as well as The Individualism – Collectivism Interpersonal
Assessment Inventory (ICIAI) and a self-other association task. Both groups of vicarious
pain responders showed signicantly greater emotional contagion and reactivity, but there
was no evidence for dierences in other empathic traits or self-other associations. Sub-
sequently, the variables were grouped by a factor analysis and three main latent variables
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were identied. Vicarious pain responders showed greater socially elicited emotional states
which included the ECS, the Emotional Reactivity Subscale of EQ and the HAS. These results
show that consciously feeling the physical pain of another is mainly linked to heightened
emotional contagion and reactivity which together with the HAS loaded on the socially eli-
cited emotional states factor indicating that, in our population, these dierences lead to a
more helpful rather than avoidant behaviour.
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4.2 Introduction
Some people automatically experience and re-create the physical pain of others on their
own body and this has been known as vicarious pain responses or synaesthesia for pain
(Fitzgibbon et al., 2010b). Vicarious pain responses are mainly attributed to shared rep-
resentations of self and other and supported by overlapping neuronal mechanisms of
self-other pain processing (Lamm et al., 2011). Moreover, specic functional and struc-
tural neuronal patterns have been distinguished in populations characterized by con-
scious vicarious pain responses (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a).
In our past work, we developed the vicarious pain questionnaire (VPQ) (Grice-Jackson
et al., 2017a) which separates participants into three categories when they observe the
physical pain of others: 1) non-responders (report no pain when watching a video with
someone else experiencing physical pain), 2) sensory-localised responders (report a loc-
alised feeling of pain in the same location as the person in the video), and 3) general-
aective responders (report a generalized and emotional feeling of pain). The last two
categories have been previously referred to as pain-responders (Osborn and Derbyshire,
2010). Moreover, the sensory-localised group displays a capacity of mirroring the pain
of another on oneself in a fashion similar to the tactile mirroring encountered in mirror-
touch synaesthetes (Ward and Banissy, 2015). In the present study, we further investigate
how individual dierences in vicarious pain perception are linked to both aective and
cognitive empathic traits.
A common link has been drawn in the literature between simulating the pain of
others and empathy – the capacity to share and understand the emotional states of the
others (De Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Lockwood, 2016). Importantly, empathy is not
a unitary construct; it implies various components including aective empathy such
as emotional contagion or emotional reactivity, cognitive empathy also referred to as
theory of mind (ToM) or perspective taking, and compassionate empathy or empathic
concern which can be associated with the action to help and alleviate other’s suering
(Bernhardt and Singer, 2012). Vicarious pain responses seem to have both a strong aect-
ive empathic component since they involve the representation of the painful emotional
state of the other but also a cognitive/compassionate component. It is not clear yet to
which extent feeling the physical pain of another benets or impairs social interactions
73 4.2
since the aective aspect of empathy is a fundamental process that allows recognizing
and simulating others’ emotional states, but it does not necessarily require a cognitive
understanding of their states (Bird and Viding, 2014). Vicarious pain responses seem
to be mainly associated with an emotional reaction toward others’ states and previous
research has indicated that individuals reporting conscious vicarious sensations, such
as mirror touch synaesthetes (MTS), are more likely to score higher on the emotional
reactivity subscale of the empathy quotient (EQ) but not on the other subscales (social
skills and cognitive empathy) (Banissy and Ward, 2007). In this study, we use both the
emotional reactivity subscale of the EQ and, for the rst time, the emotional contagion
questionnaire to further investigate their association with vicarious pain responses.
There is still a debate regarding the extent to which emotional contagion and react-
ivity are related to empathy per se. For instance, Bird and Viding (2014) highlight that
emotional contagion is a precursor of empathy and not an intrinsic component since
empathy needs a clear distinction between self and other to occur. Moreover, a com-
plete overlap between self and other representations would produce distress and impair
the ability to switch between self and other perspectives (Lockwood, 2016). Thus, it
is not clear whether strong emotional reactivity, as previously witnessed in vicarious
perception, leads to empathic concern and altruistic behaviour or, on the other hand,
to personal distress and socially avoidant behaviours. It has been reported that higher
levels of aective empathy lead to altruistic/prosocial behaviour (Batson et al., 1981,
1997) and that pain intensity ratings correlate with higher empathic traits (Lamm et al.,
2007). However, higher levels of personal distress can also be triggered when witnessing
other’s pain, especially if this is accompanied by a negative outcome (Lamm et al., 2007).
As such, there is likely to be a ne balance between the extent to which one can tune into
the feelings of others, and also the extent to which one can tune out (using emotional
regulation) to guard against personal distress.
Previous research has shown that self-other control (the ability to switch focus on
information relevant to oneself or relevant to another person) improves performance in
social cognitive domains. For instance, increased motor self-other control results in an
increased vicarious pain perception (as measured by corticospinal activity and subjective
ratings) and self-reported empathy in typical adults (de Guzman et al., 2016). This is in
line with theoretical models of empathy suggesting that interactions between self-other
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control and vicarious perception may explain individual dierences in empathy (Bird
and Viding, 2014), which could perhaps be extended to those studied here. To date, few
studies have studied self-other mechanisms in conscious vicarious pain responders (e.g.
Derbyshire et al. (2013)). Addressing this gap can enable a greater understanding of the
structure of empathy (e.g. Bird and Viding (2014); Ward and Banissy (2015)), including
how individual dierences in pain perception aect social cognition (e.g. Happé et al.
(2017)).
To identify which empathic traits vary in vicarious pain responders, we used a series
of questionnaires looking at all these dimensions in the three dierent groups of people,
recruited from the neurotypical population, but classied according to the VPQ. The
groups represented the independent variable. The dependent measures were: emotional
contagion scale (ECS), the helping attitudes scale (HAS), the interpersonal reactivity in-
dex (IRI), and the empathy quotient (EQ). These measures were employed to touch on
all aspects of empathy from basic emotional contagion to motivational/compassionate
empathy, including cognitive and aective aspects of empathy. Notably, most people
do not manifest their compassion equally and they tend to favor those who are close to
them (e.g., family, partners) and their ingroups over strangers and/or out-groups. This
also applies to measures relating to vicarious pain (Avenanti et al., 2010; Hein et al.,
2010) and suggests a form of control mechanism by which people gate their empathic
responses according to the degree to which others are self-related. For instance, family
closeness is the strongest followed by closeness towards friends, colleagues and nally
strangers (Matsumoto et al., 1997). As such, we tested whether vicarious pain respon-
ders show a dierent pattern (e.g. treating strangers like family) that might give rise to
a dierent empathic response. We investigated the possible dierences in the degree of
social closeness and self- saliency in vicarious pain responders using the individualism-
collectivism attitudes questionnaire (Matsumoto et al., 1997) and an abstract self-other
association task (Sui et al., 2012). Sui et al. (2012) showed how people have faster reac-
tion times when responding to an association made between self and an abstract shape
than between another person (friend or stranger) and an abstract shape. These results
support the idea that the self is prioritised, and this also seems to vary with cultural dif-
ferences (Sui et al., 2012). Since vicarious pain responders attribute other’s sensations to
the self (they perceive the other’s physical pain as their own), we may hypothesise that
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they have a higher ability to prioritise other’s sensations over the self thus overcoming
the egocentricity bias, where self-sensations tend to be prioritised over other-sensations
(see (Silani et al., 2013). The same tendency could be manifested at a higher cognitive
level through top-down mechanisms which would actively switch from self to other’s
saliency (Bird and Viding, 2014). As such, we would expect the self not to be as pri-
oritised in vicarious pain responders and a linear trend in reaction times showing that
this population treats unknown others as close ones or as self. We would expect the self
not be as prioritised in vicarious pain responders and a linear trend in reaction times
showing that this population treats unknown others as close ones or as self.
4.3 Materials and methods
4.3.1 Participants
A total of 125 participants (mean age = 20.89, SD = 3.34; 104 females) completed the study.
Participants were recruited via email invitation or via SONA from Sussex University and
Goldsmiths, University of London. Each participant had previously completed the VPQ
online via Bristol Online Survey (BOS) and were divided into three groups: controls (C),
sensory-localised (S/L) and aective-general (A/G). The three groups were derived from
a cluster analysis of a much larger dataset of participants who have completed the VPQ
(Aged 18–60 years, M = 20.42± 4.16SD, 297 Males, 759 Females). Overall, there were
68 participants classed as controls, i.e., non- responders (mean age = 20.37, SD = 3.26,
58 females), 37 participants classed as S/L responders (mean age = 21.81, SD = 3.67, 29
females) and 21 participants classed as A/G responders (mean age = 21.00, 173 SD = 2.76,
17 females). The groups did not dier by age [F (2, 124) = 2.241, p = 0.111, η2 = 0.035]
or gender (χ2 = 0.469, p = 0.791). All participants completed the questionnaires: EC,
EQ, IRI, HAS, and ICIAI (controls: N = 68 S/L: N = 37, A/G: N = 21). Due to technical
issues, not all participants completed the self- other association task (controls: N = 55, S/L:
N = 25, A/G: N = 16). Ethical approval was obtained from the Science and Technology
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex and all participants oered their
written informed consent at the beginning of the study using an online form.
The sample size was calculated for the self-other association task a-priori, setting
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alpha at 0.5, power at 0.8 and the eect size at 0.48 based on the self-saliency eect size
indicated by Sui et al. (2013a) resulting in a sample of 75 participants (i.e. 25 participants
in each group). Observed power analyses were run a-posteriori for questionnaire data.
These were relatively small for individual subscales with the exception of the empathy
quotient and the emotional contagion scales which had an observed power of 0.8 and 0.7
respectively. The other questionnaire measures had observed power varying between
0.3 and 0.6. Collapsing the various measure onto three factors after running the factor
analysis, considerably increased the power of the study. Thus, the observed power for
socially elicited emotional states and low emotion regulation being 0.89 and 0.71 respect-
ively.
4.3.2 Measures
Vicarious Pain Questionnaire
The VPQ is comprised of 16 videos (no audio) of people experiencing physical pain (e.g.,
falls, sports injuries, injections), each video lasting for approximately 10 s (Grice-Jackson
et al., 2017). After each video, participants were questioned about their experience. First,
participants were asked if they experienced a bodily sensation of pain while viewing the
video (yes/no). If the answer was ‘yes,’ participants were asked to describe their pain
by answering three more questions about their experience: (1) how intense their pain
experience was (1–10 Likert scale, 1 = very mild pain, 10 = highly intense pain); (2) if
and where they localised the pain, answering options were either ‘localised to the same
point as the observed pain in the video,’ ‘localised but not to the same point,’ and ‘a
general/non-localisable experience of pain’; (3) to select pain adjectives from a list that
best described their vicarious pain experience (10 sensory descriptors such as ‘tingling,’
‘burning,’ ‘stinging,’ 10 aective descriptors such as ‘nauseating,’ ‘grueling,’ ‘aversive’
and three cognitive-evaluative descriptors ‘brief,’ ‘rhythmic,’ ‘constant’). All these an-
swers were used to generate the three variables that were entered the two-step cluster
analysis (i.e., pain intensity, localised-generalized responses, and sensory – aective re-
sponses) which subsequently generated the three groups (for further details see (Botan
et al., 2018b)).
77 4.3
Emotional Contagion Scale
The ECS (Doherty, 1997) is a 15-item self-reported unidimensional scale, with high re-
liability (Cronbach’s α = 0.90) which assesses the susceptibility to others’ emotions.
The ECS consists of ve basic emotions: love, happiness, sadness, anger, and fear. Each
emotion is represented by three items (e.g.,‘If someone I’m talking with begins to cry,I get
teary-eyed’ or ‘Being with a happy person picks me up when I’m feeling down’) that are
scored on a 5-point Likert scales from 1 – not at all to 5 – always, with a higher score
indicating higher emotional contagion.
Empathy Quotient
A short 15-item version of the EQ (Muncer and Ling, 2006) was used comprising ve
items for each of the three subscales: Social Skills (SS) (e.g., ‘I nd it had to know what to
do in a social situation’) (Cronbach’sα = 0.57), Cognitive Empathy (CE) (e.g., ‘I am good at
predicting how someone will feel’) (Cronbach’s α = 0.74), and Emotional Reactivity (ER)
(e.g., ‘Seeing people cry does not really aect me’) (Cronbach’s α = 0.63). Participants
gave their responses on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 4 –
strongly agree.
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index, or IRI (Davis, 1983), is a multidimensional scale,
comprised of 28 items divided into four subscales. The subscales are Perspective Taking
(PT) (e.g., ‘I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision’.),
Fantasy Scale (FS) (e.g., ‘After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of
the characters.’), Empathic Concern (EC) (e.g., ‘I am often quite touched by things that I
see happen.’), and Personal Distress (PD) (e.g., ‘When I see someone who badly needs help
in an emergency, I go to pieces’). Each subscale consists of seven items and responses are
given on a vepoint scale 0 – does not describe me very well to 4 - describes me very well.
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Helping Attitudes Scale
The Helping Attitude Scale (Nickell, 1998) is a self-report unidimensional measure of
pro-social and helping tendencies with good internal consistency (Cronbach’sα = 0.869).
It comprises 20 items scored on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly
agree). Examples of items are: ‘Helping others is usually a waste of time’; ‘When given the
opportunity, I enjoy aiding others who are in need’; ’It feels wonderful to assist others in
need’.
The Individualism – Collectivism Interpersonal Assessment Inventory (ICIAI)
The Individualism – Collectivism Interpersonal Assessment Inventory (ICIAI) (Matsumoto
et al., 1997) assesses values (Part 1) and behaviours (Part 2) when interacting with others.
It takes into account the degree of closeness with the other in four relationship groups:
family, friends, colleagues and strangers. We were mainly interested in behaviours and
so we only used the second part of the questionnaire. Participants scored from 0 = never
to 6 = all the time how much they engaged in each of the mentioned behaviours in
each of the four relationship groups. The reliability of the questionnaire is high with
Cronbach’s α = 0.90. The questionnaire contains 19 items and examples are: ‘Maintain
self-control towards them’; ’Share blame for their failures’; ’Sacrice your possessions for
them’; ’Respect them’ etc.
Self-Other Association Task
The self-other association task (Sui et al., 2012) requires participants to respond to an as-
sociation between a geometric shape (triangle, square, or circle) and a label (self, a named
best friend, or an unfamiliar person). Participants were rst asked to name a best friend
and the time period they had known each other for. Then each of the three geometrical
shapes was randomly associated to a label (e.g., you are a circle, the stated friend is a
triangle, and a stranger is a square). In the matching phase, the participants had to judge
if the match shapes- label pairings was correct. A pairing of a shape and a label (e.g.,4
– stranger) was presented for 500 ms. The pairing was generated at random and it could
conform to the initial instruction which associated each shape to a specic label, or it
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could be a recombination of a label with a dierent shape. Immediately after, participants
were expected to judge of the association was correct or not. Participants rst performed
a practice phase containing 20 trials when they were given written feedback (correct
or incorrect) followed by three blocks of 120 trials. Thus, there were 60 trials in each
condition across all blocks (self-matched, self-nonmatched, familiar-matched, familiar-
nonmatched, unfamiliar- matched, and unfamiliar- nonmatched). Reactions times were
recorded and analysed as dependent variable in a mixed model ANOVA.
4.3.3 Procedure
The questionnaires were administered via Bristol Online Survey (BOS), an online soft-
ware for collecting questionnaire data. The self-other association task was run via In-
quisit1 , an online survey for collecting both questionnaire and tasks data. Participants
lled in the questionnaires and, subsequently, they were redirected to the task. The
study took approximately 40 min (30 min for questionnaires and 10 min for the task).
All questionnaires were completed in the same order (as outlined above), so groups were
matched in this regard.
4.3.4 Statistical Analyses
Analyses of variance (one-way ANOVAs) were used to establish dierences between
groups on each questionnaire. Mixed models analyses of variance were run on the ICIAI
(3 groups * 4 conditions ANOVAs) and on the self-other association tasks (3 groups *
3 conditions ANOVAs). Variables were treated as continuous and the great majority of
them were normally distributed as shown by Shapiro–Wilk tests and histograms. Nor-
mality assumptions were violated only in the following cases: controls [IRI-EC (p = 0.01)
and ICIAI family (p = 0.01) and colleagues (p = 0.04)]; S/L [EQ-CE (p = 0.02), IRI-EC (p =
0.01)]. For these cases, Kruskal–Wallis non-parametric tests were run, re-conrming the
results (see Appendix C). All analyses were run in SPSS separately for each measure and
testwise Bonferroni condence interval adjustment was used for comparisons of main
eects. Both Games-Howell and Hochberg’s GT2 post hoc tests for dierent sample sizes
were run (Field, 2013). Eect sizes (Cohen’s d) were also calculated and reported in Ap-
1 http://www.millisecond.com
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pendix C. A principal axis factor analysis (FA) was conducted on nine variables (IRI-EC,
IRI-FS, IRI-PT, IRI-PD; EQ- SS, EQ-CE, EQ-ER; ECS; HAS) which generated three lat-
ent variables. Analyses of multivariance (MANOVAs) were used to establish dierences
between groups on the three latent variables.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Between Group Dierences: One-Way ANOVAs
There were signicant group dierences on ECS [F (2, 122) = 5.281, p = 0.006, η2 =
0.08], both sensory-localised and aective-general groups scored higher than controls
(S/L : p = 0.028, A/G : p = 0.034) but did not diering from each other (p = 0.915).
There was a signicant group dierence on the emotional reactivity subscale of the EQ
[F (2, 122) = 5.247, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.08], with both sensory-localised and aective
general groups scored higher than controls (S/L : p = 0.02, A/G : p = 0.05) but not
dierent from each other (p = 0.99). None of the other subscales of the EQ showed dier-
ences between groups: Cognitive Empathy [F (2, 122) = 2.297, p = 0.105, η2 = 0.031]
and SSs [F (2, 122) = 0.370, p = 0.695, η2 = 0.006]. The results of the questionnaire
measures are summarized in Figure 4.1. IRI scores did not show any signicant dier-
ences on Personal Distress [F (2, 122) = 0.296, p = 0.744, η2 = 0.005] or in empathic
concern [F (2, 122) = 0.296, p = 0.141, η2 = 0.032] but there was a trend toward in-
creased scores in vicarious perceivers for perspective taking [F (2, 122) = 2.930, p =
0.057, η2 = 0.046] and fantasy [F (2, 122) = 2.981, p = 0.054, η2 = 0.047] subscales.
The HAS revealed no signicant dierences between groups [F (2, 122) = 2.576, p =
0.08, η2 = 0.041].
4.4.2 Between Group Dierences: Factor Analysis and
MANOVAs
A principal axis factor analysis (FA) was conducted on nine variables with oblique rota-
tion (direct oblimin). The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure veried the sampling adequacy
for the analysis, KMO = 0.741 and all KMO values for individual variables were greater
81 4.4
Figure 4.1: IRI, EQ, ECS, and HAS scores. S/L, sensory-localised; A/G, aective-general. Both
S/L and A/G scored higher on emotional contagion (ECS) and emotional reactivity
(EQ-ER) than controls but not on cognitive empathy (EQ-CE) or social skills (EQ-SS)
subscales. No signicant dierences were found on IRI and HAS. Error bars indicate
±1 SE. (p < 0.05)
than the acceptable limit of 0.5 (Kaiser, 1974). An initial analysis was run to obtain eigen-
values for each factor in the data. Three factors had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion
of 1 and in combination explained 64.8% of the variance. The scree plot was ambigu-
ous and showed inections that would justify retaining both two or three factors (Field,
2013). We retained three factors because of the convergence of the scree plot and Kaiser’s
criterion on this value. IRI-EC, IRI-PT, and IRI-FS clustered on factor 1, EQ-SS, EQ-CE,
and IRI-PD clustered on factor 2, EQ-ER, ECS, and HAS clustered on factor three. Thus,
we distinguished between three underlying latent variables: interpersonal and imagin-
ary abilities (Factor 1), low emotion regulation (Factor 2), and socially elicited emotional
states (Factor 3). The results can be seen in Table 4.1.
The three latent variables identied by FA were included in a multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA). All variables respected the assumption of normality, the only ex-
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Table 4.1: Factor analysis results
Rotated factor loadings
Variable Interpersonal and
imaginary abilities
Low emotion
regulation
Socially elicited
emotional states
IRI_EC 0.81 0.03 -0.01
IRI_FS 0.79 -0.06 -0.18
IRI_PT 0.75 0.06 0.25
EQ_CE 0.10 -0.77 0.23
EQ_SS 0.05 -0.74 0.13
IRI_PD 0.20 0.64 0.45
ECS -0.22 0.03 0.88
EQ_ER 0.25 -0.22 0.69
HAS 0.19 -0.23 0.56
Eigenvalues 3.12 1.5 1.20
% of variance 34.67 16.64 13.35
Values in bold indicate the highest loadings on each factor.
ception being the interpersonal and imaginary ability variable in the A/G (Shapiro–Wilk
test, p = 0.04). Two outliers were excluded from the A/G group and the Box’s test con-
rmed the assumption of equal covariance (p = 0.08). Pillai’s trace multivariate test re-
vealed signicant eect F(3,238) = 3.663, p = 0.002 and separate univariate tests showed
that there was a signicant dierences between groups on interpersonal and imagin-
ary abilities F(2,129) = 4.781, p = 0.01 and on socially elicited emotional states F(2,120)
= 8.122, p < 0.001 but not on low emotion regulation F(2,120) = 1.181, p = 0.311. Post
hoc tests indicated that the A/G group scored higher than controls on the interpersonal
and imaginary ability (p = 0.007) but there was no dierence between S/L and controls
(p = 0.66). Both S/L and A/G groups scored higher on socially elicited emotional states
(p = 0.008, p = 0.003 respectively). There were no dierences between the two groups or
between the two groups and controls in emotion regulation (S/L vs. C, p = 0.35; A/G vs.
C, p = 0.99; S/L vs. A/G, p = 0.67).
4.4.3 Self-Other Associations
The Individualism-Collectivism Interpersonal Assessment (ICIAI) was analyzed as a 3∗4
mixed ANOVA contrasting group (control, S/L, A/G) and closeness (family, friend, col-
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league, stranger). There was a main eect of closeness [F (3, 122) = 246.405, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.669] but there was no main eect of group [F (2, 122) = 0.619, p =
0.941η2 = 0.001] or interaction [F (6, 122) = 0.536, p = 0.949, η2 = 0.003]. At
a behavioral level, the self-other association task was analysed as a 3∗3 mixed AN-
OVA contrasting group (control, S/L, A/G) and closeness (self, friend, stranger) on re-
sponse times to correctly endorse matching pairs (see (Sui et al., 2012)). There was
a signicant eect of closeness [F (2, 94) = 29.818, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.241] but no
main eect of group [F (2, 94) = 0.600, p = 0.551, η2 = 0.013] and no interaction
[F (4, 1.940) = 0.134, p = 0.781, η2 = 0.009] (see Figure 4.2).
All together, these results indicate that vicarious pain responders have heightened
socially elicited emotional states but none of the groups dier from controls on emotion
regulation and neither on subjective (as measured by ICIAI) or objective (as measured by
the task) self-other associations. Overall, vicarious pain responders seem to have higher
emotional responsiveness than non- responders but no dierences in emotion regulation
or their reports with others.
Figure 4.2: ICIAI and self-other association task results. S/L, sensory-localised; A/G, general af-
fective. The eects of closeness appear both in subjective scores and in task reaction
times but not as an eect of group. All groups show a similar trend in RTs to the
self-other association. Error bars indicate ± 1 SE.
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4.5 Discussion
The capacity to co-represent the feelings of other people has a central role in most the-
oretical accounts of empathy (De Vignemont and Singer, 2006; Lockwood, 2016). How-
ever, the mechanism by which this occurs remains under debate as does its relationship
to social behaviour. For instance, whilst empathy may underpin acts of compassion
(Singer and Klimecki, 2014) it has also been claimed that too much empathy can be det-
rimental (Bloom, 2017). In the present study, we took advantage of a recently reported
individual dierence in the neurotypical population; namely, the extent to which people
report consciously feeling pain when observing other people in pain. Some people re-
port feeling the pain of others either localised on the corresponding part of their own
body (Sensory-Localised responders, S/L) or a non-localised, more general body feeling
(Aective-General responders, A/G). However, the majority of people report no con-
scious feelings of pain: they either have an implicit simulation or possibly do not simu-
late the pain of others. In this study, we assessed for the rst time how these individual
dierences in vicarious pain are linked to dierences in various dimensions of empathy
and relationships with others. We employed a series of questionnaires to test between
groups dierences and, given the multitude of variables used, we also ran a factor ana-
lysis which showed that there were three underlying latent variables: socially elicited
emotional states (ECS, EQ-ER, and HAS), interpersonal and imaginary abilities (IRI: PT,
EC and FT), and low emotion regulation (EQ–SS, EQ-CE, IRI-PD).
4.5.1 Socially Elicited Emotional States
Both S/L and A/G vicarious pain responders report a greater perception of socially eli-
cited emotional states. This suggests that vicarious pain perception is probably just one
trait of a much broader phenotype in conscious vicarious pain responders (including
emotion contagion as well as the dening symptom of ‘pain contagion’). Moreover, the
socially elicited emotional states variable includes both measures of emotional respons-
ivity and helping behaviours. HAS loaded on the same latent variable as emotional re-
activity/contagion indicating that higher responsiveness to others’ emotions is linked to
a helpful behaviour rather than an avoidant one. This may be explained by the fact that
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that helping someone leads to a change in the emotional state of the helper, as some of
the HAS items point out (e.g. ’It feels wonderful to assist others in need’) which would
be more noticeable in people with elevated emotional contagion. Since there were no
dierences recorded in the other variables, this behaviour may also be mediated by their
intact social-cognitive skills and their ability to distinguish between self and other (Bird
and Viding, 2014).
4.5.2 Low Emotion Regulation
Despite having shared representations of pain and enhanced aective empathy, vicari-
ous pain responders did not report enhanced social skills and neither personal distress.
It seems like these behaviours are neither impaired nor stimulated by strong emotional
responses as previously stated by Bloom (2017) (N.B. we only recorded general, trait at-
titudes in this study and not immediate responses to painful stimulation). Interestingly,
social and cognitive skills (the two EQ subscales) and personal distress (the IRI subscale)
loaded on the same factor showing that the more personal distress someone reports, the
lower his/her social – cognitive skills are. Thus, impaired social- cognitive skills lead
to higher levels of personal distress and the capacity to regulate emotions seems to be
mainly linked to poor social-cognitive skills rather than high emotional responsiveness.
Vicarious pain responders are characterised by higher socially elicited emotional states,
but they have typical social-cognitive skills and emotion regulation suggesting that the
mechanisms for these dierent empathic qualities could be segregated and function in-
dependently, but they are not fully understood yet.
Reporting feeling the pain of others does not seem to impact in any way their ability
to relate to the other or their levels of personal distress. In the wider literature, symp-
toms such as emotional contagion are regarded as developmental precursors of empathy,
which are diminished as emotional regulation mechanisms mature (Thompson, 1991;
Eisenberg, 2000). People with vicarious pain appear to have retained a high capacity
for emotional contagion but without reporting a concomitant problem in regulating or
coping with these symptoms. Osborn and Derbyshire (2010) also reported that, in vi-
carious pain responders, there was no correlation between vicarious pain intensity and
personal distress. The fact that vicarious pain perceivers do not have higher levels of
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personal distress may be due to habituation to pain which sometimes is noticed in re-
sponse to frequent exposure to pain (Bingel et al., 2007) or to the fact that they developed
a response mechanism towards occurrence of pain. Thus, a testable prediction is that
these populations would have better emotional regulation which would be recorded in
both questionnaires and physiological measures such as heart-rate variability (Appel-
hans and Luecken, 2006) and would shed more light on bodily and emotional processing
in vicarious pain responders.
4.5.3 Interpersonal and Imaginary Abilities
Three of the scales of the IRI (empathic concern, perspective taking, and fantasy) were
found to be associated together, and the A/G group scored signicantly higher on this
factor. These measures tend to reect a more deliberate empathic style (e.g., choosing
to take another person’s perspective) than the emotional contagion/reactivity measures
already discussed (which were elevated in both responder groups and with larger ef-
fect sizes). Further studies combining behavioral and neuroscientic measures in these
groups are needed to establish what underpins this. Previous research indicated that
individual dierences in perspective taking (PT subscale of IRI) and empathic concern
(EC subscale of IRI) inuence the feeling of being touched (Bolognini et al., 2013b).
Experimentally induced excitability over somatosensory cortex can elicit synaesthetic
mirror-touch ((Bolognini et al., 2013b,a), but also see Bowling and Banissy (2017)), a
phenomenon similar to mirror-pain responses of the S/L group (see Ward et al. (2018)).
However, whilst these studies found that the IRI predicted tactile sensations in their
sample (likely comprising non-responders), the IRI was not elevated in the S/L group,
but in the A/G group.
With regards to perspective taking, Derbyshire et al. (2013) found that vicarious pain
responders were more inuenced by the visual perspective of an avatar when judging
from their own viewpoint (but they did not distinguish between dierent kinds of re-
sponders). Bucchioni et al. (2016) showed that motor-evoked responses are inhibited
more when participants observe the pain from a rst - person perspective than from a
third-person perspective (hand that receives the pain is rotated at 180◦). If vicarious pain
responders are more inuenced by a third perspective, then we would expect them to
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show greater inhibition of motor evoked responses in this condition too.
4.5.4 Self-Other Associations
There were no dierences in self-other associations between vicarious pain responders
and controls. In both the subjective (ICIAI questionnaire) and objective (self-other as-
sociation task) measures, we would have expected a linear trend showing that vicarious
pain responders treated unknown others as close ones or as self. The results did not
conrm this hypothesis. The ICIAI has a strong cultural component (Matsumoto et al.,
1997) whilst the self-other association task requires an abstract association and records
reaction times to congruent or incongruent association between a geometrical shape and
a label. The task mainly determines changes in perceptual saliency by employing vari-
ous self- other associations and the use of self-associated labels. Importantly this type of
task does not require participants to engage in online control of self-other representa-
tions. That is to say that participants do not have to co-represent themselves and others
in the same trial because they are cued toward self or other, and thus it is unlikely that
self or other are represented at the same time (i.e., only the self or other is represented,
but not both). Prior work suggests that the online control of co- activated self-other
representations is linked to empathy and associated brain networks including the rTPJ
(e.g., Santiesteban et al. (2012, 2015); Sowden et al. (2015); Nobusako et al. (2017)), but the
ability to attribute mental states to the self or others does not tend to recruit this same
brain network (e.g., Lombardo et al. (2010); Sui et al. (2013a,b)). Given that individuals
with conscious vicarious pain perception have been shown to dier in their neural pro-
le within the rTPJ (Grice-Jackson et al. (2017a)), it is perhaps more likely that they will
dier on tasks that involve the online control of co-activated self-other representations
than tasks that tap into the ability to attribute states to the self or others via cues like
the one used in the current investigation.
4.5.5 Summary
Overall, our results indicate that vicarious pain responses are mainly linked to heightened
socially elicited emotional states and we obtained no evidence for signicant dierences
in emotion regulation or self-other associations. Moreover, dierences in perspective
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taking and imaginative abilities were only recorded in the A/G group. These results
further characterise vicarious pain responders and indicate that consciously feeling the
physical pain of another is associated with heightened socially elicited emotional states,
but not with low emotion regulation. Thus, the heightened emotional responsiveness
observed in vicarious pain responders is mainly associated with a helping rather than
avoidant behaviour and good emotion regulation could mediate this mechanism.
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Article IV: Dierences in Interoceptive Accur-
acy andEmotionRegulationDistinguish between
Aective and Sensory aspects of Feeling the
Pain of Others
5.1 Abstract
Vicarious pain responses refer to the ability to physically re-experience someone else’s pain,
but there is considerable inter-individual variability expressed in the quality of the pain
felt. In the present study, we investigated interoceptive and autonomic processes in three
distinct groups of vicarious pain responders: controls (people who report no pain when see-
ing someone else experiencing physical pain), (2) sensory-localized (S/L) responders (report
sensory qualities and a localized feeling of pain) and (3) aective-general (A/G) responders
(report a generalized and emotional feeling of pain). The aim of the study was to establish
if there were any dierences between vicarious pain responders and controls in the accur-
acy of perceiving their cardiac interoceptive signals and in physiological arousal and/or
regulation.
Participants completed the State-Trait Anxiety Index (STAI), a cardiac interoceptive ac-
curacy and awareness task and a video-presentation task depicting people suering intense
or mild physical pain and no-pain. Recordings of heart rate, systolic blood pressure (SBP),
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and skin conductance response (SCR) were taken during the video-presentation task and at
baseline. Results indicated that the A/G group had lower interoceptive accuracy but not
awareness whilst the S/L group had higher heart rate variability (HRV), an index of good
autonomic emotion regulation. There were no dierences between groups in anxiety levels
or in the amplitude of SBP and SCR; there was only an eect of condition with observing
injections eliciting a higher physiological response than accidents and no-pain. These res-
ults are framed within theories linking bodily self-awareness to interoceptive processes and
increased HRV to better autonomic regulation. Altogether, these ndings indicate that vi-
carious pain responders have adaptive coping strategies and a salutogenic approach to their
bodily feelings.
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5.2 Introduction
5.2.1 Vicarious Pain Responders: General Introduction
Seeing someone else in pain may elicit a similar sensation in the observer which is known
as vicarious pain perception (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010b, 2012). Vicarious pain experiences
have been reported in clinical populations such as patients with a history of traumatic
pain or in phantom limb patients (Giummarra and Bradshaw, 2008; Fitzgibbon et al.,
2010b), but also in typical populations. Individuals may report feeling pain on their own
body when observing others in pain in experimental settings, usually as a response to
the presentation of images or videos depicting painful events (Osborn and Derbyshire,
2010; Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a). These conscious pain experiences have been identi-
ed in about 30% of the population but there is considerable inter-individual variability
expressed in the quality of the pain felt. Grice-Jackson et al. (2017a) identied two sub-
groups of vicarious pain responders who report dierent qualities of their vicarious ex-
perience. Using a cluster analysis method, they identied a group of sensory-localised
vicarious pain responders (S/L) who report feeling a localised pain sensation on their
own body when seeing someone else in pain and represent about 17% of the population,
and a group of aective-general responders (A/G) who report a generalised pain sen-
sation in their entire body and represent about 10% of the population. Seeing someone
else in pain in an fMRI-based paradigm, generates neuronal responses in specic brain
regions, most notably the somatosensory cortices, activating sensory-motor processes
through mimicry mechanisms which occur even in the absence of conscious pain re-
port (see Lamm et al. (2011) for a metanalysis). These mechanisms are thought to be
more pronounced in vicarious pain/touch responders and, according to the threshold
theory (Blakemore et al., 2005; Ward and Banissy, 2015), the overactivity in brain re-
gions involved in mirroring the states of others leads to vicarious brain activation above
a threshold for conscious perception. There is a fair amount of evidence supporting this
theory with various studies nding increased grey matter density and cortical activity in
regions such as the somatosensory cortex (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a; Holle et al., 2013;
Blakemore et al., 2005).
However, other neuronal particularities have been identied in these populations
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(e.g. lower density in the rTPJ (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a; Holle et al., 2013)) supporting
a complementary theory: the self-other theory. This theory refers to impairments in
the ability to distinguish between self and other which can be manifested in the socio-
cognitive domain, in the control of self and other actions or experiences, and in bodily
self-other representations.
5.2.2 Bodily self and interoceptive awareness in vicarious pain
responders
The ability to distinguish between self and other has been of great interest in studies
investigating vicarious perception and there is a fair amount of evidence supporting the
idea that vicarious perception is related to dierences in bodily self. More precisely, the
capacity to mirror the sensory experience (pain or touch) of another person on one’s own
body may reect a tendency to treat all observed bodies as self-related and to identify
more with the other. Derbyshire et al. (2013) used the RHI paradigm and showed a
greater tendency to incorporate the rubber hand in the pain-responders group when
compared to controls as recorded by subjective reports (N.B. they did not characterise the
pain responders nor divided them into two groups). In a more recent study, Botan et al.
(2018b) showed that only the sensory-localised group of vicarious pain responders had a
greater tendency to incorporate the rubber hand in both synchronous and asynchronous
conditions as recorded by subjective ratings and proprioceptive drifts.
Dierences in bodily self-awareness have also been recorded in both groups of vi-
carious pain responders which reported more depersonalisation-like experiences (i.e. de-
tachment from themselves and their environment) (Bowling et al., 2019). Interestingly,
individuals with more pronounced depersonalisation traits are also more susceptible to
body ownership illusions (Kanayama et al., 2009; Sierra et al., 2002), apparently linked to
dierences in the primary somatosensory cortex (e.g., Aspell et al. (2012); Otsuru et al.
(2014)). This evidence further suggests that the altered sense of bodily self may be asso-
ciated with atypical somatosensory activity.
Notably, vicarious pain responders score higher on the Multidimensional Assessment
of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) indicating that they have higher interoceptive sens-
ibility, or awareness of their body (Bowling et al., 2019). Mehling et al. (2012) dened
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interoceptive awareness as the ability to be sensitive and to notice subtle bodily changes
and developed MAIA as a measure of it. However, Garnkel et al. (2015a) proposed three
independent dimensions of interoception: sensibility (noticing subtle changes in the
body recorded with subjective reports), interoceptive accuracy (performance on heart
beating and counting tasks) and awareness (metacognition reported as condence in
the performance on interoceptive tasks). To avoid confusion, we will use the terms and
denitions given by Garnkel et al. (2015a). These three dimensions of interoception are
dissociable, they do not correlate with each other and have been dierently associated
with bodily self-processing (Garnkel et al., 2015a).
Vicarious pain responders have higher interoceptive sensibility as measured with
subjective reports, however, it is unclear if this also corresponds to higher interocept-
ive accuracy and/or awareness. Previous studies using MAIA have shown that dier-
ences in interoceptive processing seem to be related to emotional susceptibility but com-
pletely independent from interoceptive accuracy (Calì et al., 2015) and, in relation to pain,
bromyalgia patients suering from chronic pain exhibit a higher tendency to note bod-
ily sensations as suggested by the noticing and non-distracting subscales (Valenzuela-
Moguillansky et al., 2017). These results are in line with Bowling et al. (2019) ndings
of higher scores in vicarious pain responders on MAIA noticing and non-distracting
subscales.
Regarding interoceptive accuracy, previous research has indicated that high intero-
ceptive accuracy is associated with decreased tolerance to pain manifested in lower pain
thresholds (Pollatos et al., 2012) and that it enhances the estimated degree of pain (cog-
nitive empathy), as well as arousal and feelings of compassion (aective empathy), in
response to painful pictures (Grynberg and Pollatos, 2015). Moreover, interoceptive pro-
cesses have been linked to the bodily-self which arises from the integration of multisens-
ory experiences manifested within the exteroceptive, interoceptive and proprioceptive
domains (Tsakiris, 2017). The focus of this research has been on explaining and fur-
ther characterising bodily-self processes in vicarious pain responders. To this end, it has
investigated the somatosensory (tactile) and proprioceptive particularities in vicarious
pain responders through bodily ownership paradigms, but it has not yet considered the
interoceptive domain. Importantly, interception has been considered to play a major role
in the malleability of the bodily self (Seth, 2013) and empirical evidence has linked the
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suggestibility to bodily ownership paradigms to interoceptive accuracy. Tsakiris et al.
(2011) showed that lower interoceptive accuracy is associated with higher susceptibility
to the RHI. However, these results have not been fully replicated. Crucianelli et al. (2018)
did not nd any evidence indicating that the performance on the heartbeat counting task
inuenced the suggestibility to the RHI paradigm in a sample considerably larger than
the one used by Tsakiris et al. (2011) (i.e. 63 versus 46 participants).
Neuroanatomical evidence also points out to a relation between vicarious pain and
interoceptive processing. The anterior insular cortex is implicated in mapping internal
bodily states and self-related bodily experiences (including pain and touch) (Craig and
Craig, 2009; Critchley et al., 2004), in representing emotional arousal (Singer et al., 2009),
in processing and expecting noxious stimuli (Coghill et al., 1999; Bornhövd et al., 2002;
Sawamoto et al., 2000), and providing the neural basis of interoceptive processing (Critch-
ley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2007). Most importantly, the bilateral anterior insula is ac-
tivated both when someone experiences pain and when someone observes other’s pain
(Singer et al., 2004). It mediates the empathic engagement according to individual traits
(Singer et al., 2006) and has greater density in vicarious pain responders (Grice-Jackson
et al., 2017a). Thus, interoceptive processing, vicarious pain perception, and bodily self-
awareness seem to be interconnected processes and may be of particular interest in the
study of bodily-self.
Altogether, the evidence connecting vicarious pain responses and interoception is
conicting and we tried to address this gap by measuring both interoceptive accuracy
(Schandry, 1981) and awareness (condence ratings) in the two groups of vicarious re-
sponders.
5.2.3 Bodily and emotional processing in vicarious pain
responders
Pain sensitivity has been associated with pain anxiety and anxious traits (Palit et al.,
2015) and evidence coming from physiological studies shows that anxiety is an important
co-variate in the regulation and response of the sympathetic nervous system in vicarious
pain responders (Nazarewicz et al., 2015). Moreover, empathic vicarious pain seems to
be related to acute distress (Young et al., 2017) and personal distress has been identied
95 5.2
as a good predictor of arousal symptoms as well as a promoter of adaptive empathic
skills (Tone and Tully, 2014).
Anxiety has been considered a predictor of pain perception as well as physiological
responses to pain in vicarious pain populations (Nazarewicz et al., 2015; Young et al.,
2017). In these studies, the authors used anxiety itself as a variable in their analysis to
establish the vicarious pain groups which mainly represented two categories: anxious
vicarious pain responders and non-anxious vicarious pain responders. Physiological
dierences (e.g. slower respiration rate, increased heart rate and decreased heart rate
variability) were found for the anxious vicarious pain responders. In our research, we
take a somewhat dierent approach of dening the groups of vicarious pain responders
based on the phenomenological characteristics of pain (using our previously developed
measure), and consider anxiety as a separate individual dierence which may, or may
not, be a characteristic of one or more of these groups (for previous evidence see Bowling
et al. (2019) and Botan et al. (2018a)). In the present study, we took measures of both
anxiety state and trait as well as heart rate in order to re-test the predictions that there
are no dierences in anxious states in vicarious pain responders and that this may be
related to better emotion regulation, expressed as an increase in heart rate variability
(HRV).
Heart rate variability represents the variability in the interval between successive
heartbeats and it is an indicator of cardiac autonomic regulation in responses to stressors
(Appelhans and Luecken, 2006; Thayer et al., 2012). Decreased heart rate variability has
been associated to a poorer adaptability of the autonomic nervous system, cardiac func-
tioning and health outcomes (Koenig et al., 2016; Tracy et al., 2016) and negatively cor-
related with increased heart rate (Sacha and Pluta, 2005). Cardiac functioning has been
linked to responses to emotional stimuli (including pain) and an increase in heart rate
has been often recorded in response to negative emotions including sadness and pain
(Miu and Balteş, 2012; Loggia et al., 2011) whilst HRV has also been found to vary ac-
cording to pain exposure and individual pain thresholds (Appelhans and Luecken, 2008;
Meeus et al., 2013; Riganello et al., 2019; Tracy et al., 2018). In our current study design,
we recorded HR and HRV at resting state but also during presentations of videos evoking
pain and eliciting vicarious responses in the viewers, our prediction being that vicarious
pain responders would have higher HRV.
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Alongside heart rate measurements, systolic blood pressure (SBP) and skin conduct-
ance response (SCR) were recorded as event-related activations during the experiment
in order to obtain an indicator of the level of physiological arousal. SBP was recorded
as a measure of hyperarousal following a stressful situation (Davydov et al., 2007, 2010;
Gasperin et al., 2009) which increases during perception of negative states such as anger
or fear (of pain) (Garnkel et al., 2015b; George et al., 2006; Roberts and Weerts, 1982),
or imagery of these negative states (Schwartz et al., 1981). SCR was recorded along-
side SBP, as a measure of (vicarious) arousal (Vaughan and Lanzetta, 1980, 1981) which
increases in response to both self and vicarious pain and its intensity can predict pro-
social behaviour (Hein et al., 2011). Interestingly, SCR responses to arousing stimuli are
supressed in dissociative-experiences conditions such as depersonalisation/derealisation
(Dewe et al., 2016; Sierra et al., 2002) which are linked to vicarious pain responses and
also in anxiety (Naveteur et al., 2005), a trait that has been previously associated with
vicarious pain.
We were mainly interested in the physiological processes associated with vicarious
pain responses starting from the assumption that pain elicits an arousal response con-
trolled by the autonomic nervous system and manifested in the sympatho-vagal balance
(Koenig et al., 2016). As previously stated, vicarious pain responses are based on mirror-
ing mechanisms which occur at a neuronal and physiological level and are also mani-
fested in mirroring-physiological changes. Thus, they have been linked to autonomic
physiological changes similar to autonomic responses experienced in oneself (Levenson
and Ruef, 1992). Knowing that vicarious responders experience an intense bodily pain,
we would expect a higher increase in their SCR and SBP when compared to controls, but
it becomes dicult to predict their response if taking into account possible confounds
such as depersonalisation and anxious traits.
Altogether, interoceptive accuracy together with reported levels of anxiety and physiolo-
gical parameters of arousal (i.e. SPB and SCR) were measured during this experiment in
controls and vicarious pain responders. The aim was to record physiological changes in
these populations in response to pain presentation and to establish their level of arousal
and/or distress as well as their objective sensitivity towards their body. Based on previ-
ous research in these sub-groups, our main research questions were: 1) does the higher
interoceptive sensibility observed in vicarious pain responders correspond to a higher
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interoceptive accuracy and/or awareness?; 2) do vicarious pain responders have better
emotion regulation considering the fact that they do not show higher levels of anxiety or
personal distress despite having heightened emotional contagion?; and 3) is their intense
bodily response to pain caused, at least partly, by an enhanced physiological reactivity
to pain?.
5.3 Materials and Methods
5.3.1 Participants
A total of 72 participants (mean age = 21.57, SD = 4.30; 56 females) completed the study.
Each participant had previously completed the VPQ online via Qualtrics Online Survey
and were divided into three groups following a cluster analysis conducted on a larger
dataset of participants (Aged 18–60 years, mean age = 20.11, SD= 6.94; 290 Males, 1004
Females). This was based on the dimensions of mean pain intensity, number of sensory
minus aective descriptors, and number of localised minus general responses (following
Botan et al. (2018b)). There were 30 participants classed as non- responders (i.e. controls)
(mean age = 22.40, SD = 5.47, 22 females), 20 participants classed as sensory-localised
(S/L) responders (mean age = 21.45, SD = 3.89, 14 females) and 22 participants classed
as aective-general (A/G) responders (mean age = 20.55, SD = 2.32, 20 females). The
groups did not dier by age [F (2, 71) = 1.199, p = 0.308, η2 = 0.034] or gender (χ2 =
3.238, p = 0.198).
Due to technical issues, not all data was recorded from all participants: two non-
responders did not complete the interoceptive tracking task, one A/G lacked heart rate
variability data (HRV), one S/L and two A/G lacked blood pressure data, and one A/G
lacked skin conductance data. Additional interoception data was recorded in a previous
unpublished experiment using the same methodology from 69 participants (mean age
= 22.75, SD = 4.09; 60 females) which included 56 non-responders (controls), 11 S/L re-
sponders and two A/G responders (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a), classied according to
the same cluster analysis as the new participants. Participants were recruited via email
invitation or via SONA from Sussex University. Ethical approval was obtained from the
Science and Technology Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex and all
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participants oered their written informed consent at the beginning of the study.
5.3.2 Vicarious Pain Questionnaire
The VPQ is comprised of 16 videos (no audio) of people experiencing physical pain (e.g.,
falls, sports injuries, injections), each video lasting for 10s (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a).
After each video, participants were questioned if 1) they experienced a bodily sensation
of pain; 2) how intense was that main (1-10 Likert scale); 3) if the pain was localised to the
same place, to a dierent place or generalised to the entire body; and 4) asked to describe
the pain selecting various pain adjectives (10 sensory such as ‘tingling,’ ‘burning,’ ‘sting-
ing,’ and 10 aective descriptors such as ‘nauseating,’ ‘gruelling,’ ‘aversive’ ). These an-
swers were used to generate the three variables (i.e., pain intensity, localized-generalized
responses, and sensory – aective responses) entered the two-step cluster analysis. The
three groups of vicarious pain responders were generated: controls, sensory-localised
(S/L) and aective general (A/G) (for further details see Botan et al. (2018b)).
5.3.3 Interoceptive Accuracy and Awareness
Interoceptive accuracy was measured using the heartbeat tracking task (Schandry, 1981)
containing six trials with varying interval durations of 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 seconds
played in a randomised order. Participants were instructed to silently count the number
of heartbeats perceived in the given interval and to report them at the end of each trial.
Their actual heartbeats were measured with a pulse oximeter. For each trial, the accuracy
score was derived using the following formula: 1−(|nbeatsreal−nbeatsreported|)/((nbeatsreal+
nbeatsreported)/2).
The resulting scores of each trial were averaged yielding the overall value for each
participant (Garnkel et al., 2015a). Condence judgements were taken at the end of each
trial, participants being asked to rate the condence they had in their reported number of
heartbeats. Their response was recorded on a 10 points continuous visual analogue scale
(VAS) from ‘total guess/no heartbeat awareness’ to ‘complete condence/full perception
of heartbeat’. Interoceptive awareness was then calculated using the Pearson correlation
between interoceptive accuracy and condence rating (Garnkel et al., 2015a).
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5.3.4 Psychophysiological responses to vicarious pain
The task consisted of 32 lm clips: 16 videos showed people in physical and 16 control
videos showing people performing regular activities (e.g. riding a bicycle, sitting on
a sofa, reading the newspaper etc.). The videos depicting the physical pain were the
same used in the Vicarious Pain Questionnaire (VPQ). Half of them contained images
with injections and the other half accidents. All clips lasted for 10s and their order was
randomised. A jittered inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 5s, 10s or 15s represented by a grey
screen with a xation cross followed each video. The task was presented on a computer
screen placed in front of the participants using Cogent20001 (version 1.32) in Matlab
(R2013a, Mathworks). The design of the task can be seen in Figure 5.1b.
5.3.5 Physiological Measures
All physiological measures were recorded using with Cambridge Electronic Design (CED)
hardware and Spike2 physiological recording software (version 7.17) at a sampling rate
of 1000Hz, interfacing physiological recording with the task in Matlab. Measurements
set-up and recording can be seen in Figure 5.1a.
Heart Rate and Heart Rate Variability
Cardiac cycles were recorded using electroencephalography (ECG, CED1902-11/ECG),
with 10Hz high bandpass lter and 100 Hz low bandpass lter applied (Fedotov, 2016),
consisting of three electrodes: two placed under the lower clavicle on the right and
left side respectively and one (the ground electrode) placed on the back of the parti-
cipant. For the analysis, a threshold was applied to isolate R-wave peaks and to extract
the number of heartbeats in a given time interval. The heartbeats were extracted for
pain videos, control videos, and three minutes resting state period taken at the end of
the task. This gave measures of heart rate (HR) (beats per time interval) and heart rate
variability (HRV) expressed as the root mean square of successive dierences (RMSSD)
between normal heartbeats, the primary time-domain measure for short-term variation,
strongly correlated with high-frequency variations and an indicator of the vagally me-
1 http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent_2000.php
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diated (parasympathetic) changes reected in HRV (Shaer and Ginsberg, 2017). Both
HR and HRV were calculated for injection videos, accident videos, control videos and
resting state.
Blood Pressure
Blood pressure was recorded using photoplethysmographic technology (Finometer PRO;
Finapres 2300, Ohmeda, Eaglewood, CO, USA) using an inatable nger cu and in-
frared plethysmograph attached to the index nger of the participant’s left hand. Beat-
to-beat values of systolic blood-pressure (mmHg) were recorded and smoothed using
Spike 2.7.17 channel process function, creating a constant signal of systolic peaks. Mean
systolic blood pressure levels were then derived by averaging systolic levels over acci-
dent videos, injection videos, control videos and resting state (Garnkel et al., 2015b).
Skin Conductance Response
Skin conductance was recorded using two nger electrodes (CED2502) placed on the in-
dex and middle nger of the participant’s right hand. Analysis were performed in Matlab
using Ledalab (V3.4.9) software. Adaptive data smoothing was applied, and continuous
decomposition analysis was performed with extraction of continuous phasic and tonic
activity. Event-related activation was computed for each type of stimulus events: acci-
dents, injections, and control videos as the sum of SCR-amplitudes of SCRs greater than
0.02MuS within a time window of 1-4s of stimulus onset. The data was the transformed
in order to obtain a more normal distribution using the formula log10(SCR+1).
5.3.6 Anxiety Questionnaire. State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI)
The State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger et al., 1983) is a 40-item self-report
scale which assesses both state and trait anxiety. State anxiety items (N=20) assess how
participants feel and that precise moment (i.e. ‘indicate how you feel right now’) and
include statements such as: I am calm., I feel tense., or I am frightened. Trait anxiety items
(N=20) assess the dispositional, or more stable, trait of anxiety proneness (i.e. ‘indicate
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Figure 5.1: a) Recording set-up and interface; b) Task set-up.
how you generally feel’). It contains items such as: I feel nervous and restless or I feel
satised with myself. For both state and trait scales, respondents are asked to indicate to
what degree the item describes their feelings on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from
1 = not at all and 4 = very much so. The questionnaire was administered immediately
after participants nished watching the videos.
5.3.7 Statistical Data Analyses
Analyses of variance (one-way ANOVAs) were used to establish dierences between
groups on unidimensional measures including the interoceptive accuracy and awareness
scores, anxiety scores and resting state measures of heart rate and heart rate variability.
Mixed models analyses of variance (3 ∗ 3 mixed ANOVAs) were run for task measures
of HR, HRV, blood pressure, and skin conductance. The analyses assessed the interac-
tions between the 3 groups (C, S/L, and A/G) and 3 conditions (control videos, accident
videos, and injection videos). When sphericity was not assumed, the most conservative
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was reported (Field, 2013).
Variables were treated as continuous and most of them were normally distributed
as shown by Shapiro–Wilk tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. When normality as-
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sumptions were violated in more than one group, Kruskal–Wallis H and Mann-Whitney
U non-parametric tests were also run, reconrming the results as shown in Appendix
D. These cases included interoceptive accuracy scores and task heart rate data and skin
conductance data. All analyses were run in SPSS separately for each measure and test
wise Bonferroni condence interval adjustment was used for comparisons of main ef-
fects and Hochberg’s GT2 post hoc tests for dierent sample sizes were run (Field, 2013).
Given the multitude of measures and possible interdependency between them (e.g. pos-
sible link between anxiety and physiological responses), supplementary correlation and
hierarchical multiple regression analyses were run. In the case of hierarchical multiple
analyses, collinearity statistics were all within accepted limits (i.e. Tolerance scores were
all > 0.2 whilst VIF scores < 4) (Hair et al., 2013). Durbin Watson test results were all
situated between 2 and 2.5 indicating no autocorrelation of residuals. Residual and scat-
ter plots indicated the assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity were
mostly satised (Pallant, 2001).
The sample size was based on previous publications investigating dierences in physiolo-
gical processes in vicarious pain responders (Nazarewicz et al., 2015; Young et al., 2017).
Based on these ndings, eect sizes in physiological reactivity in vicarious pain respon-
ders have been relatively large with partial η2 reaching 0.14 2. A-priori power analyses
conducted with G-power calculator setting the eect size at 0.42, alpha at 0.5, and power
at 0.8 indicated a total sample size of 93, approximately 31 participants in each group.
This number was reached for the non-responder group, but not for the responder groups
due to diculties in recruiting them. A-posteriori power calculations showed an ob-
served power of 0.9 for interoceptive data (which benetted from extra participants), 0.5
for HRV data, and 0.3 for BP and SCR data. These two last results were clearly non-
signicant, however future studies with greater power should try to replicate them.
2 http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/statswiki/FAQ/eectSize
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 Interoceptive accuracy and awareness
Interoceptive accuracy and awareness scores can be seen in Figure 5.2. There were signi-
cant group dierences in interoceptive accuracy (F (2, 137) = 12.960, p < 0.001, η2 =
0.161), the A/G group having lower interoceptive accuracy than both controls (p<0.001,
d=1.01) and S/L (p<0.001, d=0.78). Both results passed the new signicance value set
at α = 0.016 after adjusting for Bonferroni comparisons (0.05/ 3 group comparisons).
There were no group dierences in interoceptive awareness (F (2, 139) = 1.692, p =
0.188, η2 = 0.024).
Figure 5.2: Interoceptive accuracy and awareness scores. Error bars indicate ±1SE. ∗ p < 0.01.
5.4.2 Heart Rate (HR) and Heart Rate Variability (HRV)
There were no dierences between groups in resting state HR (F (2, 68) = 1.528, p =
0.224, η2 = 0.044) nor HRV (F (2, 70) = 1.314, p = 0.275, η2 = 0.037). However,
the S/L group showed a trend towards lower HR and higher HRV (see gure 3). Re-
garding task-related HR, mixed model 3 ∗ 3 ANOVAs showed a signicant eect of
condition (F (1.659, 109.491) = 39.859, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.377) with control videos
having lower HR than accident videos (p<0.001) and injection videos (p<0.001) and ac-
cident videos having lower HR than injection videos (p<0.001). There was no eect of
group (F (2, 66) = 0.059, p = 0.943, η2 = 0.002) nor interaction (F (3.318, 109.491) =
0.634, p = 0.610, η2 = 0.019). Regarding task-related HRV, mixed model 3 ∗ 3 ANOVAs
showed a signicant eect of group (F (2, 68) = 3.230, p = 0.046, η2 = 0.087) with
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S/L group having higher HRV than the control group (p=0.045, d=0.67), but this would
not survive Bonferroni corrections set atα =0.005 (i.e. 0.05/9 (3conditionsx3groups)). Im-
portantly, this was still a signicant predictor at all stages of the multiple regression ana-
lysis presented in section 5.4.6. There was no eect of condition (F (2, 136) = 0.759, p =
0.470, η2 = 0.011) nor interaction (F (4, 136) = 1.223, p = 0.305, η2 = 0.035) (see Fig-
ure 5.3).
Figure 5.3: Heart Rate (HR) at resting state as beats per minute (BPM) and during the task as
beats per 10s video (BPV) for each pain category and control in the upper part of
the gure. Heart rate variability (HRV) as RMSSD expressed in milliseconds (ms) at
resting state and during the task in the lower part of the gure. Main eect of group
for task HRV with S/L group having higher HRV than controls. Error bars indicate
±1SE. ∗ p < 0.05.
5.4.3 Blood Pressure
There was a signicant eect of condition in blood pressure (F (2, 132) = 11.235, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.145), the average blood pressure being higher for injection videos when
compared to both control videos (p<0.001) and accident videos (p=0.002). There was no
eect of group (F (2, 66) = 1.458, p = 0.240, η2 = 0.042) nor interaction (F (4, 132) =
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1.076, p = 0.371, η2 = 0.032). A/G group showed a general tendency towards higher
blood pressure for all conditions. Results can be seen in Figure 5.4.
5.4.4 Skin Conductance
There was a signicant eect of condition in skin conductance (F (2, 136) = 13.260, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.163). The average amplitude in skin conductance response was higher
for injection videos than control videos (p<0.001) and accident videos (p=0.001). There
was no eect of group (F (2, 68) = 0.738, p = 0.482, η2 = 0.021) nor interaction
(F (4, 136) = 0.419, p = 0.795, η2 = 0.012). Results can be seen in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Mean systolic blood pressure and skin conductance results. There was a main eect
of condition for both measures with injection videos showing increased physiological
arousal than both accident videos and control videos. Error bars indicate ± 1SE. *
p<0.01
5.4.5 Anxiety Results and Trait measures correlations
There were no dierences between groups in neither anxiety state (F (2, 63) = 0.727, p =
0.488, η2 = 0.023) nor trait (F (2, 63) = 1.494, p = 0.232, η2 = 0.047), as previously
recorded (Bowling et al., 2019). Anxiety did not correlate with any of the interoceptive
or physiological measures. A strong negative correlation was seen between HRV and
HR. Correlations can be seen in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Correlations between HR, HRV, Anxiety and Interoception
Interoceptive
Accuracy
Interoceptive
Awareness
Anxiety
State
Anxiety
Trait
HR
(bmp)
HRV
RMSSD
Interoceptive
Accuracy
Interoceptive
Awareness
r = 0.046
p = 0.706
Anxiety
State
r = 0.030
p = 0.817
r = - 0.065
p = 0.610
Anxiety
Trait
r = 0.013
p = 0.921
r = - 0.051
p = 0.690
r = 0.599
p <0.001
HR
(bmp)
r = - 0.126
p = 0.311
r = - 0.082
p = 0.510
r = 0.111
p = 0.392
r = 0.244
p = 0.056
HRV
RMSSD
r = 0.189
p = 0.120
r = -0.005
p = 0.969
r = 0.111
p = 0.388
r = - 0.032
p = 0.802
r = - 0.569
p <0.001
5.4.6 Hierarchical Multiple Regression Models for main
outcome variables
Hierarchical multiple regression models were run for the main outcome variables: in-
teroceptive accuracy, HRV, BP, and SCR in pain condition. The group was added at the
rst step followed by age and gender and anxiety state and trait. For interoceptive ac-
curacy, HR and HRV were also added as a fourth step (Zamariola et al., 2018) and BP as a
fth step (O’Brien et al., 1998). For HRV, HR was added as a predictor in the fourth step
of the analysis (Sacha and Pluta, 2005).
As indicated in Table 5.2, the rst model of the hierarchical multiple regression in-
cluding the groups as predictors contributed signicantly to the regression model, F
(2,56) = 4.001, p=.024) and accounted for 12.5% of the variation in interoceptive accur-
acy. Adding the other variables explained an additional 5.3% of the variation and this
was not signicant.
As indicated in Table 5.3, the rst model of the hierarchical multiple regression in-
cluding the groups as predictors contributed signicantly to the regression model, F
(2,59) = 4.117, p=.021) and accounted for 12.2% of the variation in HRV. Adding the other
variables explained an additional 31.5% of the variation and this change in R2 was sig-
nicant. The S/L group was a signicant predictor at all stages of the analysis and HR
was a signicant predictor when added at stage four.
Table 5.2: Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting interoceptive accuracy (∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variables B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
S/L Group -.048 .107 -.063 -.024 .112 -.032 -.026 .119 -.034 -.040 .122 -.052 -.040 .124 -.052
A/G Group -.277 .103 -.378** -.248 .106 -.338* -.253 .110 -.346* -.248 .115 -.339* -.249 .119 -.340*
Gender -.025 .115 -.029 -.011 .122 -.013 -.041 .125 -.048 -.041 .126 -.048
Age .012 .010 .162 .011 .011 .152 .012 .011 .155 .012 .011 .155
Anxiety State .003 .008 .060 .000 .008 .009 .000 .008 .008
Anxiety Trait .0004 .006 .001 .001 .006 .032 .001 .006 .034
HRV .003 .003 .207 .003 .003 .206
HR .000 .005 .016 .000 .005 .014
BP .000 .003 .006
R2 .125 0.149 .152 .188 .188
F for change in R2 4.001* 2.355 1.551 1.447 1.261
Table 5.3: Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting heart rate variability (HRV) in the pain condition (∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p <
0.001)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
S/L Group 20.840 7.594 .376** 19.814 7.283 .358* 20.934 7.863 .378** 13.709 6.819 .284*
A/G Group 3.720 7.283 .070 6.475 7.351 .122 6.352 7.489 .120 -.620 6.499 -.012
Gender 14.218 7.737 .230 15.235 8.023 .247 6.894 7.005 .112
Age .427 .695 .077 .436 .717 .078 -.427 .633 -.077
Anxiety State .058 .499 .018 .020 .422 .006
Anxiety Trait .280 .408 .107 .546 .350 .209
HR -1.118 .234 -.563***
R2 .122 0.185 .198 .437
F for change in R2 4.117* 3.231* 2.264 5.984***
Table 5.4: Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting blood pressure in the pain condition
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
S/L Group 2.088 5.748 .052 2.702 5.922 .067 1.001 6.101 .025
A/G Group 9.475 5.584 .243 8.940 5.804 .230 8.170 5.873 .210
Gender -5.019 6.039 -.112 -4.524 6.193 -.101
Age .023 .542 .006 -.093 .555 -.023
Anxiety State .346 .384 .150
Anxiety Trait -.399 .318 -.209
R2 .050 0.062 .089
F for change in R2 1.542 .930 .883
Table 5.5: Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting blood pressure in the pain condition
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
S/L Group 0.17 0.20 .125 .009 .020 .069 .008 .020 .055
A/G Group .007 .019 .053 .000 .020 -.029 -.004 .020 -.029
Gender .028 .021 .179 .028 .021 .179
Age -.004 .002 -.282* -.004 .002 -.316*
Anxiety State .002 .001 .222
Anxiety Trait -.001 .001 -.079
R2 .012 .029 .030
F for change in R2 .375 1.469 1.230
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In the case of SBP, none of the models accounted for a signicant variation, not even
anxiety (see Table 5.4. None of the models accounted for signicant variation in pain
SCR. However, age was a signicant predictor when added at stages two and three in-
dicating a decrease in SCR responsiveness with age (see Table 5.5), this being in line with
some of the previous ndings (e.g. (Barontini et al., 1997; Gavazzeni et al., 2008)). The
inuence of age on SCR is beyond the scope of this research focused on the dierences
between vicarious pain responders and non-responders groups that have been matched
on age and gender.
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 Summary of Results
In the present study, we further investigated dierences in autonomic and interoceptive
processes in vicarious pain responders. We used two dierent groups of vicarious pain
responders, namely the sensory-localised (S/L) group and the aective-general (A/G)
group as well as a control group of non-responders. We based our predictions on previ-
ous ndings in these populations regarding their increased reported sensibility towards
their bodies and their higher emotional contagion, but not personal distress and neither
anxiety. Firstly, we explored if their increased interoceptive sensibility as previously re-
corded by MAIA also corresponds to a higher interoceptive accuracy and/or awareness.
Secondly, we explored if their increased emotional contagion, together with typical per-
sonal distress and anxiety levels, is related to changes in autonomic processes, mainly
to regulatory processes manifested in the sympathovagal balance as measured through
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HRV. Levels of arousal induced by pain perception were also measured by both SPB and
SCR recordings.
Our results indicated that vicarious pain responders do not display higher interocept-
ive accuracy nor awareness despite their increased sensibility towards bodily changes.
Notably, only the A/G group showed lower levels of interoceptive accuracy indicating
that they are worse at perceiving their cardiac signals. Anxiety measures reconrmed
previous results indicating that the groups do not dier in neither state nor trait anxi-
ety levels. Moreover, the state of arousal as recorded by SBP and SCR did not indicate
higher physiological reactivity in these two groups when compared to controls. There
was a signicant eect of condition, with injection videos eliciting a more pronounced
response, however, this did not dier between groups. Regarding emotion regulation
processes, there was a signicant higher HRV in the S/L group suggesting that this pro-
cess may represent a coping mechanism, maintaining typical homeostatic and emotional
levels of distress.
More generally, the results support the claim that individual dierences in vicarious
pain determined, in this instance, by phenomenological reports are linked to individual
dierences in interoception and autonomic mechanisms. In eect, the dierences in in-
teroceptive accuracy (worse in A/G but not S/L) and heartrate variability (greater in S/L
than A/G) resembles a neuropsychological double dissociation, albeit within a ‘neuro-
typical’ sample. This suggests that these groupings reect the selective involvement of
dierent mechanisms relevant to vicarious experience.
The main limitations to this study were represented by the small number of pain
trials. Moreover, whilst we did check for anxiety, other potentially confounding vari-
ables such as depersonalisation, blood-injury-injection phobia (BII), exercise and cardio-
vascular history which can aect both HR and HRV should have been checked for too
(N.B. all participants had normal body mass index (BMI)).
5.5.2 Interoceptive processes
The A/G group has lower interoceptive accuracy when compared to both controls and
S/L responders whilst the S/L group has comparable interoceptive accuracy with controls
even though both groups of vicarious responders have higher interoceptive sensibility.
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Moreover, there were no dierences in interoceptive awareness between groups indic-
ating that A/G responders are generally aware of having lower accuracy. This is in line
with previous ndings suggesting that interoceptive sensitivity and accuracy are dis-
sociable traits (Garnkel et al., 2015a) and with ndings suggesting that interoceptive
sensibility as measured with MAIA, is independent from interoceptive accuracy (Calì
et al., 2015). The dimension of interoceptive sensibility seems to be connected mainly to
the attention payed to our bodies and enhanced in people systematically exposed to or
suering from pain such as chronic pain patients (Valenzuela-Moguillansky et al., 2017),
or even vicarious pain responders (Bowling et al., 2019) and not to the actual ability to
perceive our cardiac functioning.
The heartbeat counting task (HCT) (Schandry, 1981) used to assess interoceptive ac-
curacy has received some criticism. It has been claimed that non-interoceptive processes
such as beliefs about own heart rate inuence the performance on the task. Empirical
evidence has indicated that enhancing knowledge about one’s heart rate through direct
feedback increases performance on the task (Ring et al., 2015) and that participants rely
on prior estimations of heart rate when reporting the number of heartbeats felt (Desmedt
et al., 2018). However, regardless of the strategy used to determine own’s heartbeat, it
can be assumed that reduced perception of real heartbeats leads to greater reliance on
heartbeat estimations. For instance, heartbeat signals are more intense at higher levels
of systolic blood pressure resulting in a lower reliance on estimation (O’Brien et al.,
1998). It may be that A/G responders have worse “estimations” of their own heartbeat,
but this would most likely be related to their poorer perception of the actual heartbeats.
Moreover, this fact cannot be attributed to physiological dierences in systolic blood
pressure since their SBP was not lower and using blood pressure as a covariate did not
inuence our results (F(2,63)=4.402, p=0.016, η2 =0.123, A/G < C, p =0.016). Another cri-
ticism concerns the fact that participants tend to count seconds so, participants with a
heartbeat closer to 60 bpm would perform better (Zamariola et al., 2018). Regarding this
criticism, measurements of heartbeat rate were introduced in the analysis as a co-variate,
the main eect of group being preserved (F(2,63)=4.717, p=0.012,η2 =0.130, A/G < C, p
=0.010).
Higher interoceptive accuracy has been associated to lower pain thresholds and
arousal levels (Pollatos et al., 2012; Grynberg and Pollatos, 2015), but there is no direct
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evidence suggesting that vicarious pain responders have lower pain thresholds when
exposed to direct painful stimulation. Moreover, in the present study, it was shown that
they do not display higher levels of physiological arousal. Their vicarious pain percep-
tion might stem from the ability to simulate it, probably through a top-down process,
rather than a bottom-up one. The fact that A/G group displays lower interoceptive ac-
curacy seems to be more related to the fact that lower interoceptive accuracy is linked
to a more malleable sense of self associated with depersonalisation-like traits predom-
inant in vicarious pain responders as shown by Bowling et al. (2019). Indeed, abnormal
interoceptive processing has been recorded in clinical populations suering from deper-
sonalisation ((Sedeño et al., 2014; Schulz et al., 2013) but also see Michal et al. (2014)),
psychosis (Ardizzi et al., 2016), and, more generally, abnormal bodily self-consciousness
(Ainley and Tsakiris, 2013; Kunstman et al., 2016; Ferentzi et al., 2018). However, the
fact that only the A/G group showed decreased IAcc remains intriguing considering
that the S/L group also displays depersonalisation-like traits (Ferentzi et al., 2018) but
also proneness to expand bodily boundaries (Botan et al., 2018b; Derbyshire et al., 2013).
This may suggest that the mechanisms leading to disrupted processing of bodily signals
in the A/G group are dierent from or complementary to the ones leading to dissociable
experiences.
A second explanation may reside in their physiology, characterised by a tendency in
increased SBP and a propensity towards blood-injury-injection phobia (results collected
but not published yet) which may lead to overwhelming and unclear bottom-up cardiac
signals. IAcc depends on visceral (i.e. cardiac) aerent signals which are highly aected
by external factors including arousing stimuli used in experimental settings (Eichler and
Katkin, 1994; Rief et al., 1998). These stressors usually lead to activation of the sympath-
etic system and to pronounced aerent signals from the viscera. However, these signals
may be confounded and dicult to interpret in the presence of a stressor which may dir-
ect attention away from the body (Chajut and Algom, 2003; Pilgrim et al., 2010). In these
regards, there is some evidence that, in conditions of arousal following an experimental
stressor, IAcc diminishes in female participants (Fairclough and Goodwin, 2007). Further
evidence suggests that IAcc diminishes under the inuence of stressors only if attention
ceases to be directed to internal bodily signals and oriented instead towards external
stimuli (Schulz et al., 2013). The IAcc task was always completed at least ve minutes
115 5.5
after the experimental task and participants were always instructed to direct attention
towards their heart. However, the eects of watching painful videos might have been
prolonged in this subgroup, especially if we consider that SBP was high in this group
during control videos. Further research addressing the eects of painful stressors on
bodily changes as well as their impact over time (e.g. in the next minutes after watching
the pain stimuli) may elucidate the cause of lower IAcc in the A/G group.
5.5.3 Anxiety, HRV and Emotion Regulation
Anxiety seems to be positively correlated with interoceptive accuracy (see Domschke
et al. (2010) for a review) and neuroimaging studies suggested that that the size and
reactivity of AI is linked to both heartbeat detection and to general experience of anxiety
symptoms (Paulus and Stein, 2006; Stein et al., 2007). We did not nd a correlation in
our entire sample between anxiety and IAcc. However, these results should be cautiously
considered since our population sample was not representative of the entire population.
This is because we deliberately recruited more vicarious pain responders in order to
obtain comparable numbers in all three groups. Thus, whilst in the general population
the percentage of vicarious responders is about 25, in the present sample it was about
58 (42 participants out of 72 were classed as responders). Importantly, there were no
dierences in anxiety state nor trait between vicarious pain responders, re-conrming
previous results with the same measures (Bowling et al., 2019), but dierent to the study
of (Young et al., 2017). In their study, they used a measure of anxiety-sensitivity that
focuses on concern in regard to bodily feelings of arousal and their misinterpretation
(e.g. ’It scares me when I feel faint’, ’When my head is pounding, I worry I could have a
stroke’ (see Taylor et al. (2007)) as opposed to our use of the STAI which focuses largely
on mental states.
Altogether, these specic characteristics of vicarious pain responders including the
absence of anxious or distressful traits and the high interoceptive sensibility, but not ac-
curacy (Botan et al., 2018a; Bowling et al., 2019) indicate that these populations may ad-
opt a mindful approach towards their body. According to the mindful bodily awareness
theory proposed by Mehling et al. (2012), increased sensitivity towards bodily signals
serves to optimize the integration of internal (e.g. visceral perception) and external sig-
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nals (e.g. vicarious pain perception). Due to this, the anxious preoccupation with bodily
signals which may occur in painful situations can be avoided. Unfortunately, we can-
not establish the directionality of the relation: namely if this general sensibility towards
bodily changes leads to higher sensibility towards pain or if it is an adaptive response
mediating emotional regulation. However, previous evidence suggests that there is a
bidirectional communication between the brain and the body and that top-down pro-
cesses such as regulation of attention towards the body decrease psychological stress
and enhance health and well-being (Taylor et al., 2010; Muehsam et al., 2017).
The fact that vicarious pain perceivers do not have higher levels of anxiety after
seeing others in pain may be due to habituation to pain which sometimes is noticed
in response to frequent exposure to pain (Bingel et al., 2007) or to the fact that they
developed a response mechanism based on mindful interpretation of bodily signals to-
wards occurrence of pain. Indeed, interoceptive sensibility has been associated with
better self-regulation capacities (Weiss et al., 2014) and a mindful attitude towards the
body was proven to contribute to emotion regulation (Lutz et al., 2013). Based on this,
we tested the prediction that vicarious pain responders would have higher emotional
regulation as recorded by physiological measures of heart-rate variability.
Emotion regulation, the ability to respond to evocative stimuli in an adaptive manner
and in a given situation, critically depends on the adjustment of physiological arousal
controlled by the autonomic nervous system (ANS) (Gross, 1998). Heart Rate Variab-
ility (HRV) has been used for decades as an index of emotion regulation since it is a
measure of the interplay between sympathetic and parasympathetic systems’ control
over heart rate, thus it indicates the exibility of the autonomic system crucial for con-
tinuous emotional self-regulation (Appelhans and Luecken, 2006). Moreover, it seems to
provide a measure of the activation or deactivation of the ANS activity over the heart
through branches of the vagal nerve as suggested by both polyvagal (Porges, 2001) and
neurovisceral integration (Thayer and Lane, 2000) theories.
Previous research indicated that young people who have higher resting state HRV
display lower levels of distress after watching upsetting videos (Fabes et al., 1993) and
that they also cope better in social situations (Fabes et al., 1994). A study conducted on
mammals, indicated that HRV increases when they are exposed to a painful stimulus,
but not to an anxious or both painful and anxious stimulus (Reid et al., 2017). Seemingly,
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increased HRV rates in S/L responders may indicate the perception of a painful stim-
ulus as simply pain, without attributing to it a distressful component. Thus, they may
use physiological emotion regulation to implement adaptive coping strategies. These
results need to be further investigated from a psychological perspective using emotion
regulation tasks or questionnaires, the expectation being that they would record better
abilities to better regulate, at least when exposed to painful stimuli.
The fact that the A/G group did not show higher HRV despite this group reporting
intense sensations of pain not accompanied by anxiety nor distress needs further in-
vestigation. It may be that they have another coping mechanism or that their tendency
towards BII (at least in part of the participants) attenuated the eect, previous evidence
suggesting that HRV is lower in non-clinical panickers and blood phobics (Friedman and
Thayer, 1998).
5.5.4 Physiological Arousal: SBP and SCR
Both vicarious pain responders and controls showed elevated SBP and SCR levels in
the injection (intense pain) condition providing evidence for physiological arousal in all
these groups. Whilst we expected vicarious pain responders to display increased SPB
and SCR in the pain condition, we did not expect controls to have a similar response.
Moreover, the magnitude of the response in vicarious pain responders was not higher
than in controls. There was only a signicant condition eect with injection videos eli-
citing a greater physiological response in all three groups. It is likely that the injection
videos elicited sensations such as disgust or fear in non-responders, thus their enhanced
arousal response despite not reporting any bodily sensation of pain when watching them
(most of them still found them repugnant). A wider variety of pain-eliciting videos that
would not necessarily evoke disgust in the observer may capture dierences in physiolo-
gical arousal between responders and non-responders. Regardless of the nature of the
stimuli, the physiological arousal observed in all three groups indicates the presence
of a bodily response to the sight of pain although only the two vicarious responders
consciously report it. In the general population, previous evidence shows that painful
images do elicit autonomic responses as measured by both SCR and BP (Vaughan and
Lanzetta, 1980; Holand et al., 1999; Hein et al., 2011)) and, at a cortical level, activations
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are observed in the neuronal matrix of pain including AI and ACC at the sight of pain
without conscious bodily report of it (Jackson et al., 2006; Singer et al., 2004). A mirror-
ing response to pain seems to be ubiquitous and what generally distinguishes vicarious
pain responders seems to be the over-activity of this response, at least at a neuronal
level (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a). Enhanced physiological reactivity was not seen in
this study in the two groups of vicarious pain responders suggesting that this manifest-
ation is mainly due to top-down mechanisms (e.g. hyperactivity of the somatosensory
cortex) rather than bottom-up ones (e.g. disinhibited physiological/visceral response
amplifying the vicarious perception). Some evidence suggested that vicarious pain re-
sponders may have a hyperreactive autonomic system and be more prone to acute dis-
tress (Young et al., 2017) mainly due to a poor regulation of the parasympathetic system
(lower HRV and increased HR). Importantly, these results were confounded by anxious
traits, namely anxious vicarious pain responders displayed these changes (Nazarewicz
et al., 2015) which were not unexpected considering that anxiety has been associated
to poorer autonomic regulation and higher physiological arousal (Thayer et al., 1996;
Mezzacappa et al., 1996). In our study, we compared these groups exclusively based on
their perception of pain and not anxious predispositions and showed that there are no
dierences in their arousal levels and autonomic reactivity in SCR and SBP.
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Discussion
In this nal section, the ndings reported in this thesis will be summarised and fur-
ther discussed by assessing the degree to which the empirical research addressed the
aims and conrmed or informed the predictions formulated in the introductory chapter.
Methodological limitations will also be discussed together with possible improvements
to experimental designs and future directions to inform future literature in the eld.
Lastly, the implications and contributions to the wider literature will be presented in the
context of the major theories of vicarious pain perception.
6.1 Summary of Findings
The main aims of this thesis were to explore shared self-other bodily representations in
vicarious pain responders by investigating the sense of bodily ownership in these sub-
groups of the population and to explore aective shared-self other representations by
examining empathic traits and physiological processes.
The ndings of each empirical chapter addressed the initial aims and partly con-
rmed the hypotheses as seen in table 6.1. Notably, these ndings indicated dier-
ences between the two groups of vicarious pain responders in both bodily and aective
shared self-other representations. The main dierences between the two groups of vi-
carious pain responders are presented in table 6.2 (N.B. All the results were compared
against a baseline measurement represented by the results of the control group, i.e. non-
responders).
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Table 6.1: The initial aims and ndings of each empirical chapter.
Empirical Chapter Aims Findings
Article I To investigate bodily ownership in
vicarious pain responders.
The S/L responders but not the A/G responders
exhibit increased susceptibility to the RHI in the
asynchronous condition only.
Article II
To explain particularities in bodily
ownership of vicarious pain responders
within current theories of multisensory
integration, namely the
Bayesian Sensory Inference model.
S/L responders exhibit increased susceptibility to
both RHI and EI in the asynchronous condition.
S/L responders are more inuenced by
tactile-temporal predictions.
Article III
To investigate the inuence of
vicarious pain perception on empathic
traits and self-other associations.
Both S/L and A/G responders show heightened
emotional reactivity and contagion but not other
empathic traits.
Article IV
To explore physiological reactivity in
these subgroups and possible
coping mechanisms that would contribute
to the normal functioning of these individuals.
Evidence for better emotion regulation in
the S/L group as measured by HRV but not
in the A/G group.
A/G responders have lower interoceptive
accuracy but not S/L responders.
Table 6.2: The ndings for each group when compared to controls in each of the empirical studies
conducted.
Study Sensory-Localised Group Aective-General Group
Article I Increased susceptibility to the RHI in
the asynchronous and light conditions
-
Article II Increased susceptibility to the RHI and
EI in the asynchronous condition
-
Rely more on tactile-temporal priors -
Article III Enhanced Socially-Elicited Emotional
States including Emotional Contagion and Reactivity
Enhanced Socially-Elicited Emotional
States including Emotional Contagion and Reactivity
Article IV - Lower Interoceptive Accuracy
Better emotion regulation recorded as HRV -
In Article I, as hypothesised in the introduction and in line with previous research
(see Derbyshire et al. (2013)), vicarious pain responders showed atypical bodily own-
ership as indicated by their performance on the rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigm.
Importantly, only the S/L group showed increased susceptibility to the RHI and repor-
ted signicantly higher proprioceptive drift and subjective ratings of ownership and
agency than controls in the asynchronous condition. There was also a trend towards
higher proprioceptive drift in the light condition (when a laser beam played on the
dummy hand) but there were no dierences between groups in the other two condi-
tions: touch-only (when only the real hand was stroked) and see-only (when only the
dummy hand was stroked) demonstrating that this is not just a general tendency towards
incorporating the rubber hand. These ndings indicated that the increased susceptibil-
ity to the rubber hand illusion as previously recorded by (Derbyshire et al., 2013) might
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have been driven by the S/L group. Moreover, they further distinguished this group
as a separate typology amongst other populations that also exhibited particularities in
bodily ownership. Compared to mirror-touch synaesthetes (MTS), S/L responders do
not report higher ownership in the see-only condition than controls (Davies and White,
2013). Compared to populations characterised by depersonalisation and psychotic traits
(Kállai et al., 2015; Germine et al., 2013), the S/L responders do not report higher rat-
ings only in the synchronous condition but also in the asynchronous condition. Their
pattern of results is most similar to ndings obtained in eating disorders (ED) patients
(Eshkevari et al., 2012; Kaplan et al., 2014; Zopf et al., 2016). Following these observations,
we screened our vicarious pain responders using the EDE-Q questionnaire (Mond et al.,
2006) but we did not obtain a signicantly higher prevalence of ED dispositions in the
S/L group (results unpublished). Overall, these ndings may suggest that both groups
have a more unstable bodily phenotype easily modulated by external (environmental)
inuences, prior beliefs or enhanced visual signals (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009).
In Article II, which represented a follow up of Article I, atypical bodily ownership
observed in S/L responders was explored using a second paradigm – the Enfacement
Illusion and the atypical susceptibility to the RHI observed in this group was replicated
and further investigated within the Bayesian sensory inference model. This model, when
applied to the multisensory integration occurring in the RHI, stipulates that a match
between expectations and input signals would generate a stronger experience of the
illusion and that more precise modalities are weighted more strongly and can override
less precise ones (Samad et al., 2015). The model was further addressed in the second
study by introducing two conditions: vision-only (i.e. looking at the dummy hand for 2
minutes without any other stimulation) and asynchronous-random (i.e. alternating the
strokes between the dummy and the real hand but at unpredictable time intervals). We
also took a measure of proprioceptive imprecision, that is the variation within the reports
of the ignition position of the real hand without any previous stimulation. The vision-
only condition provided information about the strength of visual input in this group;
the asynchronous-random condition provided information about their susceptibility to
tactile-temporal predictions, and the measure of proprioceptive imprecision provided
information about the strength of the incoming proprioceptive signal.
Results showed the following: a) there were no dierences between groups in drift
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in the vision-only condition indicating that visual input is not more precise in the S/L
group; 2) there were no dierences in the asynchronous-random condition between
groups but results in the asynchronous condition re-conrmed that S/L are more sus-
ceptible to the illusion in this condition suggesting that the S/L group relies more on
tactile-temporal predictions; 3) there were no dierences in proprioceptive imprecision
between groups but the magnitude of the imprecision of the proprioceptive signal pos-
itively correlated with the magnitude of the drift in the asynchronous and vision-only
conditions only in the S/L group indicating that they do not have higher propriocept-
ive imprecision but they are more susceptible to proprioceptive imprecision that the
other two groups. The results obtained in the EI paradigm suggested that S/L responders
identify more with the other’s face in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions
re-conrming that asynchrony is perceived as synchrony in this group and, considering
previous results obtained in the RHI, it can be assumed that this is due to the perfect
tactile-temporal correlation. Importantly, the EI does not have a proprioceptive com-
ponent so greater susceptibility to proprioceptive imprecision cannot be applied to the
interpretations of these results which are more likely due to tactile-temporal rhythmicity
and meeting strong tactile expectations (i.e. receiving the stroke when it is expected).
Both EI and RHI explore bodily-ownership by exploiting similar mechanisms of multis-
ensory integration recruiting parietal brain regions such as the intraparietal sulcus (IPS)
and the temporo-parietal junction, and the premotor cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris
et al., 2006; Apps et al., 2013), the main dierence residing in the necessity to recall and
co-represent facial features when performing the EI, a process recruiting regions such
as inferior occipital gyrus (Nagy et al., 2012). Thus, the ndings obtained with the RHI
by employing the various conditions, could be extrapolated to the EI. However, this
should be tested in an EI study using all these conditions and checking if the results are
comparable in the synchronous and visual-only conditions in the general population.
Altogether, these results suggest that the S/L group employs stronger tactile-temporal
priors and rely more on sensory predictions. By generalising to their vicarious trait,
it can be assumed that S/L responders have very strong expectations about when and
where to experience the physical pain that they observe, thus its immediate and localised
characteristics.
Interestingly, proprioceptive drift varies across conditions in the sensory-localised
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responders. They report comparable drift in synchronous, asynchronous, vision, and
light conditions greater than in the feel-touch, see-touch, or asynchronous random con-
ditions. It would be interesting to further explore all these results which may be inter-
preted within the Bayesian framework considering the strength of priors and violation of
the predictions. Thus, the probability of experiencing the illusion depends on the input
signals updating the priors. In the rst four conditions, predictions are not violated, and
a common cause can be attributed to the experience. In the synchronous condition, touch
on both the rubber and dummy hand are felt simultaneously in perfect agreement; in the
asynchronous condition, there is a high correlation between touch on the real hand and
touch on the dummy hand and the expectation of when and where the touch should be
received is met; in the light condition, a tingling and thermal warm sensation is expec-
ted and reported by most of the S/L responders; in the visual-only condition, there is no
sensory input to violate the expectation that the dummy hand is the real hand. In the last
conditions, the expectations are violated or not clearly constructed. In the see-only con-
dition, the expected feeling of touch when touch is seen is never met; in the touch-only
condition, the expectation of seeing the touch that is felt on the real hand is never met;
nally, in the asynchronous -random condition, no tactile-temporal expectations can be
clearly formulated and the touch delivery always has an element of surprise. Overall, it
can be concluded that S/L responders rely more on tactile-temporal priors and that their
phenomenological experience depends on the probability that these predictions are met
(i.e. that their top-down signals are not updated by contradictory bottom-up inputs).
By analogy, the multitude of mirror-pain sensations reported in phantom limbs of am-
putees (Goller et al., 2013) could be attributed to the fact that, without actual bottom-up
input from the real limb, it is easier to involuntary simulate pain in the phantom limb
(N.B. they are not congenitally amputees and they have previously experienced the sen-
sation). This pattern of results together with possible directions to be followed to test
this hypothesis will be discussed in Section 6.3.
In Article III, shared self-other representation mainly associated with empathic traits
were further investigated in vicarious pain responders. This study used subjective meas-
ures, namely a series of questionnaires assessing emotional and cognitive empathic abil-
ities and a self-other association task investigated the saliency of the self. The results
indicated that both groups of vicarious pain responders scored higher on socially elicited
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emotional states (i.e. emotional contagion and reactivity and attitudes towards helping
others) but there were no dierences in measures of cognitive empathy, personal dis-
tress or self-other associations. Between subject analyses and factorial analyses were
run to 1) assess dierences between groups and 2) explore which empathic traits were
highly correlated. The ndings showed that vicarious pain responses correspond to a
wider trait of general emotional contagion and are not conned exclusively to pain con-
tagion, but there was no evidence supporting the idea that they may have higher levels
of empathic understanding and neither personal distress. The empathic traits which
were highly correlated and loaded on the same factors indicated that helping attitudes
are linked to a helpful rather than avoidant behaviour and that the levels of personal
distress are not stimulated by strong emotional responses as previously stated by Bloom
(2017) (N.B. only general trait attitudes were recorded in this study and not immediate
responses to painful stimulation). Interestingly, personal distress was mainly correlated
with cognitive skills rather than emotional reactivity suggesting that, despite high emo-
tional reactivity, cognitive empathic abilities such as perspective taking can moderate the
aective responses. Thus, the absence of distress despite increased levels of emotional
reactivity in vicarious pain responders may be mediated by their typical social-cognitive
skills and better emotion regulation (Bird and Viding, 2014).
Article IV was a follow-up of the third study and further addressed emotional pro-
cesses in vicarious pain responders by recording physiological changes and interoceptive
abilities. This study tested if vicarious pain responders’ capacity of enhanced emotional
contagion without evidence of personal distress was due to habituation to pain which
sometimes is noticed in response to frequent exposure to pain (Bingel et al., 2007) or to
the fact that they developed a response mechanism towards occurrence of pain, namely
emotional regulation. It also investigated if the increased aective state when witnessing
pain corresponded to enhanced physiological reactivity. The study recorded measures
of anxiety (both state and trait), emotional regulation (i.e. heart rate variability (HRV)),
physiological arousal (i.e. blood pressure and skin conductance response) and detection
of internal heart signals (i.e. interoceptive accuracy and awareness). The main ndings
reconrmed previous results, namely that the groups did not dier in neither state nor
trait anxiety measures and that their physiological arousal as recorded by blood pressure
and skin conductance response was not signicantly higher than in non-responders. Re-
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garding emotion regulation processes, there was a signicantly higher HRV in the S/L
group whilst observing pain videos suggesting that this process may represent a coping
mechanism in this group, maintaining typical homeostatic and emotional levels of dis-
tress but, interestingly, it was not higher in the A/G group. Regarding heartbeat percep-
tion processes, the A/G group showed lower levels of interoceptive accuracy indicating
that they are worse at perceiving their cardiac signals. Overall, these results indicated
that individual dierences in vicarious pain are linked to dierences in cardiac intero-
ceptive and autonomic mechanisms. Moreover, these ndings distinguish between the
two groups of vicarious pain responders and indicate a selective involvement of dierent
mechanisms relevant to vicarious experience. The fact that S/L responders have higher
HRV than non-responders is very likely related to better emotional regulation in this
group, however, it is still not clear if they developed this coping mechanisms due to
constant indirect experience of pain or if this is a congenital trait. Importantly, emotion
regulation seems to be linked to life experiences and follows stages of development with
the recruitment of a set of prefrontal brain regions involved in executive function that
mature in time (Martin and Ochsner, 2016). Interestingly, the A/G group did not dis-
play increased HRV but they still report typical levels of anxiety and personal distress
and they did display poorer interoceptive accuracy which has been previously linked to
depersonalisation traits (more pronounced in A/G; Bowling et al. (2019)) and anxious
traits (Domschke et al., 2010), but they also reported higher interoceptive sensibility as
recorded by MAIA (Bowling et al., 2019). Why interoceptive accuracy is lower in this
group and why A/G responders do not show higher distress is still unclear and these
questions will be addressed in the following section.
6.2 Methodological limitations and future directions
This section will address the methodological limitations encountered in each study as
well as suggestions about how to tackle them and future directions based on current
ndings. Lastly, it will address some general limitations encountered across all studies.
In Articles I and II, the task used, namely the RHI, was robust and previously em-
ployed in numerous other studies (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005; Rohde et al., 2011; Makin et al., 2008). A main limitation of Article II was represen-
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ted by the sample size which was considerably smaller than in Article I due to diculties
in recruiting participants. The sample of S/L responders was comparable to the one in
article I (about twenty responders), but the number of non-responders was smaller (27
compared to 57 in Article I) whilst the number of A/G responders was limited to twelve.
Taking into account medium eect sizes of 0.5 (Field, 2013) and previous research, the
initial aim was to recruit at least twenty participants in each group, a target that was
achieved for S/L responders and non-responders but not for A/G responders. Import-
antly, after collapsing proprioceptive drift results from the rst and second study for
synchronous and asynchronous conditions, the initial results were preserved (see Ap-
pendix B.3).
Another limitation of Articles I and II is posed by the possibility that the results could
be confounded by other concealed trait dierences between the groups such as hypnot-
isability. A study run on a large sample screened for both vicarious pain experiences and
suggestibility traits showed that hypnotisability predicted total pain responses as well as
vicarious pain intensity and that the two groups of vicarious pain responders have higher
hypnotisability scores (Lush et al., 2019). This is important in the context of RHI studies
because previous research indicated that responses to the illusion are inuenced by sens-
ory suggestibility (Marotta et al., 2016). The idea that vicarious pain experiences may be
linked to imaginative suggestion has been previously vehiculated by De Vignemont and
Jacob (2012). The authors suggest that feeling another’s pain is intrinsically related to
mental imagery and distinguish between empathetic pain as feeling sorry for someone
which is in pain and contagious pain as imagining being in pain. According to the au-
thors, vicariously feeling the pain of somebody else consists in choosing to re-enact that
pain in a simulation-like fashion. However, it is debatable if it is a deliberate act or not
since it is hard to establish if it is purely involuntary (an involuntary reex) or if the
will of the individual is thoroughly manifested in it. They dene it as sub-intentional in
the sense that it is not an involuntary reex, but it can occur without conscious aware-
ness of the intention. As such, vicarious responders would have the ability to generate
pain-like experiences to meet their expectations of the state, but they would experience
it as non-intentional. This is in line with what Ward and Banissy (2015) state as dier-
ence between imagined-sensory experience and mirror-sensory experience represented
by the lack of sense of self-causation. Future research should address this gap and fully
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investigate the link between vicarious pain experiences and imaginative suggestion and
to elucidate if vicarious pain experiences are strictly linked to sensory suggestibility (i.e.
prior sensory expectancies) or a more general suggestible or imaginary trait. Previous
research has indicated that imagery recruits SI activation and that it modulates changes
in connectivity between SI and PFC (Ostwald et al., 2012). Future studies should check
for possible underlying trait confounds and test the hypothesis that S/L responders rely
more on tactile-temporal priors and that their phenomenological experience depends on
the probability that these predictions are met (i.e. that their top-down signals are not
updated by contradictory bottom-up inputs). This could be achieved by measuring the
amplitude signal of somatosensory cortical encoding of Bayesian surprise (Ostwald et al.,
2012) possibly in a trial-by-trial RHI paradigm or by delivering electrical tactile stimuli
when and where expected or not expected. It would be interesting to also explore the
performance and somatosensory cortical responses of S/L responders when the sensorial
quality of the stimuli is altered and the touch is delivered either in a congruent condition
(soft or rough fabrics are used to touch both the rubber hand and the real hand) or an
incongruent ’surprise’ condition (dierent fabrics are used for the rubber hand and real
hand respectively).
There is no conclusive information on proprioceptive or somatosensory ability in
vicarious pain responders. The measure of proprioceptive imprecision employed in this
thesis indicated no signicant dierences in their proprioceptive ability. More evidence
has been obtained in regards to their somatosensory sensibility, but it comes mainly
from neuroimaging studies indicating greater activity in the somatosensory cortices (e.g.
(Derbyshire et al., 2013; Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a)). Until now, only one behavioural
study assessed their ability to detect tactile signals indicating that observing pain equally
facilitates the detection of tactile stimuli, both in vicarious pain responders and controls
(Vandenbroucke et al., 2014). Tasks assessing tactile/somatosensory sensitivity in vicari-
ous pain responders such as the tactile evaluation kit surface (Darian-Smith and Oke,
1980) and their proprioceptive ability including threshold to detection of passive mo-
tion, joint position reproduction, or active movement extent discrimination (Han et al.,
2016) could be employed in future research to test for possible dierences and their link
with performances on bodily ownership paradigms.
In Article III, a variety of questionnaires and a self-other saliency task (Sui et al.,
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2012) were used. A total of 125 participants were tested and the initial aim was to re-
cruit at least 30 participants in each group for a medium eect size of 0.5. We recruited
68 non-responders, 37 S/L responders and 21 A/G responders, this group being the least
represented in the general population (fewer than 10%) and the hardest to recruit due
to reluctance to take part in studies. Signicant dierences were found in emotional
contagion and reactivity between both groups of vicarious responders when compared
to non-responders. The other measures did not reach signicance and all these results
were discussed and interpreted in Article III. Non-signicant results obtained with PT
measures were the most intriguing since they PT abilities have been previously asso-
ciated with vicarious pain responses (Derbyshire et al., 2013). Whilst Derbyshire et al.
(2013) used an avatar PT task, here the PT subscale of the IRI questionnaire (Davis, 1983)
was used. Interestingly, vicarious pain responders did not show increased PT abilities
when the director task was previously used (Grice-Jackson, 2018). PT tasks rely mainly
on cognitive visual and spatial abilities of the participants in controlled environments
whilst self-report measures on their social-understanding and relatedness to others (e.g.
’I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision’). Further
studies are needed to fully understand PT abilities in vicarious pain responders which
should include both visual and spatial tasks and subjective reports on a large enough
sample, but the focus should be on their spatial perspective and location abilities (e.g.
avatar task and possibly RHI task with hands rotated at various degrees) possibly linked
to neuronal particularities in the rTPJ (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017b), a region associated
with spatial location (Serino et al., 2013). The signicant results obtained with emotional
contagion should be further investigated with more objective measures of emotion re-
cognition and imitation tasks. Considering embodied mimicry and simulation theories
stating that emotional understanding is mediated by mirror simulating mechanisms (De-
cety and Grèzes, 2006; Gallese, 2003; Niedenthal et al., 2005), we would expect vicarious
pain responders to have enhanced embodied mimicry and to perform better on emo-
tion recognition tasks (e.g. ERT, CANTAB, Cambridge Cognition Ltd., 2017) and/or on
emotional motor imitation task (Braadbaart et al., 2014) as recorded by reaction times or
motor evoked potentials (MEPs) (Schutter et al., 2008).
In Article IV, the main limitations were represented by the lack of a control task
for interoceptive testing and the dichotomy of the videos used in the physiological task
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(i.e. injections versus falls). The interoceptive accuracy task has been widely criticised
(Zamariola et al., 2018; Ring et al., 2015; Desmedt et al., 2018). In future research, this
may be overcome by introducing control conditions checking for participants’ prior be-
liefs about their heart rate and/or for participants’ tendency to count seconds instead of
heartbeats which would lead to a better performance of the participants with a heart-
beat closer to 60 bpm. Regarding the nature of the videos used in the main task together
with physiological recordings, a specic trend was noticed: injection videos elicited an
arousal eect in all groups whilst falls videos did not dier from control videos (there
was a trend towards higher BP and SCR in the S/L group only, but it did not reach signi-
cance). It is likely that the injection videos elicited sensations such as disgust or fear in
non-responders, thus their enhanced arousal response. In future studies, a wider variety
of pain-eliciting videos should be used (such as burns, cuts etc.) and more videos of each
pain category should be employed for increased study power. Moreover, it will also help
distinguish better between the two categories of responders since there is preliminary
evidence that A/G responders may have a predisposition to Blood-Injury-Injection (BII)
phobia thus their descriptive reports of pain after watching the injection videos. Extra
data that has been collected (not published yet) indicated that they score signicantly
higher on BII questionnaire (Wani et al., 2014) than the other two groups. Thus, future
studies should further address the dierences between the two groups of vicarious pain
responders, with emphasis on the A/G responder group.
There were some general limitations common to all studies. Firstly, the recruitment
of participants was dicult due to availability of vicarious pain responders. The VPQ
was used for screening most of the students in the School of Psychology who were will-
ing to complete the questionnaire for credits. As such, the samples used in these studies
were limited to the undergraduate population of the University of Sussex, most of them
being young women. Given the restricted number of vicarious pain responders (less
than 25% of the population for both groups), individuals classed as responders were in-
vited through emails to participate in the empirical studies. Because of their limited
availability, diculties in recruiting participants for a follow-up study were often en-
countered. Consequently, all empirical studies were conducted for a duration of at least
two academic years and invitations were sent on a regular basis. This led to the recruit-
ment of considerable larger samples than in previous published studies (e.g. (Osborn
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and Derbyshire, 2010; Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a,b; Young et al., 2017; Nazarewicz et al.,
2015; Blakemore et al., 2005), but sometimes still not reaching the desired sample size
for some of the groups (e.g. A/G group in Article 2) and vicarious pain responder groups
being outnumbered by controls.
Another limitation is represented by the fact that female participants are predom-
inant in the samples of the studies presented in this thesis. This is mainly due to the
recruitment process which screened undergraduate students from the School of Psycho-
logy, where the number of female students is considerably larger than male students.
There is some evidence showing that females have increased pain sensitivity than males
(for a review, see Bartley and Fillingim (2013) and this may be reected in the fact that
more females report vicarious pain-like responses. However, given the fact that the pool
sample was composed mainly from women and that there are no signicant gender dif-
ferences between the groups of responders and non-responders, there is no sucient
evidence to conclude that vicarious pain responses are inuenced by gender. Regarding
the impact that this fact might have had on the experimental results, whilst there is some
evidence showing that the RHI is inuenced by individual dierences in traits such as
suggestibility (Marotta et al., 2016; Lush et al., 2019) , kinaesthetic or temporal sensitivity
(Costantini et al., 2016) or even empathic traits (Asai et al., 2011), there is no evidence in-
dicating the inuence of gender on the RHI. As such, the results obtained in the studies
using bodily ownership paradigms are extremely unlikely to be linked to gender dif-
ferences, especially if we consider that the analyses of comparison were run between
groups that were matched for gender and age. Concerning interoceptive measures of
accuracy, there is some evidence indicating that females are less ecient in consciously
detecting heartbeats, but more in-tune with their bodily sensations (Grabauskaite˙ et al.,
2017). However, when using interoceptive and physiological tasks, the analyses were
mainly looking at group comparisons between responders and non-responders which
had comparable numbers of males and females as indicated by Chi-square tests. Fur-
thermore, interoceptive accuracy did not show signicant eect of gender (t(68) = -0.918,
p=0.362) and, when controlling for gender as a confounder, the results obtained with the
interoceptive accuracy task stayed the same (F(2,66) = 4.760, p=0.013, η2=0.124) suggest-
ing that the results obtained are not inuenced by gender.
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6.3 Contributions to the eld and present theories
The rst major contribution of this thesis was the renement of the VPQ. Test-retest
reliability analyses were conducted as part of Article I and indicated that the two-step
cluster analysis provided more reliable results if intensity was used as an input vari-
able instead of total-pain responses. The use of the intensity variable in the two-step
cluster analysis together with the increased number of participants added to the data
base rendered the measure more conservative. Other measures have been used in the
past to assess vicarious experiences, but they lacked detailed questioning on the quality
of the pain experienced and the classication of the participants was arbitrary (Osborn
and Derbyshire, 2010; Giummarra et al., 2015). Grice-Jackson et al. (2017b) developed an
online screening questionnaire which relies on immediate reports of vicarious pain and
not just past experiences (compared to Giummarra et al. (2015)) and uses a rigorous clas-
sication based on input variables. The classication has become even more conservat-
ive following the use of intensity as an input variable and the expansion of the database.
As a consequence, the percentages of vicarious pain responders have dropped from 19%
to 13% in the case of S/L group and from 12% to 10% in the case of A/G group (the rst
percentages were reported by Grice-Jackson et al. (2017b), the second percentages were
obtained following the last cluster analysis conducted on the most recent database).
A second important contribution to the eld was brought by identifying dierences
in self-other bodily representations in vicarious pain responders and the fact that the
atypical susceptibility to bodily ownership paradigms is displayed only by the S/L group.
Previous models have suggested that vicarious sensory perception was related to ex-
panded bodily boundaries and self-other bodily confusion (Derbyshire et al., 2013; Dav-
ies and White, 2013; Maister et al., 2013). However, these dierences were not clearly
dened in vicarious pain responders and the explanation was conned to a general tend-
ency to identify more with the other. Our results indicated that this is not just a general
tendency but that it is strictly related to tactile experiences and bodily priors. Thus, the
increased malleability of bodily ownership in S/L responders occurs only when the ex-
pectations about tactile predictions are met. This thesis used for the rst time baseline
proprioceptive imprecision measures and an asynchronous-random condition and con-
rmed all testable predictions of the Bayesian Sensory Inference Theory (Samad et al.,
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2015) indicating that: a) comparable drift is reported in both synchronous and visual con-
ditions; b) a high tactile-temporal correlation is responsible for the drift observed in the
asynchronous condition and c) proprioceptive imprecision is directly correlated to drift
amplitude in the visual and asynchronous conditions. Overall, this theory completes pre-
vious RHI theories which stated that the susceptibility to the illusion was an interplay of
top-down bodily phenomenological expectations and bottom-up incoming multisensory
signals (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). The Bayesian Sensory Inference theory takes this
statement further and seeks to explain the dynamics of this interplay between top-down
predictive signals and bottom-up corrective signals. Article II conrmed the predictions
of this theory and applied them to the atypical results obtained in the S/L group. Surely,
more neurophysiological evidence needs to be collected and the results should be rep-
licated with other paradigms (e.g. EI and entire body-ownership paradigms).
A third important contribution of this thesis consisted in partially unravelling asso-
ciations between empathetic and aective processes in vicarious pain responders. Previ-
ous research has linked vicarious sensory abilities to empathy (Banissy and Ward, 2007;
Jackson et al., 2006; Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a), but, at the same time, theories of em-
pathy have repeatedly dened it as a non-unitary construct comprising at least three
dimensions: aective (i.e. emotional contagion - a precursor), cognitive (i.e. ToM and
PT), and compassion (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012; Bird and Viding, 2014). Indeed, Ban-
issy and Ward (2007) only found signicantly higher scores on the emotional reactivity
subscale of the Empathy Quotient and not the other two subscales namely social skills
and cognitive empathy. Our ndings conrmed that vicarious pain responders have
higher emotional contagion and regulation but typical cognitive skills and personal dis-
tress. These results tted well within current theories of empathy (Bird and Viding,
2014) indicating that the various dimensions are dissociable and, most importantly, that
personal distress can be counteracted by cognitive abilities. Moreover, our ndings did
not support the claiming that emotional contagion inicts personal distress and hinders
helping attitudes (Bloom, 2017). However, these results do not dismiss Bloom’s model,
instead they suggest that it should be cautiously considered within the various dimen-
sions that aect empathic behaviours. Interestingly, both groups have higher emotional
contagion and reactivity, but only the S/L group displays better emotional regulation. It
may be that the A/G group benets from a dierent mechanism of emotional control or
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that the cognitive awareness constantly distinguishing between self and other may be
sucient to control distress. Of course, these hypotheses need to be further tested.
Finally, this thesis further distinguished between S/L and A/G responders on dimen-
sions of bodily ownership, interoception and emotion regulation. Previous research in-
dicated structural and functional dierences in SI between the two groups of vicarious
responders (Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a). The research conducted as part of this thesis
further dierentiated between the two groups demonstrating that better emotional reg-
ulation and atypical bodily susceptibility to bodily ownership paradigms such as RHI
and EI are only present in the S/L group. Furthermore, the A/G group has lower intero-
ceptive accuracy when compared to controls which may be due to dierences in insular
activity (Craig, 2002; Critchley et al., 2004; Grice-Jackson et al., 2017a). There are also
similarities between the groups, mainly on empathy measures: both groups score higher
on emotional contagion and reactivity, but, whilst the S/L group has been characterised
by various behavioural, physiological, and neuronal traits, the A/G group prole remains
more enigmatic. It has been shown that they have higher emotional reactivity, typical
levels of personal distress but not higher emotional regulation and lower interoceptive
awareness. All these manifestations may be underlined by neuronal particularities such
as increased activity in the aective pain matrix including the anterior insula. Moreover,
they do not dier on bodily ownership paradigms and tend to report higher levels of BII.
Further research is needed to investigate the prole of the A/G group which seems to be
more heterogenous in its characteristics.
6.4 General Conclusions
This thesis has brought signicant contributions to the eld of vicarious pain experi-
ences and has further investigated bodily and aective shared self-other representations
in two distinct groups of vicarious pain responders. It has broadened our understanding
of bodily ownership and emotional processes as well as various aspects of empathy in
vicarious pain responders. This research is of theoretical interest in deepening our know-
ledge on the phenomenon of vicarious pain and its link to broader bodily phenotypes as
well as aective processing. It has also paved the way for future research directions and
debates regarding the importance of bodily and cognitive distinction between self and
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other, the nature of coping mechanisms in response to pain, and inter-individual dier-
ences in embodied pain processes. This thesis may also inform future methodological
practices and may have implications for improving our understanding of embodiment
in vicarious pain.
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AppendixA: SupplementaryMaterials forArt-
icle I
A.1 VPQ group dierences comparing TPRs with
intensity
Table A.1: Number of subjects in each group for test and post-test generated with TPR or Intens-
ity as cluster analysis variables.
Group Time 1 Time 2 Entire Sample
TPR Intensity TPR Intensity TPR Intensity
Controls 49 49 51 55 730 773
S/L 21 21 18 17 191 158
A/G 12 12 13 10 135 125
Overall, 2 subjects changed group at time 1 when comparing TPR with Intensity rep-
resenting 2.44% of the sample (N=82) and 4 subjects changed group at time 2 representing
4.88%.
At the entire sample level (N=1056), 48 subjects changed group, representing 4.5%.
A.2 Baseline comparisons and non-parametric tests
Further one sample t-tests were conducted for a comparison to a baseline of ‘0’ for all
groups and all conditions. Signicant results were obtained in controls for synchronous
condition, t(53) = 4.632, p<0.001; in S/L for synchronous, t(20)=4.112, p=0.001, asyn-
chronous t(20) = 4.295, p<0.001 and light t(20) = 2.528, p=0.02; in A/G for synchronous
t(18) = 5.18, p<0.001.
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Table A.2: Means and standard deviations for light subjective ratings according to the presence
of light induced sensation.
Light Subscale Sensations present Sensations Absent
Ownership 3.7 ± 1.42 2.31 ± 1.27
Location 4.00 ± 1.46 2.20 ± 1.21
Agency 3.23 ± 1.46 1.71 ± 0.94
Independent Sample t-tests showed that there was a signicant dierence in sub-
jective ratings of illusion strength in the light condition between those who did report
light-induced sensations and those who did not. Higher subjective ratings were found
for light ownership t(39) = 3.229, p<0.05; light location t(39)=4.162, p<0.001; light agency
t(39)=3.780, p<0.001. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test conrmed these results.
A.3 Percentages of people experiencing the illusion
in each group
Table A.3: Percentages of subjects experiencing the illusion in each group, namely participants
who reported a positive proprioceptive drift.
Group Synchronous Asynchronous Light See-touch Feel-touch
Controls 72 53 54 39 40
Sensory-localised 86 82 77 59 36
Aective-general 89 26 42 58 53
Table A.4: Percentages of subjects experiencing the illusion for each subscale of each condition,
namely participants whose score was higher than 4.
Syn Asyn Light See Feel
Own Loc Age Own Loc Age Own Loc Age Own Loc Age Own Loc Age
C 53 44 35 16 19 16 23 18 19 16 18 14 19 16 14
S/L 73 77 59 32 27 32 50 45 32 27 32 23 27 27 27
A/G 68 68 37 11 21 0 32 37 16 21 26 11 16 21 5
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Table A.5: Percentages of subjects who scored higher than 4 for at least one of the subscales.
Group Synchronous Asynchronous Light See-touch Feel-touch
Controls 60 25 32 25 25
Sensory-localised 86 45 64 41 36
Aective-general 74 21 47 42 21
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AppendixB: SupplementaryMaterials forArt-
icle II
B.1 RHI and EI questionnaire items
Table B.1: RHI Questionnaire. Items and Subscales.
Subscale Items
Ownership
It seemed like. . .
1. . . . I was looking directly at my own hand, rather than
at a rubber hand.
2. . . . the rubber hand began to resemble my real hand.
3. . . . the rubber hand belonged to me.
4. . . . the rubber hand was my hand.
5. . . . the rubber hand was part of my body.
Location
6. . . .my hand was in the location where the rubber hand was.
7. . . . the rubber hand was in the location where my hand was.
8. . . . the sensation I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching
(or laser pointer playing on) the rubber hand.
Agency 9. . . . I could have moved the rubber hand if I had wanted.
10. . . . I was in control of the rubber hand.
B.2 RHI entire sample analyses
B.2.1 Proprioceptive drift results
Dierences between conditions were compared in the entire sample in a repeated meas-
ures ANOVA; sphericity was assumed, and Bonferroni adjustments were applied. There
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Table B.2: EI Questionnaire. Items and Subscales.
Subscale Items
Ownership
It seemed like. . .
1. I felt the touch delivered in the other’s face.
2. The touch I felt was caused by the cotton bud touching the other’s face.
3. The other’s face was my face.
4. The other’s face was part of my body.
5. The other’s face belonged to me.
Appearance
6. I was looking at my own reection in a mirror rather than at the other’s face.
7. The other’s face began to resemble my own face in terms of shape.
8. The other’s face began to resemble my own face in terms of skin tone.
9. The other’s face began to resemble my own face in terms of facial features.
Agency
10. The other’s face would have moved if I had moved.
11. I was in control of the other’s face.
12. My own face was out of my control.
Disownership 13. I couldn’t really remember how my face was.
14. The experience of my own face was less vivid than normal.
were signicant dierences between conditions F(3,123) = 6.043, p=0.001. Pairwise com-
parisons indicated that drift in the synchronous condition was signicantly higher than
drift in the asynchronous-random condition, p=0.002, but not than the visual-only, p=1.000,
and asynchronous, p=0.182, conditions. Drift in the vision-only condition was higher
than in the asynchronous-random, p=0.026, but not than in the asynchronous condition,
p=0.921.
Figure B.1: The drift in each of the four conditions obtained on the entire sample.
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B.2.2 Questionnaire results
Ownership
Non-parametric Friedman test indicated that there were signicant dierences between
conditions, χ2 = 56.705, p < 0.001. Post-hoc Wilcoxon tests indicate that feelings
of ownership were greater in the synchronous condition than in all other conditions:
asynchronous, Z=-6.412, p<0.001; visual, Z= -5.892, p<0.001; asynchronous-random, Z=-
5.739, p<0.001. Feelings of ownership in the visual condition were greater than in the
asynchronous condition, Z=-2.199, p=0.028 but not than in the asynchronous random
condition, Z=-1.125, p=0.261. Ratings in the asynchronous random and asynchronous
were comparable: Z= -0.942, p=-0.346.
Location
Non-parametric Friedman test indicated that there were signicant dierences between
conditions, χ2 = 50.466, p < 0.001. Post-hoc Wilcoxon tests indicate that perceived loc-
ation was greater in the synchronous condition than in all other conditions: asynchron-
ous, Z=-5.862, p<0.001; visual, Z= -5.781, p<0.001; asynchronous-random, Z=-5.387, p<0.001.
Perceived location in the visual condition did not dier from the asynchronous condi-
tion, Z=-0.615, p=0.539 nor asynchronous-random condition, Z=-775, p=0.439. Location
ratings in the asynchronous random and asynchronous were comparable: Z= -0.364,
p=0.716.
Agency
Non-parametric Friedman test indicated that there were signicant dierences between
conditions, χ2 = 88.101, p < 0.001. Post-hoc Wilcoxon tests indicate that feelings
of agency were greater in the synchronous condition than in all other conditions: asyn-
chronous, Z=-5.311, p<0.001; visual, Z= -6.587, p<0.001; asynchronous-random, Z=-4.700,
p<0.001. Feelings of agency in the visual condition were greater than in the asyn-
chronous condition, Z=-4.197, p<0.001 and asynchronous-random condition, Z=-4.858,
p<0.001. Ratings in the asynchronous random and asynchronous were comparable: Z=
-0.779, p=0.436.
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N.B. The entire sample analyses are confounded by the fact that the proportion of
vicarious pain responders, mainly S/L responders, was much higher than in a randomly
selected sample, 54% compared to 27%.
B.2.3 Correlation analyses between drift and subjective ratings
Table B.3: Correlation results between drift in each condition and questionnaire subscales.
Syn Asyn Vis Asyn
Rand
Own Loc Age Own Loc Age Own Loc Age Own Loc Age
Syn
Drift
r=0.084
p=0.529
r=0.147
p=0.270
r=0.141
p=0.239
Asyn
Drift
r=0.306
p=0.020
r=0.336
p=0.010
r=0.326
p=0.012
Vis
Drift
r= 0.269
p= 0.043
r=0.209
p=0.111
r=0.370
p=0.005
Asyn
Rand
Drift
r=0.224
p=0.139
r=0.107
p=0.484
r=-0.118
p=0.439
As Table B.3 shows, correlations between proprioceptive drift and questionnaire res-
ults were obtained only for the asynchronous and vision-only conditions.
B.2.4 Dierences in proprioceptive imprecision depending on
the preceding condition
Figure B.2: Dierences in proprioceptive imprecision based on the preceding condition.
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There were no signicant dierences between conditions (F(3.369,171.805) = 0.327,
p= 0.828, η22=0.006) and accounting for group interaction did not inuence these results
(F(6.760,165.613) = 0.561, p= 0.781, η2=0.022). Furthermore, the conditions did not pre-
dict the magnitude of proprioceptive imprecision, not even when accounting for group
interaction. The regression model using conditions as predictors only accounted for 0.6%
of the variation and it was not signicant (F (1,206) = 0.008, p=0.930).
B.3 Collapsing results for drift in the synchronous
and asynchronous conditions
Figure B.3: The results collapsed across the two studies using RHI in vicarious pain responders.
The nal sample size was: controls, N= 84; S/L, N= 41; A/G, N= 31.
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C.1 Non-parametric tests results.
Kruskal-Wallis H test for measures that were not normally distributed re-conrmed the
parametric test results regarding dierences between groups: EQ-C (χ2 = 5.061, p =
0.080), IRI-EC (χ2 = 4.698, p = 0.095), ICIAI family (χ2 = 0.710, p = 0.701) and
colleagues ( χ2 = 1.284, p = 0.526).
C.2 Eect sizes
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Figure C.1: Eect sizes for EC, EQ subscales, IRI subscales and HAS for S/L and A/G when com-
pared to controls. Medium eect sizes (Cohen’s d>0.5) were observed on EC and
EQ-ER for both S/L and A/G and on IRI-PT and IRI-F only for A/G. All the other
eect sizes were small.
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D.1 Non-parametric tests results
Interoceptive Accuracy: There were signicant group dierences: (H(2) = 14.729, p =
0.001), A/G < C (U = -3.737, p<0.001) and A/G<S/L (U = -3.006, p=0.002). Task HR: There
was main eect of condition (χ2(2) = 94.645, p < 0.001). There were no group dif-
ferences for neither of the conditions: control videos (H(2) = 0.549, p = 0.760); accident
videos (H(2) = 0.179, p = 0.914); injection videos (H(2) = 0.626, p = 0.731). Task SCR:
There was main eect of condition (χ2(2) = 23.495, p < 0.001). There were no group
dierences for neither of the conditions: control videos (H(2) = 0.483, p = 0.786); accident
videos (H(2) = 0.328, p = 0.849); injection videos (H(2) = 0.132, p = 0.936).
